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

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# OD SAVREMENE UMETNOSTI DO POTROŠNOG TELA I NAZAD

Jovita Pristovšek



Mitja Perinčič & Jovita Pristovšek, *U susret slomljenoj ruci*, 2010–2012, digitalni kolaž, inkdžet štampa na samolepljivom tekstilu, 100x80, vlasništvo autora

Mitja Perinčič & Jovita Pristovšek, *In Advance of the Broken Arm*, 2010–2012, digital collage, inkjet print on self-adhesive textile, 100x80, ownership of authors

Izhodište sledećeg teksta je rad *U susret slomljenoj ruci*, nazvan po istoimenom redi-mejdu Marsela Dišana (1915), i odnosi se na njegovu litografiju pod nazivom *Četiri redi-mejda* (1964).

Počnimo sa pitanjima: „Šta ovo mnoštvo slika potrošnih tela na polju umetnosti (kao i u javnosti) znači? I na koji način je moguće govoriti o spoju umetnosti i onih figura koje se obično uzimaju samo kao predmet unutar umetničke produkcije (bez preispitivanja samog mesta sastanka; otuda mesto sastanka onoga što se zove umetnička produkcija, koja pripada životnim figurama sa stilom, i prikaz figura golog života)?” Pored ova dva pitanja postoji još jedan problem koji nastaje istovremeno, tj. pitanje konstitutivnog reza koji odvaja umetnost kao domen slobode (apstrakcija, mašta, neuslovljenost i sl.) od rada kao domena nužnosti (konkretnost, efikasnost, običnost i sl.), jaz koji je premošćen postavljanjem umetnosti i rada u sferu u kojoj se ne mogu razlikovati (Višmit 2010b). Da bi se iznova artikulisao odnos između savremene umetnosti i potrošnog tela kroz pitanje komercijalizacije društvenih odnosa i tela, potrebno je slediti barem dve linije: liniju dematerijalizacije rada i umetnosti i njihovog spajanja (Višmit) (gde ne bi trebalo, u zaključku, izostaviti preispitivanje oca konceptualne i savremene umetnosti – Dišana), i liniju „nekropolitickog intenziviranja biopolitike” (Gržinić

2009b), koja reartikuliše radikalnu biopolitičku deregulaciju života i njegovu potrošnost u svetlu Mbembovog koncepta nekropolitike.

Analiza sadašnjeg sazvežđa umetnosti u odnosu na rad, dakle statusa umetnosti u vreme kada su fleksibilna i performativna subjektivnost, kao i sile stvaranja u svojoj eksperimentalnoj slobodi, postale alfa i omega savremenog finansijskog kapitalizma, može se pratiti u skladu sa delom korpusa tekstova Marine Višmit, u kome ona proučava proces spajanja umetnosti i rada (pod uslovima finansijalizovane akumulacije[1]), dakle, kroz robni oblik umetnosti i robni oblik radne snage, kako bi se objasnio njihov društveni karakter apstraktnog rada.[2] Istražujući razloge za različitosti između umetnosti i rada kao dva kategorički i međusobno isključujuća oblika društvene proizvodnje i debatu o konstitutivnoj vezi (i razdvajanju) između mentalnog i ručnog rada[3], Višmit posmatra šta se događa kada se već spomenuta veza (između mentalnog i ručnog rada) prenese na odnos umetnosti i rada (Višmit 2010a). Specifičnost umetničkog dela – kako ona zaključuje – zasniva se na dva osnovna faktora; prvi se odnosi na umetničku produkciju kao proces koji nije organizovan po zakonu vrednosti, prema kome vrednost robe određuje radno vreme uloženo u nju (ovde se poziva na Džon Roberta), i koji kao proizvodni proces

nije plaćeni rad (Višmit 2010a), predstavljajući dakle zanatski rad, jer stvaralac kontroliše sve faze proizvodnje; dok se drugi faktor odnosi na umetnost kao apsolutnu robu[4], odnosno umetnost čija je upotreba vrednost u potpunosti ukinuta upravo u korist njene tržišne vrednosti i zbog nje.

Višmit daje argumente za nestabilnu suspenziju između autonomije i heteronomije, koja je svojstvena umetnosti, kroz suprotnosti između umetnosti kao područja slobode, i rada kao nužnosti, i posmatra njihovu bliskost sa aspekta njihovog društvenog karaktera apstraktnog rada – tačnije kroz reviziju Adornovog mapiranja ove kontradikcije kao nejednake topologije autonomije i heteronomije: prvo se shvata kao umetnički kvaliteti izgrađeni prema sopstvenim zakonima, a drugo kao društvena uslovljenost izvan tih zakona (Višmit 2010b). Ova podela je – prema njenim rečima – upravo podela koja garantuje kompenzacijsku ulogu i posebno mesto (u sferi koju pokreću imperativ za opstanak i kapitalistička akumulacija) i prikazuje je (umetnost) kao konstitutivnu anomaliju koja podržava zakon vrednosti (ibid.). Višmit stoga određuje umetnički rad kao iskustvo u posebnoj sferi ljudskog delovanja koje se zove umetnost, pod uslovom da se umetnost može shvatiti kao određena vrsta robe (ali ne kao roba radne snage) (ibid.). Ovaj posebni status robe, karakterističan za umetnička dela kao neponovljiva, održava umetnička dela izvan okvira oblika vrednosti[5], te im omogućava da prevaziđu svoj status robnog fetiša time što postaju donekle preuveličani fetiš[6] ili, inače, apsolutna roba (ibid.). Možda gorenavedeno važi i za umetnički rad.

Međutim, Višmit reartikuliše ove uslove autonomije umetničkog dela (koje zavisi od heteronomije produktivnog rada, ali je u isto vreme i odbija) kao umetnički režim produkcijskih uslova autonomije (ibid.), jer umetnost – kako ona tvrdi – deluje odstupanjem od zakona vrednosti, kada govorimo o načinu proizvodnje, što nije slučaj kada govorimo o socijalizaciji umetnosti[7] (i apsorpciji društvenih odnosa u robni oblik koji danas prevladava). Kao što ona pokazuje, širenje kategorije umetnosti (u uvek novim domenima društvene delatnosti) – širenje koje ukazuje na krizu u proizvodnim odnosima, održavajući umetnost i rad kao odvojene, kao i uopšte odnos između kapitala i rada (ibid.) – paralelno je sa širenjem oblika vrednosti (uvek novih područja društvenih odnosa) (Višmit 2010a).

Zakon vrednosti se dakle urušava ako radno vreme više nije stub proizvodnje i ako „rad i nerad razvijaju istu produktivnost, na osnovu treniranja generičkih ljudskih sposobnosti: govora, pamćenja, društvenosti, etičke i estetske sklonosti, [kao i] na sposobnostima apstraktivnog razmišljanja i učenja” (Virno 2003:89). Prema mišljenju Paola Virna, nekad postojeća razlika između rada i nerada rešava samu sebe razlikovanjem plaćenog i neplaćenog života; a granica između njih je promenljiva, samovoljna i predmet je političke odluke (ibid.: 90). „Baš u vreme kada znanje i govor postaju glavna proizvodna snaga, paradoksalno, dolazi do neobuzdanog umnožavanja modela organizacije rada i njihove koegzistencije” (ibid.: 92). Višmit definiše ovo neobuzdano umnožavanje i koegzistenciju modela organizacije rada kroz spekulaciju kao način proizvodnje, uobičajeni za umetnost, ali i za trenutnu fazu kapitalizma, i koji je istovremeno „zaslužan” za promenu statusa umetničkog dela kao apsolutne robe (Višmit 2010a). Unutar tog okvira, umetnost i rad se pokazuju u fatalnoj sferi nerazlikovanja, sferi koju Višmit upoređuje sa Marksovom kategorijom apstraktnog rada: „bliskost između umetnosti koja se smatra za apstraktni rad i apstraktnog rada koji se posmatra kao ljudski kapital je ilustrovana gubitkom mere kod oba, neodređenošću i širenjem umetnosti i neodređenošću i širenjem rada” (Višmit 2010b).

Prebacivanjem svog spoljašnjeg referenta u kapital (tj. upotrebne vrednosti u tržišnu vrednost), rad je stvorio samopreferentnost, karakterističnu za društvenu logiku spekulacije. Činjenica da je „kolaps rada koji proizvodi vrednost značio kolaps rada kao društvenog

i političkog identiteta i zastupljenost tih identiteta” (Višmit 2010b), kao što je navedeno od strane Paola Virna kroz Fukoov koncept biopolitike[8], i kao što je definisano u vezi sa radnom snagom: u ovom trenutku, kada se život nalazi u središtu biopolitike, u trenutku kada je ulog u igri (koja je više od igre) nematerijalna i ne-pristupa radna snaga, sam život zamenjuje generički proizvodni kapacitet (Virno 2003: 68). Kada zajedničko učešće (generičkih) kognitivih i jezičkih ili komunikacionih sposobnosti, kao konstitutivni element postfordističkog radnog procesa, omogućuje fleksibilnost kapitala i inovacija, dok u isto vreme podriva klasičnu podelu rada i podstiče ličnu zavisnost (ibid.: 26), život postaje ulog finansijske investicije i potencijalni profit. Ili, kao što kaže eksplicitnije na jednom drugom mestu: reč je o uključivanju same antropogeneze u trenutni režim proizvodnje (ibid.: 48).

Ali, čak i da je – u definicijama preovladavajućeg modela postfordističke proizvodnje – moguće otkriti tamnu stranu, ona se reflektuje i u kategorijama fleksibilnog, virtuoznog i kreativnog rada (mobilnost i migracije radnika, prilagodljivost na neprihvatljive uslove rada, kao i spremnost na odustajanje od, već stečenih, radničkih prava i sl.); sam proces uključivanja antropogeneze u savremeni kapitalistički način proizvodnje, razvijen od strane Virna, tera nas da ga promislamo u svetlu širenja uvek novih nijansi eksploatacije, eksploatacije i socijalne smrti, a samim tim u svetlu (državnih, biopolitičkih) „tipova racionalnosti” (Fuko 2003: 175), koji ne samo što daju prednost sferi korporacije (što se grubo može nazvati „privatizacijom”), već se – kako tvrdi Marina Gržinić – sve više i više udaljavaju od horizonta proizvodnje samog života (Gržinić 2009b).

Ovu radikalizaciju biopolitičkih procesa u kontekstu globalnog kapitalizma, M. Gržinić objašnjava kao „nekropolitiko” intenziviranje biopolitike, kojim je ponovo politizovan koncept Fukoovog koncepta biopolitike u odnosu na koncept nekropolitike Ahila Mbembea, u isto vreme praveći razliku između njih rečima: „Ako je biomoć, prema Fukoovom mišljenju, upotreba moći da se 'da život i pusti da umre', onda je nekromoć upotreba moći da se 'pusti da živi i ubije'” (Gržinić 2009b). Ona ukazuje na ključnu razliku između dva: ako je kod prvog glavni projekat još uvek u proizvodnji života, onda je kod drugog reč o njegovom potpunom napuštanju. Prema konceptu nekropolitike, Ahil Mbembe određuje savremene oblike potčinjavanja života moći smrti (Mbembe 2003: 39–40.), uzimajući u obzir manje apstraktne a više taktičke kategorije poput života i smrti (ibid.: 14), kao i, od presudnog značaja, odnos između politike i smrti u onim sistemima koji mogu da rade samo u vanrednom stanju (ibid.: 16). U slučaju Afrike, Mbembe tumači (savremenu) politiku kao „posao” smrti (ibid.: 16), pozivajući se na Fukoov pojam suverenosti i njegov odnos prema ratu i biomoći, dok u isto vreme pokazuje pojam biopolitike kao nedovoljan za objašnjenje „novih i jedinstvenih oblika društvenog života u kojem je veliki deo populacije podvrgnut uslovima života koji mu daju status živih mrtvaca” (ibid.: 40). Ukratko, njegova briga su „one figure suvereniteta čiji centralni projekat nije borba za autonomiju, već generalizovana instrumentalizacija ljudskog postojanja i materijalno uništavanje ljudskih tela i populacija” (ibid.: 14).

Razlog za ove promene, kao što je M. Gržinić obrazložila sa osvrtom na Santjaga Lopes Petita, jeste promena u funkcionisanju globalnog kapitalizma, što je promena u samoj vezi između kapitala i vlasti: ako je u 1970-im kapital postojao u organskom jedinstvu sa vlašću, onda je njihov odnos danas zastupljen u obliku suvlasništva (Gržinić 2009b). Funkcionisanje savremenog globalnog kapitalizma je poput funkcionisanja ponavljajućeg, reverzibilnog, konfliktnog događaja; događaja koji se tumači kao „neobuzdanost” kapitala, najjasnije reflektovana, prema autorovom mišljenju, u savremenoj logici kapitalističke proizvodnje, usmerenoj samo ka dobiti kapitala, a ne u korist poboljšanja društvenih uslova i uslova života. Ova „neobuzdanost” kapitala, kako M. Gržinić objašnjava sa osvrtom na Marinu Garses, ne znači da je kapital

ograničen u okvirima ekonomskog sistema i njegove proizvodnje, već da obuhvata sve sfere života, stoga se takođe podudara sa samom stvarnošću.[9] Ona naglašava da to nije slučaj u kome kapital prevazilazi svoje granice (postavljene izvan kapitala), već to znači da je kapital više od kapitala, te da kapital koji je više od kapitala jeste moć (Lopes Petit u Gržinić 2009b). Ono što Petit zove suvlasništvom kapitala/moći, kako tvrdi M. Gržinić, odvija se kroz tri osnovna medijuma: kroz inovacije (novih informacionih i komunikacionih tehnologija, biotehnologija, farmaceutske industrije i nauke), putem javnog prostora (gde smo svedoci njegove privatizacije i depolitizacije), kao i kroz rat (kao mehanizam za regulaciju života kroz zaradu na smrti) (Gržinić 2009b). Ukratko, preko Petita i pozivajući se na Mbembea, M. Gržinić objašnjava manifestaciju novog oblika odnosa između kapitala i vlasti, pod nazivom „privatna indirektna vladavina”, zaradom na smrti – ovde i sada (Gržinić 2009a).

Ova uspešna adaptacija države globalizaciji jasno je vidljiva „u pojačanim merama koje se sprovode od strane nacionalnih država u pogledu privatizacije svih javnih sektora, od obrazovanja do zdravlja i kulture, ali i na način na koji se tretiraju klasna podela i rasizam u našoj kapitalističkoj sadašnjici. Pojačan rasizam, ako mislimo samo na zakonodavnu politiku EU, predstavlja klasne procese i institucionalnu racionalizaciju koji su podržani od strane novih, konstanto nadograđivanih, neokolonijalnih struktura” (Gržinić 2009b).

Pomenuto se implicitno može otkriti i u analizi Angele Mitropoulos, u kojoj se ona bavi pitanjem ljudskih prava i demokratije u odnosu na pravne/zakonske okvire; u toj analizi ona pokazuje da osnovna ljudska prava uopšte ne postoje, a čak i ako ih ima, onda je njihovo kršenje inkorporisano u pravnim okvirima već na samom početku (Mitropoulos 2009). Ona takođe pokazuje da je zapis u genealogiji nacionalne države i pravnog/zakonskog okvira (kao i sigurnost njegovog poretka) pravni oblik vrednosti (dakle, u ekstremnim slučajevima to znači i donošenje odluka o tome šta će biti legalni rad, ili, drugim rečima, razlika između plaćenog rada i ropstva), zakonsko regulisanje odnosa (između ostalog i odlučivanje o tome šta će biti ovlašćeno umnožavanje), a na poslednjem, ali ne i najmanje bitnom mestu, pravna forma identiteta koja omogućava dokaz o identitetu (ibid.). „Ono što prolazi kao zakonski tender je konvencija za obračun dugova – i davanje legitimiteta nasilju tamo gde konvencija posrne” (ibid.), koja će, između ostalih stvari, takođe odlučiti o tome ko i/ili šta će biti uključen u pravni okvir (kao legalni i ilegalni) i ko i/ili šta će biti isključen iz njega (van zakona). Mitropoulos tvrdi da je to radi davanja „autentičnosti” rasi, radu, polu itd. unutar zajedničkog pravnog okvira, gde je njihova produktivnost rada u odnosu na nacionalnu državu (ponovo) definisana kao „nepredvidivo životno okruženje” (Wendell Holmes u Mitropoulos 2009), beskrajni niz vanrednih stanja i donošenje propisa koji su presedani u pravnom okviru.[10]

Inače, samu radnu snagu A. Mitropoulos ne smatra sinonimom za goli život; ona kaže da se tu više radi o tome „da običajno pravo pokušava da sudi onome što je samo pribegavanje genealogiji [...] Teorija radnog prava je, na svoj način, metod beleženja genealogije eksploatacije i naknade – doslovno, praćenje linije pravde i zaduženja, suđenja po ne-tako-sigurnoj pretpostavci da znamo kome i čemu dugujemo naše postojanje” (ibid.). I ako bi dug, danas, proizveo višak vrednosti[11], ili drugim rečima „preveo vlasništvo u poslušnost sa svom efikasnošću pravne retorike” – i tako, begunac postao onaj „ko je odbio obećanje da će pružiti svoj rad” (Stiven M. Best u Mitropoulos 2009), onda nije neobično da A. Mitropoulos smisljeno ukazuje na čitanje postfordizma kao ažurirane verzije ropstva: „Ne samo da je rad jednog roba neizmeran, on se navodno nalazi izvan vremena i u obostrano sentimentalnim vezama između gospodara i roba, ali je ipak shvaćen kao neograničena obaveza na rad. Ropstvo, umesto plaćenog rada, jeste zagonetka (i telos) u srcu teorije radne vrednosti – ili, bolje rečeno: označava izvlačenje viška bez tačno određenog limita, kroz rasnu



i polnu distribuciju zarade i njene prapratne arhitekture domaćinstva i naroda" (Mitropoulos 2009).

Zar među ovim rečima ne odjekuju sve one tragične priče radnika migranata (pogotovo radnika iz bivše Jugoslavije i građevinske industrije), koje je slovenačka država izneverila, dok postoje brojni izveštaji, a među njima i aktivnosti nadzora inspekcije rada Republike Slovenije u 2008, o njihovom sprovođenju radnog zakonodavstva, kao i propisa o bezbednosti i zdravlju na radu; a poslodavci koji zapošljavaju strane radnike, ili im omogućavaju da rade, imaju, barem od 2006, povećani broj povreda (čak i fatalnih ishoda i deportacija radnika bez njihove zarađene plate)? [12] Ipak, u 2010-oj, mi, građani Slovenije, (kada bi priča privukla pažnju medija) gledali smo TV i bez komentara posmatrali šta se događa sa mnoštvom ekonomskog i pravnog/političkog viška ljudskih života (Mignolo 2009: 69–88), Na taj način, i mi smo postali potrošni. Trenutno se nalazimo u kohabitaciji građana sa punim pravima i onih kojima su ta prava uskraćena. [13]

Hajde da napravimo drastični zaokret natrag na vezu između potrošnog tela i umetnosti! Ako umetničko stvaralaštvo redefiniše šta je radna snaga (Gržinić 2009c), onda je potrebno ispitati i gest svojstven Dišanovom redi-mejdu. Prema mišljenju M. Višmit, ovo preplitanje stvaralačke subjektivnosti i robe postoji u osnovi „kontroverznog nasleđa” konceptualne umetnosti, u pokušajima povlačenja sa umetničkog tržišta kroz odbacivanje objekta; pokušaji koji se danas odražavaju ili kao znak ekonomskog pomaka prema uslugama, pa čak i kao povod ili odraz širenja tržišnih odnosa (Višmit 2010c: 248). Protivrečnost umetnosti, kao što je već rečeno, potiče iz njene beskorisnosti; što više umetnost pokušava da pobegne od forme fetiša, više postaje komercijalizovana. To je ono o čemu je govorio i sam Dišan kada je priznao svoj propali pokušaj napuštanja umetnosti, upravo na osnovu činjenice da su njegovi redi-mejd objekti bili tretirani kao umetnički (Dišan u Robertsu 1968). Uprkos njegovom zalaganju za negaciju umetničke kompetentnosti preispitivanjem kriterijuma vrednosti koji određuju šta jeste, a šta nije umetnost, on je bio vrlo svestan predstojećeg porasta u preplitanju kreativne subjektivnosti i robe. „Umetnost je za mene umrla,” kako Dišan kaže, „sa činjenicom da bi, umesto da bude singularni entitet, postala univerzalni, ljudski faktor u životu svih ljudi; svako bi bio umetnik, ali pogrešno prepoznat kao umetnik” (Dišan u Badiou).

Andrea Frejžer takođe precizno artikuliše posledice njegovog neuspeha: „Institucionalizacija Dišana je negacija umetničke kompetentnosti, redi-mejd pretvara tu negaciju u vrhunsku afirmaciju svemoći umetničkog pogleda i njegove neograničene uključujuće moći. To je otvorilo put za umetničku konceptualizaciju i komercijalizaciju svega” (Frejžer 2005: 104., citirano i u Višmit 2010b).

Kako smo svi manje ili više upoznati s neograničenom klasifikacionom moći kapitala, predlažem još jedan, malo drugačiji pristup. Dišanova operacija razdvajanja (unutrašnji razlaz između serijski proizvedenog i otkrivenog) stvorila je dela *bez* (Vajcman 2007: 72): točak *bez* pneumatike, lopatu za sneg *bez* snega, stakal za flaše *bez* boce; ali svi ti objekti su – istovremeno – takođe *bez* figure-radnika, čija je „ruka” zamenjena mašinom u serijskoj proizvodnji predmeta, dok se danas ova ruka pokazuje kao odbačena upravo iz nematerijalnog rada. Parafrazirajući Vajcmanovu izjavu o Dišanovom redi-mejdu, možda bismo čak mogli reći da, ako je gest redi-mejda infuzija praznine u objekat (ibid.: 70), onda se susretom figure radnika sa Dišanovim redi-mejdom radnik/radnica paradoksalno pokazuje sam/sama kao gotovo savršena figura u toj praznini. Nije li radnik/radnica (kao i prikaz njega/nje u umetnosti) tačno (ne)subjekat, koji je, pored upotrebne vrednosti (njegov/njen rad više nema proizvodnu vrednost) takođe izgubio deviznu vrednost (u smislu da je on/ona izgubio/izgubila poziciju subjekta kao društvenog i političkog identiteta upravo zbog samog kolapsa rada kao društvenog i političkog identiteta)? Međutim, radi

se o stalnoj petlji između umetničkog stvaralaštva i rada. Baš kao što umetničko stvaralaštvo redefiniše šta je rad, na isti način (obezvređeni) rad opet redefiniše umetničko stvaralaštvo kao i umetnički pogled, a time i uslove za uvođenje kritičkih strategija (među ostalim, takođe onih koje se odnose na postupke konceptualne prakse) u području savremene umetnosti. Međutim, problem koji savremena (kritička) umetnost treba najverovatnije da reši jeste, kao što tvrdi M. Gržinić, ideološki obrazac (tj. performativno ponavljanje); oblik artikulacije „nenormalnog” i „monstruoznog” društvene stvarnosti koja pojačava tu monstruoznost i abnormalnost kroz pražnjenje njenih sadržaja i značenja, jer „ono što ideologija danas pogrešno tumači nije stvarnost, već ona sama” (Gržinić 2009b).

Sa engleskog na srpski preveo Miloš Dimitrijević

#### FUSNOTE

[1] Termin finansijalizacija, prema mišljenju Džona Belamija Fostera, ukazuje na dugoročnu promenu u samom centru kapitalističke ekonomije, dakle pomak od proizvodnje ka finansijama, gde sama akumulacija – stvaranje realnog kapitala u oblasti roba i usluga – postaje podređena finansijama. Belami Foster u svom pozivanju na Karla Marksa tvrdi da je tendencija kapitala, skrivena u svojoj opštoj formuli M-C-M (novac-roba-novac) – na osnovu koje Marks analizira prirodu i poreklo viška vrednosti – da se transformiše u čisto monetarnu ili spekulativnu ekonomiju, drugim rečima u M-M (novac-novac) – gde novac „stvara” novac bez posredne veze sa robnom proizvodnjom, a u isto vreme upozorava da to nije kruta podela između monetarne i stvarne proizvodnje, već (pozivajući se na Hari Magdofa i Pol M. Svizija) podela između niže proizvodnje osnovne ekonomije i finansijske konstrukcije (koja se – u vreme krize – održava upravo na načelu da je „prevelika da padne” (Foster 2010).

[2] Pojmom apstraktnog rada Maks definiše kolekciju apsolutno neistaknutog ljudskog rada uloženog u robu. „Ekvivalentnost toto coelo različitih oblika rada može postojati samo u apstrakciji njihove stvarne nejednakosti, u svedenosti na zajedničke karakteristike koje oni poseduju kao potrošnja ljudske radne snage, kao apstraktni ljudski rad” (Marks 1980: 13).

[3] Osnova diskursa je čitanje Marine Višmit knjige Alfred Sohn-Rethela pod naslovom *Intelektualni i ručni rad: kritika epistemologije*.

[4] O apsolutnoj robi, odnosno robi utvrđenoj kao samostalno postojanje razmenske vrednosti ili individualna inkarnacija društvenog rada, Marks govori u kontekstu novca kao sredstva plaćanja i njegovih protivrečnih funkcija – novac ili funkcioniše u obliku ideje kao obračunski novac ili kao mera vrednosti (dakle novac kao medijum ili kao sredstvo prometa u razmeni roba-novac-roba) ili kao samostalno postojanje razmenske vrednosti; kao apsolutna roba (dakle, novac koji više ne posreduje proces, na primer, u razmeni roba-novac, gde se roba ne prodaje kako bi se kupila roba, već kako bi se robna forma zamenila monetarnom formom) (Marks 1980: 79–88).

[5] „Oblik vrednosti, kao što je opisao Marks, društveni je karakter razmenske vrednosti robe koja se može uporediti putem opšteg standarda količine apstraktnog rada sadržanog u njoj. Opšti vrednosni oblik, u kome su svi proizvodi rada prikazani kao puke zamrznute količine nediferenciranog ljudskog rada, pokazuje, po svojoj strukturi, da je društveni izraz sveta robe. Na ovaj način se jasno stavlja do znanja da u ovom svetu opšti ljudski karakter rada oblikuje svoj specifični društveni karakter (Kapital Vol. 1. str. 160)” (Marina Višmit 2010b).

[6] Robni fetišizam, prema Marksovom mišljenju, označava društvene odnose (osoba) prerusene u društvene odnose između stvari ili proizvoda rada (Marks 1980: 36–39).

[7] Pojmom socijalizacije umetnosti M. Višmit definiše širenje veza između institucije umetnosti ili proširenje na mestima gde se umetnost događa (Višmit 2010b).

[8] Fuko definiše biopolitiku kao državnu praksu još od 18. veka pa nadalje i njene metode u pokušaju da racionalizuje probleme, kao i pojave, karakteristične za populaciju (kao što su plodnost, higijena, zdravlje, rasa itd.) paralelno sa pitanjem liberalizma kao pitanjem „previše vlasti”. Kao što on kaže, to su vrste racionalnosti „sprovedene u postupcima u kojima se ljudsko ponašanje, ili njihovi životi, usmeravaju od strane državne uprave” (Fuko 2003: 175).

[9] Videti takođe Marinu Gržinić, „From Biopolitics to Necropolitics and the Institution of Contemporary Art” (Od biopolitike do nekropolitike i institucije savremene umetnosti): Pavilion #14 Biopolitics, Necropolitics and De-Coloniality,” (Biopolitika, nekropolitika i dekolonijalnost), [http://www.pavilionmagazine.org/pavilion\\_14.pdf](http://www.pavilionmagazine.org/pavilion_14.pdf), april 2012. Depolitizacija, ili drugim rečima, politička neutralizacija javne sfere je, kao što je tvrdila

i S.L. Petit, paralelni proces razvoja neoliberalnog globalnog kapitalizma i pokazuje se kao direktna posledica podudarnosti kapitalizma i stvarnosti (Santjago Lopez Petit, „Public Space or Spaces of Anonymity” (Javni prostor ili prostori anonimnosti): <http://www.barcelonametropolis.cat/en/page.asp?id=23&ui=416>, april 2012), te nije neobično da ona – u tom kontekstu – dočarava ovu političku neutralizaciju javnog prostora frazom „gubitak slobodnog protoka reči” (ibid.), koja rezonuje sa Virnovim „generalnim ili zajedničkim intelektom” (sposobnost mišljenja sama po sebi), kao pomoćnom osom postfordističke proizvodnje viška vrednosti (Virno 2003: 52).

[10] Privatno vlasništvo je, kako je tvrdila A. Mitropoulos, takođe zajednički imenilac pola i rase sa istorijskog gledišta, dakle, ženâ kao ljubomorno privatizovanih predmeta požude, i ženâ kao privatnog vlasništva muškaraca (Mitropoulos 2009); kao i robova kao ličnih radnih alata, i robova kao privatnog vlasništva gospodara (Mbembe 2003: 21), rečima „jednostavno, ne postoji način na koji se može misliti o seksualnoj ekonomiji bez razgovora, takođe, o rasnoj organizaciji, iako veza nije toliko metonimična ili homologna koliko su obe ključne u genealogiji, legitimnom prenosu vlasništva putem imena” (Mitropoulos 2009). Na kraju, ali ne i najmanje važno, kao što ona objašnjava pozivajući se na Somervilovu, uvođenje „interrasnog braka [je] postignuto njegovom punom heteroseksualizacijom” (ibid.).

[11] Za raspravu o dugu kao savremenoj osnovi za društvenu reprodukciju, pogledati Marinu Višmit, „Human Capital and Poisonous Property : after the wage” (Ljudski kapital i otrovne nekretnine: nakon plate), Deo 1: [http://www.reartikulacija.org/?p=1487&langswitch\\_lang=si](http://www.reartikulacija.org/?p=1487&langswitch_lang=si) Deo 2: <http://www.reartikulacija.org/?p=1492>, april 2012.

[12] Videti Gorana Lukića (ZSSS, 22,7 2010.), „Migrant Workers in the Vice of Politics” (Radnici migranti u grehu politike): <http://zasolidarnost.blogspot.com/2010/07/delavci-migranti-v-primezu-politike.html>, jul 2012.

[13] Ovde mogu biti klasifikovani homoseksualni građani, koji su ostali bez definisanih prava na koje imaju pravo kao i svi drugi građani, iako su bili spremni da se odreknu svog prava na usvajanje dece, nakon što je propao referendum za nacrt novog slovenskog porodičnog zakona. (Radi objašnjenja unutrašnje podele samog državljanstva, na primeru Izraela i Palestine, videti Ariella Azoulay, *The Civil Contract of Photography* (Građanski ugovor fotografije), New York, 2008.)

Videti literaturu, str. 6.

## FROM CONTEMPORARY ART TO DISPENSABLE BODY AND BACK

### Jovita Pristovšek

The outset of the following text is the work *In Advance of the Broken Arm*, entitled after the homonymous ready-made of Marcel Duchamp (1915) and referring to his lithograph entitled *Four Readymades* (1964).

Let's begin with a question: What does this multitude of images of dispensable bodies in the field of art (as well as in the public) mean? And in what way is it possible to speak about the junction of the art and those figures that are usually taken only as a subject matter within art production (without questioning



the very place of the meeting; hence the place of the meeting of what is called art production, belonging to the figures of life with style, and the depiction of the figures of bare life)? Beside these two questions there is another issue arising simultaneously, i.e. the question of constitutive incision, dividing art as a domain of freedom (abstraction, imagination, un-conditionality etc.) from labour as a domain of necessity (concreteness, effectiveness, ordinariness etc.), the gap that has been bridged by placing art and labour in the sphere of indifferability. (Vishmidt, 2010b). To rearticulate the relation between contemporary art and dispensable body through the question of commodification of social relations and bodies it is necessary to follow at least two lines: in the direction of the process of dematerialization of labour and art and their merging (Vishmidt) (where we should not, at the conclusion, leave out the questioning of the father of conceptual and contemporary art Duchamp) and in the line of "necropolitical intensification of biopolitics" (Gržinić 2009b) that rearticulates the radical biopolitical deregulation of life and its dispensability in the light of Mbembe's concept of necropolitics.

The analysis of the present constellation of art in relation to labour, hence the status of art in the time when flexible and performative subjectivity as well as the forces of creation in their experimental freedom have become alpha and omega of the contemporary financial capitalism can be followed in line with a part of the corpus of the texts of Marina Vishmidt, where she studies the process of merging of art and labour (under the conditions of financialized accumulation[1]), therefore through commodity form of art and commodity form of labour force, to explain their social character of abstract labour[2]. When researching grounds for distinction between art and labour as two categorically and mutually excludable forms of social production and a debate about a constitutive bond (and separation) between mental and manual labour[3] Vishmidt observes what happens when the formerly mentioned bond (between the mental and manual labour) is re-located into the relation of art and labour (Vishmidt 2010a). The peculiarity of an artwork – as she derives it – is based on two fundamental factors; the first refers to art production as a process that is not organized by the law of value, according to which the value of commodity is determined by the work time invested in it (and here referring to John Roberts), that as a production process it is not waged labour (Vishmidt 2010a), thus representing artisanal labour, as the producer controls all phases of production; whereas the other factor refers to art as an absolute commodity[4], i.e. the art which use value has been completely abolished exactly due to and in favour of its exchange value.

Vishmidt argues the instable suspension between autonomy and heteronomy, that is inherent to art, through the contradiction between art as a domain of freedom, and labour as a necessity, and observes their proximity from the aspect of their social character of abstract labour – more precisely through revision of Adorno's mapping of this (contradiction) as uneven topology of autonomy and heteronomy: the first one understood as artistic qualities constructed according to its own laws, and the latter as social conditionality outside these laws (Vishmidt 2010b). This division is – according to her wording – exactly the division, guarantying a compensatory role and a particular place (in the sphere propelled by the imperatives of survival and capitalist accumulation) and showing it (art) as a constitutive anomaly, supporting the law of value (Ibid.). Vishmidt therefore determines art labour as an experience of a separate sphere of human activity called art, provided art can be understood as a particular type of commodity (not resembling the commodity of labour force) (Ibid.). This particular status of a commodity, immanent to an artwork as unrepeatable, keeps an artwork outside the frame of the form of value[5], thus enabling it to transcend its own status of a commodity fetish[6] by becoming a somewhat exaggerated fetish or oth-

erwise an absolute commodity (Ibid.). Perhaps the above applies also to artistic labour.

However, Vishmidt rearticulates these conditions of autonomy of an artwork (that depend on heteronomy of productive labour, but at the same time rejecting it) as artistic mode of production conditions of autonomy (Ibid.), as art – as she claims – operates by the withdrawal from the law of value, when we talk about mode of production, but which is not true when we talk about socialization of art[7] (and absorption of social relations into a commodity form, nowadays prevailing). As she shows, the expansion of the category of art (into ever new domains of social activities); the expansion indicating the crisis in production relations, keeping art and labour separated, as well as more generally in the relation between capital and labour (Ibid.), parallels the expansion of the value form (of ever new arenas of social relations) (Vishmidt 2010a).

The law of value is therefore collapsing if the work time is no longer a pillar of production and if "Work and non-work develop the same productivity, based on practicing of generic human abilities: speech, memory, sociability, ethical and aesthetical inclinations, [as well as] on the ability to abstract and learn" (Virno 2003, p. 89). According to Paolo Virno the once-existing differentiation between work and non-work resolves itself in the distinction of paid and unpaid life; and their border behaves as a changeable, self-willed and subject to political decision (Ibid: 90). "At the exact time when the knowledge and speech become the major production forces, paradoxically, comes to an unbridled multiplication of models of organization of labour and their coexistence" (Ibid., p. 92). Vishmidt defines this unbridled multiplication and coexistence of models of labour organization through speculation as a mode of production, common to art as well as to the current phase of capitalism, and at the same time "creditable" for the modification of the status of the artwork as an absolute commodity (Vishmidt 2010a). Within this frame art and labour show themselves in the fatal sphere of indifferability, the sphere that Vishmidt compares with Marx's category of abstract labour: "the proximity between art thought as abstract labour and abstract labour thought as human capital is exemplified by the loss of measure in both, by the indeterminacy and expansion of art and the indeterminacy and expansion of work" (Vishmidt 2010b).

By passing its outer referent over to capital (i.e. the use value to the exchange value), labour generated self-preferentiality, immanent to the social logic of speculation. The fact that "The collapse of value-producing work has meant the collapse of work as a social and political identity, and the representability of those identities" (Vishmidt 2010b), as indicated also by Paolo Virno through Foucault's concept of biopolitics[8], as defined in relation to labour force: at the moment, when life locates itself in the centre of biopolitics, at the moment when the stake in the game (which is more than a game) is immaterial and un-present labour force per se, the life itself replaces generic production capacity (Virno 2003, p. 68). When co-participation (of generic) cognitive and linguistic or communicational abilities, who as a constitutive element of postfordist working process, enables capital flexibility and innovation whilst at the same time undermines the classic division of labour and incites personal dependency (Ibid., p. 26), the life becomes a stake of financial investment and potential profit. Or as he puts it more explicitly at some other place: it is about inclusion of the anthropogenesis itself into the current mode of production (Ibid., p. 48).

But even though it is – in the definitions of the prevailing model of postfordist production – possible to detect a dark side, it reflects itself also in the categories of the flexible, virtuosic and creative labour (mobility and migration of workers, adaptability to unacceptable working conditions as well as willingness

to quitclaim (the already gained) workers' rights etc.), the very process of incorporation of anthropogenesis into the contemporary capitalist mode of production as developed by Virno makes us re-think it in the light of expansion of the ever new hues of exploitation, expropriation, and social deaths, hence in the light of (state, biopolitical) 'types of rationality' (Foucault 2003, p. 175) that do not only give way to the sphere of corporation (which could roughly be called 'privatization'), but who are – as argued by Marina Gržinić – stepping further and further away from the horizon of production of the life itself (Gržinić 2009b).

This radicalization of biopolitical processes within the context of global capitalism Gržinić elaborates as "necropolitical" intensification of biopolitics, by which she re-politicizes the concept of Foucault's concept of biopolitics in relation to the concept of necropolitics of Achille Mbembe, at the same time clearly differentiating the two by saying: "If, biopower, according to Foucault, is the exercise of the power to 'make live and let die,' then necropower is the exercise of the power to 'let live and make die'" (Gržinić 2009b). She points to the crucial difference between the two: if with the first one the main project is still the production of life, then the latter is all about its complete abandonment. By the concept of necropolitics Achille Mbembe determines contemporary forms of subjugation of life to the power of death (Mbembe 2003, pp. 39-40), taking into account less abstract and more tactile categories such as life and death (Ibid., p. 14), as well as, and what is crucial, the relation between politics and death in those systems that can only operate in the state of exception (Ibid., p.16). In the case of Africa, Mbembe reads the (contemporary) politics as 'work' of death (Ibid., p. 16) on the basis of Foucault's notion of sovereignty and its relation towards war and biopower, whilst at the same time demonstrating the term of biopolitics as being insufficient for the explanation of »new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of living dead« (Ibid, p. 40). Summed up, his concern are »those figures of sovereignty whose central project is not the struggle for autonomy but the generalized instrumentalization of human existence and the material destruction of human bodies and populations« (Mbembe 2003, p.14).

The reason for these changes, as elaborated by Gržinić with the reference to Santiago López Petit, is the change in the functioning of the global capitalism, which is the change in the very relation of the capital to power: if back in the 1970s capital used to operate in an organic unity with the power, then their relationship today is represented in the form of co-propriety (Gržinić 2009b). The functioning of the contemporary global capitalism is like functioning of a repeating, reversible, and conflict event; an event that is understood as "unrestraintment" of capital, most clearly reflected, according to the author, in the contemporary logic of capitalist production, aimed only at the profit of capital and not to the benefit of the improvement of social conditions and conditions of life. This "unrestraintment" of capital, as Gržinić explains with reference to Marina Garcés, does not mean that capital is limited within the frames of economic system and its production, but that it encompasses all the spheres of life, therefore it also coincides with the reality itself. [9] She stresses that this is not the case of capital exceeding its limits (placed outside the capital), but it means that capital is more than capital, and that the capital that is more than capital, is power (Lopez Petit in Gržinić 2009b). What Petit calls co-propriety of capital/power is, as argued by Gržinić, unfolding through three fundamental media: through innovation (of new informational and communicational technologies, biotechnologies, pharmaceutical industries and science), through public space (where we witness its privatization and depolitization) as well as through war (as a mechanism for regulation of life through capitalization on death) (Gržinić 2009b). Shortly, via Petit and with reference to Mbembe, Gržinić therefore elaborates

the manifestation of a new form of relation between capital and power, called "private indirect governing," capitalizing on death – here and now (Gržinić 2009a).

This successful adaptation of the state to globalization is clearly evident "in the intensified measures that are implemented by the nation states in terms of the privatization of all public sectors, from education to health and culture, and also in the way that class division and racism are managed in our capitalistic contemporaneity. Intensified racism, if we just think about EU legislative policy, presents processes of class and institutional rationalization that are supported by new, constantly re-invented neo-colonial structures" (Gržinić 2009b).

The mentioned can be implicitly detected also in the analysis of Angela Mitropoulos, where she elaborates on the issue of human rights and democracy in relation to legal/judicial frames; in the analysis in which she demonstrates that fundamental human rights do not exist at all, and if they do, then their violation is incorporated within the legal frames at the very beginning (Mitropoulos 2009). She shows that the inscription into the genealogy of a nation state and legal/judicial frame (as well as security of its order) is a legal form of value (therefore in extreme cases decision-making also about what is going to be legal labour, or, with other words, the difference between waged labour and slavery), legal regulation of relations (among others also decision-making about what authorized reproduction is going to be), and at last but not least the legal form of identity, enabling the proof of identity (Ibid). "What passes for legal tender is a convention for the reckoning of debts – and a legitimated violence steps in where convention falters" (Ibid.), that will, amongst others things, also decide about who and/or what will be included in the legal frame (as legal and illegal) and who and/or what is going to be excluded from it (as out-of-law). Mitropoulos claims, that this is about bestowing of "authenticity" to race, labour, sex etc.) inside the common legal frame, where their re- as well as productivity in relation to a nation state is (re)defined in an "unpredictable environment of life" (Wendell Holmes in Mitropoulos 2009), hence in a ceaseless succession of states of exception and passing of precedent rules and regulations into the legal frame.[10]

Otherwise the labour force itself Mitropoulos does not consider a synonym for bare life; she says that it is more »that common law attempts to judge what is just through recourse to genealogy [...] The labour theory of right is, in its way, a way of recording the genealogies of exploitation and recompense – quite literally, tracing the lines of justice and indebtedness, of adjudicating on the not-so-confident assumption of knowing to whom and to what we owe our existence« (Ibid). And should a debt, nowadays, produce a surplus value[11], or in other words "translates ownership into obedience with all the effectiveness of legal rhetoric" – and so, the fugitive is one 'who has reneged on a promise to provide his labour'" (Stephen M. Best in Mitropoulos 2009), then it is not unusual that Mitropoulos meaningfully points to the reading of postfordism as an updated version of slavery: "Not only is the labour of the slave without measure, it is situated outside time in the supposedly mutual and sentimental bonds of master and slave, but nevertheless figured as a boundless obligation to labour. Slavery, rather than wage labour, is the riddle (and telos) at the heart of the labour theory of value – or, better put: it marks the extraction of a surplus without punctual limit, through the gendered, racialised distribution of the wage and its accompanying architectures of household and nation" (Mitropoulos 2009).

Is it not that among these words echo all those tragic stories of migrant workers (especially the workers from former Yugoslav federal states and construction industry), that Slovenian state has let down, whilst there are numerous reports, amongst them also actions of surveillance of the Labour Inspectorate of the

Republic of Slovenia in 2008, over their exercising of work legislation as well as safety and health regulations at work, with the employers who employ foreign workers or enable them to work, have, at least since 2006, been foretelling a quick increase of numerous infringements (even of fatal outcomes and deportations of workers without their earned wage)?[12] Yet in 2010, we, the citizens of Slovenia, were (when the story reached attention of the media) watching TV and speechlessly observing what was going on with a multitude of economic and legal/political dispensability of human lives (Mignolo 2009, pp. 69–88), we have, likewise, become dispensable. Right at the very moment we are found in co-habitation of citizens with full rights as well as those that are denied those rights.[13]

Let's make an almost perverse turn back to the connection of dispensable body and art. If artistic creativity redefines what labour is (Gržinić 2009c), then it is necessary to question also the gesture inherent to Duchamp's ready-made. According to Vishmidt this interlacement of creative subjectivity and commodity exists in the foundation of "controversial legacy" of conceptual art, in the attempts of withdrawal from art market through rejection of the object; in attempts, nowadays reflecting either as a sign of economic shift towards services, and even as triggering or reflection of expansion of market relations (Vishmidt 2010c, p. 248). The contradictoriness of art, as already said, originates from its uselessness; for the more art tries to shun from its fetishist form, the more it integrates itself into commodification. This is what Duchamp himself spoke about when he acknowledged his failed attempt of exiting art, exactly on the basis of the fact that his ready-made objects were treated as artistic (Duchamp in Roberts 1968). Despite his strive for negation of artistic competence by revaluation of criteria of value determining what is and what is not art, he was very much aware of the coming increase in the interlacing of creative subjectivity and commodity. "Art for me had died," as Duchamp states, "by the fact that, instead of being a singularized entity, it would be universal, a human factor in the life of people, each one would be an artist, but misrecognized as artist" (Duchamp in Badiou).

Andrea Fraser also precisely articulates the consequences of his failure: "The institutionalization of Duchamp's negation of artistic competence with the readymade transformed that negation into a supreme affirmation of the omnipotence of the artistic gaze and its limitless incorporative power. It opened the way for the artistic conceptualization– and commodification – of everything" (Fraser 2005, p. 104., quoted also in Vishmidt 2010b)

As we are all more or less familiar with the unlimited subsumable power of capital, I propose another, a slightly different way. Duchamp's operation of disjunction (an inner disjunction between serially produced, and invented) has created works *without* (Wajcman 2007, p. 72): a wheel *without* pneumatics, a snow shovel *without* snow, a bottle rack without bottles, but all these objects are – simultaneously – also *without* a figure – a worker, whose "hand" had been ousted by a machine in a serial production of objects, whilst nowadays this hand is showing as ousted exactly from the part of non-material labour. Paraphrasing Wajcman's statement about Duchamp's ready-made, perhaps we could even say that if the gesture of a ready-made is in the infusion of the void into an object (Ibid., p. 70), then with the meeting of worker figures with Duchamp's ready-made gesture, a worker, paradoxically shows himself/herself as an virtually perfect figure of this void. Isn't a worker (as well as depicting of him/her in art) exactly the (non)subject, who has, beside the use value (his/her labour is no longer value-producing) lost also the exchange value (in the sense that he/she has lost the position of a subject as a social and political identity exactly due to the very collapse of the labour as a social and political identity)? However, a recurrent loop between artistic

creativity and labour is at work. Just like artistic creativity redefines what labour is, in the same way (the de-valuated) labour recurrently redefines the artistic creativity itself as well as the artistic gaze, and with it also the conditions for the introduction of critical strategies (amongst others also of the ones referring to the procedures of conceptual practices) in the field of contemporary art. However, the problem that the contemporary (critical) art should most likely resolve is, as argued by Gržinić, the ideological form (i.e. performative repetition); the form of articulation of 'abnormal' and 'monstrous' social reality that intensifies this monstrosity and abnormality through emptying of its content and its meaning, as "what ideology misrepresents today is not the reality, but itself" (Gržinić 2009b).

Translated from Slovenian into English by Anamarija Lili No

#### FOOTNOTES

[1] The term financialization according to John Bellamy Foster indicates a long-term shift in the very centre of capitalist economy, hence the shift from production to finances, where the accumulation itself – a creation of real capital in the sphere of goods and services – becomes subordinated to finances. Bellamy Foster in his reference to Karl Marx argues that it is a tendency of capital, hidden in its general formula M-C-M (money for commodity for money) – on the basis of which Marx analyses the nature and origin of the surplus value – to be transformed into a pure monetary or speculative economy, hence into M-M (money for money) – where the money "breeds" money with no intermediary connection of commodity production, when at the same time warning that this is not a rigid division between monetary and real production, but (referring to Harry Magdoff and Paul M. Sweezy) a division between the lower production basis of the economy and the financial superstructure (that is – in the time of crises - maintained exactly at the principle that is "too big to fall" (Foster 2010).

[2] With the term of abstract labour Marx defines a collection of absolutely un-distinguished human labour invested in a commodity. »The equivalence to coelo of diverse forms of labour can exist only in abstraction from their actual inequality, in the reduction to a common character that they possess as the spending of human labour force, as an abstract human labour« (Marx 1980, p. 13).

[3] The discourse basis is Vishmidt reading Alfred Sohn-Rethl's book entitled Intellectual and Manual Labour: a Critique of Epistemology.

[4] About absolute commodity, i.e. the commodity determined as an independent existence of exchange value or individual incarnation of social labour, Marx speaks in the context of money as means of payment and its contradictory function – money either functions in a form of an idea as accounting money or as a measure of value (hence money as a medium or as a means of circulation in the exchange of commodity for money for commodity) or as independent existence of exchange value; as an absolute commodity (therefore the money that no longer mediates the process, for example in the exchange of commodity for money where the commodities are not sold in order to buy commodities, but in order to substitute the commodity form with a monetary form) (Marx 1980, pp. 79-88).

[5] »The form of value, as described by Marx, is the social character of exchange-value in commodities which can be compared via the general standard of the quantity of abstract labour "objectified" in them. "The general value-form, in which all the products of labour are presented as mere congealed quantities of undifferentiated human labour, shows by its very structure that it is the social expression of the world of commodities. In this way it is made plain that within this world the general human character of labour forms its specific social character" (p. 160, Capital Vol. 1)« (Marina Vishmidt 2010b).

[6] Commodity fetishism according to Marx denotes social relations (of persons) disguised into social relations among things or labour products (Marx 1980, p. 36-39).

[7] With the term of socialization of art Vishmidt defines the expansion of the bonds of the institution of art or the expansion of the places where art happens (Vishmidt 2010b).

[8] Foucault defines biopolitics as a governmental practise since the 18th century onwards and its methods in attempt to rationalize problems as well as phenomena characteristic to the population (such as fertility, hygiene, health, race etc.) in parallel to the issue of liberalism as the question of "govern too much". As he says these are the types of rationality »implemented in the procedures where human behaviour or their lives are directed by state administra-



tion« (Foucault 2003, p. 175).

[9] See also Marina Gržinić, "From Biopolitics to Necropolitics and the Institution of Contemporary Art": Pavilion #14 Biopolitics, Necropolitics and De-Coloniality, [http://www.pavilionmagazine.org/pavilion\\_14.pdf](http://www.pavilionmagazine.org/pavilion_14.pdf), April 2012. Depoliticization, or put differently, political neutralization of public sphere is, as argued also by Petit, a parallel process of the development of neoliberal global capitalism and is showing itself as a direct consequence of coincidence of capitalism and reality (Santiago López Petit, "Public Space or Spaces of Anonymity": <http://www.barcelonametropolis.cat/en/page.asp?id=23&ui=416>, april 2012.); it is not unusual that Petit – in this context – summons up this political neutralization of public space in a phrase "the loss of the free circulation of words" (Ibid.), resonating to Virno's "general or common intellect" (the ability to think per se), as a supporting axis of postfordist production of surplus value (Virno 2003, p.52).

[10] Private property is, as argued by Mitropoulos, from the historical point of view also a common denominator of the sex and race, therefore of women as jealously privatized objects of desire, and women as private property of men (Mitropoulos 2009) as well as slaves as private labour tools, and slaves as private property of the master (Mbembe 2003, p.21); saying »There is, very simply, no way to think of sexual economies without speaking, also, of the organisation of race, though the connection is less metonymic or homologous than that they are both crucial to the inscriptions of genealogy, the legitimate transmission of property through name« (Mitropoulos 2009). At last but not least, as she explains on the basis of Somerville, the introduction of "inter-racial marriage [was] achieved by its full heterosexualization" (Ibid).

[11] For discussion about debt as a contemporary foundation for the social reproduction, see Marina Vishmidt, "Human Capital and Poisonous Property : after the wage", Part 1: [http://www.reartikulacija.org/?p=1487&langswitch\\_lang=si](http://www.reartikulacija.org/?p=1487&langswitch_lang=si) in 2. del: <http://www.reartikulacija.org/?p=1492>, April 2012.

[12] See Goran Lukić (ZSSS, 22.7. 2010), "Migrant Workers in the Vice of Politics": <http://zasolidarnost.blogspot.com/2010/07/delavci-migranti-v-primezu-politike.html>, julij 2012.

[13] It is here that homosexual citizens who have remained without defined rights they are entitled to, like every other citizen, even though they were willing to deny their right for adoption of children, after the referendum for a draft of a new Slovenian Family Code had failed, could be classified. (On the elaboration of the inner division of citizenship itself, based on Israel and Palestine, see Ariella Azoulay, *The Civil Contract of Photography*, New York, 2008).

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# RASIZAM (Racialization) GLOBALNOG KAPITALIZMA

Marina Gržinić i Šefik Tatlić

## Uvod

U periodu od januara do jula 2011, autori ovog teksta učestvovali su u žestokoj diskusiji, povodom teksta Valtera Minjola (Walter Mignolo) *Dispensable and Bare Lives. Coloniality and the Hidden Political/Economic Agenda of Modernity*, koji je objavljen na internetu.[1] Marina Gržinić je još ranije bila uključena u diskusiju, koja na istu temu i dalje traje u Beču. Ta diskusija je ponovo pokrenuta, tj. izašla je u javnost, posle objavljivanja prevoda na nemački Minjolove knjige u Austriji.[2]

Želimo da se osvrnemo na ove zatvorene/javne debate i njihove posledice na naš teorijski i politički rad, te na saveze koji omogućavaju intervenisanje u sistemu globalnog kapitalizma.

Za početak, daćemo veoma kratak kontekst povodom ove rasprave, a to je tekst Valtera Minjola *Dispensable and Bare Lives*, koji predstavlja srž debate kroz koju se ukazao mnogo širi kontekst sukobljavanja u oblasti teorije i kritičkog mišljenja. Njegov tekst *Dispensable and Bare Lives* u našoj analizi ponovo postavlja rasnu diskriminaciju kao glavnu stavku unutar načina na koji istorija kolonijalizma i antisemitizma može biti ponovo zajedno iščitana u svim svojim različitostima. U poslednjem delu teksta, nakon što je predstavio istoriju procesa kapitalističke rasne diskriminacije koja je povezana sa kolonijalizmom, Minjolo iznosi situaciju po kojoj je danas organizovana drugačija stvarnost koja se tiče pozicije Jevreja u globalizovanom svetu. Rezultat razmišljanja o tom procesu bio je taj da je Minjolo prikazao efekte procesa rasne diskriminacije u odnosu na prirodu sekularizacije neoliberalnog globalnog kapitalizma, koja proizvodi nove oblike diskriminacije i ugnjetavanja. Rezultat ovakve analize bio je takav da je zbog bavljenja procesom rasne diskriminacije unutar neoliberalnog globalog kapitalizma u vezi sa rasizmom i antisemitizmom, Minjolo bio proglašen za nekog ko reprodukuje antisemitske klišeje, čak je skoro i sam svrstan među antisemite.

Ono što se tvrdi u Minjolovom tekstu je najsazetije formulisano pitanje: „Zašto ne bi nekakva lokalna buržoazija u Africi, bivšoj Istočnoj Evropi ili na Bliskom istoku mogla da bude odgovorna za diskriminisanje članova sopstvene zajednice?“ Naravno, ovo ne bi smelo nikada da se odnosi na etničke pripadnike određene nacije kao saučesnike u sopstvenoj segregaciji, ali zašto bi bilo nemoguće zamisliti određene klase kao saučesnike njihovim kolonijalnim gospodari-ma? Ovako opisana situacija do koje je Minjolo došao, iz pozicije čitanja koja predstavlja dekolonijalni korak u okviru teorije, ponovo iscrtava matricu rasne diskriminacije kao glavnu kolonijalnu matricu od vremena kolonizacije pa sve do danas.

Ono što postaje sve više i više očigledno, te ono što prevazilazi debatu vezanu za Minjolov tekst jeste da je, paradoksalno, Minjolov antirasizam (Minjolo je označio različite oblike rasizma kao proizvode kapitalizma, kolonijalizma i Holokausta) danas viđen kao njegova suprotnost, kao pozicija koja ponavlja antisemitske klišeje – te se stoga može reći da je Minjolo identifik-

ovan kao dekolonijalni antisemita. Figura „dekolonijalnog antisemite” koju sada iznosimo kako bismo okarakterisali napade protiv Minjola, figura je koju je identifikovao, razradio i redefinisao Santijago Slabodski (Santiago Slabodsky)[3] u nedavnim raspravama o mogućnosti da se povežu najveći zločini u ljudskoj istoriji – kolonijalizam i Holokaust. Slabodski preuzima još radikalniji korak u svojoj analizi, jer predlaže ove dve figure, to jest dve uloge koje su dodeljene različitim pozicijama u okviru geopolitičke diferencijacije globalizovanog sveta. Santijago Slabodski govori o dekolonijalnom antisemiti na jednoj strani, i imperijalnom Jevrejstvu na drugoj.[4]

Akile Mbembe (Achille Mbembe)[5] govori o sličnom slučaju, a to je postkolonijalni antisemita kao figura na koju se Mbembe referiše u kontekstu današnje Francuske. Ova kovanica je na kraju „otvorila” prostor u Prvom svetu za rasističku hegemonizaciju takozvanih drugih Drugih, posebno onih kojima se pripisuje najveći stepen antisemitizma, a koji su svi prikladno najčešće na udaru poslednjih kapitalističkih neokolonijalnih intervencija.

U tekstu povremeno prelazimo sa termina „dekolonijalan” na „postkolonijalan,” ali konstantno govorimo sa tačke koja razmatra kritiku postkolonijalizma od strane dekolonijalnih studija jer, postkolonijalne studije, danas nakon što su izvršile značajan istorijski rad u sedamdesetim i osamdesetim, predstavljaju mainstream akademski kontekst, te konsekvantno, na neki način, predstavljaju apolitični okvir u kom se odvijaju diskursi o kolonijalizmu.

U tekstu koji sledi, ne želimo da razvijamo raspravu vezanu konkretno za tekst *Dispensable and Bare Lives*, već želimo da se fokusiramo na širu situaciju. Dve figure, sa jedne strane post/dekolonijalni antisemita, a sa druge imperijalni Jevrejstvo, dovode u pitanje sve što su do sada nastojale da postignu postkolonijalne i dekolonijalne studije. Ovo je ponovo aktuelizovano u debatama koje se odvijaju trenutno u Beču, a koje su u vezi sa izdavanjem nemačkog prevoda već spomenute knjige Valtera Minjola.

Ovde je u pitanju način na koji se rasizam/rasna diskriminacija, organizovana od globalnog kapitalizma, koristi antisemitizmom. Želimo da istaknemo da danas moramo da posmatramo antisemitizam kao deo šire kapitalističke matrice rasne diskriminacije.

Dakle, neophodno je sagledati načine na koje rasno diskriminisana populacija odgovara na ulogu koja joj je „dodeljena” u procesu rasne diskriminacije unutar neoliberalnog globalnog kapitalizma. U tom smislu, u kontekstu trenutnih debata koje se vode povodom Minjolovog teksta, nema potrebe preterano naglašavati, tj. pretvarati u mantru ono što se zna i što je jasno, tj. da je: „Kroz evropsku istoriju, pre, tokom i posle jevrejske emancipacije, šteta naneta Jevrejima, da su pogromi nad Jevrejima sprovedeni i da su Jevreji (među njima i takozvani ‘sekularni Jevreji’) diskriminisani na različitim nivoima,” jer rasizam kao kapitalistička ideologija dodeljuje ove uloge, a ono što treba identifikovati je da je ova „dodela uloga” perfidna operacija, koju tako treba i nazvati, a još značajnije je razumeti da je proces rasne diskriminacije od kapitalističkog/kolonijalnog sistema predstavljen kao pozitivan proces.

Upravo i Slabodski ukazuje na taj proces. On identifikuje dve figure čije značenje se stalno razrađuje, ali koje nisu precizno definisane u današnjim debatama o globalnom kapitalizmu. Prateći nedavne debate, možemo da kažemo da smo se našli u pat poziciji kada smo pokušali da predstavimo analizu koja bi pomogla da istorijski razumemo šta se desilo sa stanjem, figurom i snagom (agency) Jevreja, pogotovo u sklopu ovakve kritičke analize. Razlog tome je to što su promene u neoliberalnom globalnom kapitalizmu, koje obuhvataju promene nacionalne države u ratnu državu u globalnom kapitalizmu, uticale da se ovako kontekstualizovan kritički pristup, ukratko rečeno, klasifikuje kao antisemitski.

Da bi se odgovorilo na to pitanje, predložimo da sagledamo poziciju Jevreja u okviru šireg konteksta istorije kapitalizma, kako bismo takođe razumeli istorijsku poziciju Jevreja. Cilj nam je da pitamo šta i na koji način se dogodilo Jevrejima u procesu diktiranom od strane kapitala, tj. unutar društvenih i političkih promena unutar kapitalizma posle 1945, ali ne gledajući na ovo pitanje striktno kao na delove navodno neutralnog procesa, nego gledajući kompletn društvenopolitički proces kao splet odnosa u kontekstu eksproprijacije, kontrole i ideologije.

U analizi diskuje koja sledi, pratićemo tri linije.

Prvo, s obzirom na to da figura dekolonijalnog antisemita blokira sve dalje analize i saveze, te uspostavlja nove hijerarhije u današnjem prostoru teorije, politike i intervencije, naš zadatak je da razumemo kako je konstruisan i gde je smešten dekolonijalni antisemita.

Drugo, razvićemo sistematizaciju procesa globalnog kapitalizma – rečima Adorna, pokušaćemo da pratimo fašistički program globalnog kapitalizma, koji se razvijao od 1945. pa do danas. Ta linija predstavlja reprodukciju kapitala sa istovremeno dva ometajuća procesa koja funkcionišu kao multiplikacija/normalizacija: heterogenizacija hijerarhije eksploatacije sa jedne strane i homogenizacija kolonijalnog centra (navodna eksploatacija svih od strane neoliberalnog kapitalizma) na drugoj strani. U ovom delu želimo da aktuelizujemo tezu da je performativnost, koja se do sada razvila u globalnom kapitalizmu (prazni performativni proces repetitivom, što je koncept koji je razvila Gržinićeva) u stvari mnogo fleksibilniji proces nego što smo mislili, a svodi se na uzimanje profita putem takozvane diferencijacije eksploatacije koja se (pod izgovorom da postoji zajednički konsenzus o globalnom kapitalizmu, što je koncept koji je razvio Tatlić) predstavlja kao izjednačavanje eksploatacije. U ovom slučaju, moramo ponovo da razmislimo o argumentima koji se odnose na heterogenost i homogenost kapitalističke matrice moći, koja funkcioniše kao veza između ponovnog izvođenja i institucionalne reprodukcije teksta.

Treće, osvrnućemo se na širi kontekst u koji nas vodi ova situacija.

## Prvi deo

Prema mišljenju Santijaga Slabodskog, danas očigledno postoji „obnavljanje imperijalne uloge Jevrejstva posle 1945/8.” Ovakvu obnovljenu ulogu, kaže Slabodski, nije moguće razmontirati ili čak učiniti suvišnom. Govorimo o imperijalnoj ulozi, a ne o nazivanju svih Jevreja imperijalnim. Ovakva uloga se uspostavila u poslednjih 50 godina posle Holokausta i ona OZNAČAVA/ODREĐUJE drugo mesto figuri Jevrejstva. Moramo da pribegnemo ovakvoj figuri imperijalnog Jevrejstva kako bismo kontekstualizovali debate vezane za Minjolov tekst i obeležavanje samog Minjola i njegovog teksta kao dekolonijalnog antisemitskog teksta.

Ono što vidimo u globalnom kapitalizmu, posebno posle 2001, iznedrilo je novu figuru borbe, a to je postkolonijalni, ili da to kažemo u referenci na situaciju koju je isprovocirao Minjolov tekst, dekolonijalni antisemita. Sledi pitanje gde je ova figura smeštena i šta je njena suprotnost. Ono što vidimo je formiranje nove figure Jevrejstva, a to je imperijalni Jevrejstvo. Ova figura koja igra ulogu unutar transformacija kapitalizma je i sama uloga koji ima opasnu duplu funkciju, koja se produkuje, koja je proizvedena i koja tada funkcioniše kao takva, te predstavlja novu realnost u čitavom procesu koji reorganizuje društveni i politički proces savremene hegemonije.

U skladu sa analizom Slabodskog, naglasićemo njegov predlog da imperijalni karakter uloge Jevrejstva ili imperijalni Jevrejstvo, igra ulogu paradoksalne figure moći i mora da se posmatra kao rezultat istorije re-

valuacije tipologija antisemitizma. Kako Slabodski jasno ukazuje, u istoriji postoji univerzalizacija Jevrejstva kao univerzalnog Drugog, koji je korišćen od strane hegemonističkih procesa kapitalizma i pripadajuće liberalne ideologije kako bi se stvorili ljudi drugog reda koji mogu biti uklonjeni, diskriminisani i uništeni, što je dovelo do toga da je danas (ista figura) iznova reprodukovana od strane neoliberalne kapitalističke ideologije, te smeštena u logiku koja istu figuru u maniru refleksije u ogledalu (mirror) danas ispostavlja kao jedinu (jedinu ispravnu, imperijalnu) figuru univerzalnog stradanja. Zato je moguće identifikovati da se radi o duplom procesu univerzalizacije u okviru genealogije tipologija antisemitizma, gde su oba procesa, iako paradoksalno, rezultat istorije i prisustva ponovo probuđenog antisemitizma i rasizma. Od univerzalnog Drugog (Ništa) do univerzalnog simbola patnje (Bivstvo) postoji prostor (passage) koji krije kapitalističke procese kao što su uništenje, oduzimanje imovine, diskriminacija, eksploatacija i prisvajanje, koji su i dalje istorijski procesi, te koji se menjaju u skladu sa istorijskim razumevanjem razvitka kapitalizma.

Posle Drugog svetskog rata, posebno u vremenu u kom globalni kapitalizam vidi svog glavnog „neprijatelja”, verskog neprijatelja u liku muslimana, antisemitizam proizvodi novi ideološki okvir. Ovaj okvir predstavlja savez hrišćanstva i judaizma (protiv muslimana, koji čine najveći broj imigranata u posleratnoj Evropi), te stoga iz osećanja obaveze prema najbrutalnijem istrebljivanju Jevreja u prošlosti, kapitalizam sada proizvodi i/ili podržava potpuno suprotno gledište: univerzalizaciju stradanja Jevreja u Holokaustu kao jedine i potpuno izuzetne figure stradanja. Ovo je zatim nametnuto kao matrica koja preuređuje i ponovo piše istoriju u skladu sa onim što se smatra više ili manje važnim u genealogiji kapitalizma, a sve kroz daljnje sprovođenje akcija istrebljenja, masovnih ubistava, oduzimanja imovine i etničkog čišćenja. Zaokret ka ovom univerzalnom primeru stradanja, koji je nametnut svima drugima, mora da se sagleda iz istorijske perspektive, kao i iz savremene perspektive. Neophodno je, kako Slabodski s pravom tvrdi, za sadašnju poziciju Jevreja razumeti šta ovaj zaokret ni od čega ka svemu znači za istoriju Jevreja, kao i to da imperijalna pozicija Jevreja, prema mišljenju Slabodskog, nije nešto od čega se lako odustaje.

Na drugoj strani, dekolonijalna opcija pokušava da ponovo savlada ovu situaciju i razotkrije poziciju univerzalnog stradanja Jevreja, koja se danas vidi kao imperijalna; ali ona je ta koja takođe kao takva hegemonizuje sve ostalo, te koja čak čini da se istrebljenja miliona robova u periodu kolonijalizma posmatraju kao posebni činovi, kao oni od manje važnosti, a ovo savladavanje je ono što čini suštinu dekolonijalnog diskursa (ovo ni slučajno nije postkolonijalizam!), što govori o transformacijama i invigoraciji istorijskog kolonijalizma do tačke u kojoj bi se moglo početi govoriti o svetu posle kolonijalizma i postkolonijalnom režimu.

U suštini, dekolonijalna opcija pokušava da pokaže da su procesi rasne diskriminacije kojima je podvrgnuto crno telo, ali i druga obojena tela, uključujući i Jevreje, svi deo mehanizma reorganizacije globalnog kapitalizma. Proces rasne diskriminacije predstavlja njegovu srž. Rasizam je njegova glavna ideološka logika koja opskrbljuje globalni kapitalizam, a rasizam nije samo politika identiteta, već nešto što je sastavni deo čitave agende transformacije nacionalne države u globalnom kapitalizmu. Nekada je bilo potrebno da postoji ogromna produkcija različitosti, a danas moramo reći da identitet nedostaje, jer je takav identitet već rasno diskriminisano (rasno profilisano), to jest imperijalno kontekstualizovano. Dekolonijalna analiza insistira na dve stavke: prva je izgradnja genealogije rasne diskriminacije koja obuhvata dva sistema istrebljenja – jedan je kolonijalizam, drugi je antisemitizam; a druga je kritika imperijalne pozicije Jevreja kao nove pozicije koja



je proizvedena u sistemu diskursa i formi reprezentacije u savremenom globalnom kapitalizmu.

Jevreji vide ovu kritiku kao novi antisemitizam i konkretno u slučaju Minjola, imamo specifičnu figuru koja je proizvedena – dekolonijalni antisemita ili postkolonijalni antisemita, što je termin koji je predložio Akile Mbembe[6] govori o sličnom slučaju, a to je postkolonijalni antisemita koji je, kao figura, danas prepoznat u Francuskoj. Ova kovanica je na kraju „otvorila” prostor u Prvom svetu za rasističku hegemonizaciju takozvanih drugih Drugih.

Na izvestan način, antisemitizam na Zapadu tokom šezdesetih, sedamdesetih i osamdesetih počeo je da predstavlja (postao je) prevaziđenu poziciju („Stara škola”) u okviru zamišljene ravni na kojoj se odvijala reorganizacija rasnih matrica, a sa druge strane je istovremeno bio pripisan najrazličitijim levičarskim agendama koje su bile generalno organizovane u kritici izraelske i antipalestinske politike, kritici podrške Zapada takvoj politici, ali najviše u kritici liberalizacije kapitala. Antisemitizam, koji je bio autentična preteča evrocentričnih institucionalnih diskursa je sada, od strane istih tih diskursa, zasićen/pojačan „rasističkim” prefiksima do te mere u kojoj je stvorena situacija da je rasizam definisan kao rasizam samo ako je bio obeležen kao antisemitski.

Pošto je antisemitizam, kao specifična ili paradigmatična rasistička praksa, funkcionisao kao čvorište oko koga se okuplja beli, evrocentrični rasizam na Zapadu do kraja Drugog svetskog rata i Holokausta, nakon Drugog svetskog rata on je nastavio da daje snagu različitim reakcionarnim agendama, ali se našao u nesinhronoj poziciji u novoj paradigmatičnoj promeni koja je posledica liberalizacije kapitala i/ili reorganizacije kapitala putem različitih liberalnih agendi. Reorganizacija zapadne hegemonističke matrice je stoga fokusirana na singularizaciju spektra značenja rasističke segregacije koja je proizvedena u epistemički kontejner/okvir označen kao antisemitizam.

Pozicija dekolonijalnog antisemite, iako funkcionise kao specifičan deo koji potencijalno služi za difamaciju onih aspekata dekolonijalnih diskursa koji prelaze u prostor kritike reorganizacije rasnih hijerarhija, takođe funkcionise kao vrsta epistemičkog (i institucionalnog) čvorišta kroz koje rasistička priroda savremenih kolonijalnih zlodela biva filtrirana kako bi predstavljala kontrapunkt/kontrameru protiv dekolonijalnog diskursa kao političkog diskursa. Pošto antisemitizam predstavlja samo deo rasističkog imaginarijuma Prvog sveta, preovlađujuća važnost koja je data antisemitizmu kao originalnom rasizmu jednostavno prikriva urođene rasističke strukture u tim epistemičkim narativima i institucionalnim diskursima koji su najviše spremni da pripisu najveći stepen rasističke prominencije upravo antisemitizmu.

Istovremeno, ovo su diskursi koji su bili ili jesu uglavnom antisemitski. Pošto dekolonijalni diskurs treba da bude politički diskurs sa zadatkom da deuniverzalizuje pojedinačne istine i stvarnosti, može se reći da se dekolonijalni antisemita, kao između kritike, pojavljuje upravo na pragu granice koja je data političkoj analizi u liberalnoj demokratiji. Drugim rečima, on deluje kao prepreka analizi koja je u stanju da deuniverzalizuje specifičnu agendu koja održava homogeni sistem kontrole kroz heterogeni pristup preuređenju rasističkih ideologija putem konstrukcije ideološke agende zasnovane na komodifikaciji i ubijanju.

Jačina zabrane „rasizma” ili u širem smislu, stereotipna „rigidnost” u reprezentativnim akrobacijama na kojima zapadne strukture moći insistiraju da su zasnovane (o čemu govore antifašistički temelji Evropske unije), nemaju nikakve veze sa političkim preprekama rasizmu ili sa političkom artikulacijom procesa rasne diskriminacije identiteta. One imaju veze sa konstrukcijom institucionalne i ekonom-

ske osnove putem koje potpuni fašizam i rasizam funkcionišu pod performativnim štitom odbrane antifašističkih, kao i antirasističkih vrednosti.

Na ovom mestu možemo da izložimo glavnu kritiku Minjlove pozicije. Kritika mu nije upućena zato što je implicirano da je antisemita, već zato što nakon (niza) debata ova polarizacija nije rasvetljena u javnosti, napadi nisu razotkriveni kao sudar dve paradigmatičke pojave (dekolonijalnog antisemite i imperijalnog Jevrejina) i kao takvi nisu bili predmet razgovora, niti su dalje razvijani. U stvari, problematičan primer „postkolonijalnog antisemite” otkriven je već 2007, o čemu govori A. Mbembe u okviru francuske teorijske postkolonijalne analize, dok sam Minjolo nije zalazio u analizu uslova koje je uspostavio 2007. i ranije, a koji su odredili njegov rad. Pod pretpostavkom da ovo nije bilo jasno u trenutku pisanja ovog teksta, nije došlo do mogućnosti za diskusiju nekoliko godina, to jest do trenutka kada smo pokrenuli diskusiju o ovom (Minjolovom) tekstu 2011.

Kritiku iznosimo vezano za Minjlov tekst, na osnovu analize Deleza (Deleuze), koji je razmatrao način na koji Fuko (Foucault) koristi koncept moći. Ukratko, Delez kaže da bi moć bila sila u istoriji, o čemu govori Fuko, neophodno je da se ona sputa, ili rizikuje da postane totalizujuća na način na koji ne bismo mogli da je razlikujemo od samog postojanja. Ovo je takođe sugerisala Džoan Kopdžek (Joan Copjec) u raspravi o Stvarnom kao samoponištavajućoj osobini koja mora da postoji kako bi se održala konzistentnost bilo koje diskurzivne konstrukcije.[7] U razradi koncepta Stvarnog, Kopdžekova je iskoristila Delezovu raspravu o Fukoovom korišćenju koncepta moći, koju smo malopre opisali, kako bi predložila način na koji treba da se bavimo Stvarnim.

Dve figure – imperijalni Jevrejin i dekolonijalni antisemita su, dakle, dva tropa, koja blokiraju procese povezivanja i onemogućavaju uvid u situaciju u kojoj su oba tropa proizvod kapitalizma koji se bavi razvlašćenjem. Za dekolonijalni diskurs važno je, stoga, da napadne implikaciju da je eksploatacija univerzalna, tj. važno je shvatiti da se eksploatacija univerzalizuje ili reprezentuje kao univerzalna kroz proizvodnju figura kao što je imperijalni Jevrejin. Naime, univerzalna figura nije univerzalni Drugi, već je univerzalni simbol stradanja koji hegemonizuje sve druge diskurse. U tom smislu je moguće tvrditi da je u njenom jezgri paradoksalna ZABRANA da se misli, ili u nekim slučajevima je čak predloženo da se uopšte ne koristi reč antisemitizam, jer antirasistima neće biti moguće da povežu svoju borbu i svoju kritiku sa kritikom antisemitizma. Zašto? Jer se oni danas posmatraju kao pravi antisemiti. Figura, preciznije rečeno, značenje dekolonijalnog antisemite, koje se ostvaruje uopšte u savremenim institucionalnim i kritičkim diskursima, ne bi trebalo da se posmatra kao razdor između antisemitizma i dekolonijalnog antisemitizma, već razdor „dekolonijalnog kritičara” u meri u kojoj isti taj kritičar može da se prihvati problema kritike paradigmatične uloge pitanja rase ili rasizma, te kritike mogućnosti uloge koju i sam može imati u hegemonističkoj kolonijalnoj proceduri.

Bez obzira na to da li funkcionise kao konotacija, organ osude ili implikacija, dekolonijalni antisemitizam se, u nekom smislu, može posmatrati kao ponovno izvođenje reakcionarne analize koja je početkom 20. veka imala tendenciju da pronalazi različite „semitske” elemente u interpretacijama društvenog konflikta zasnovanim na klasnom sukobu. Na drugoj strani, ova pojava, ili značenje koje ona nosi, nije konstruisana u analitičkom procesu, već upravo kroz tišinu ili zabranu mišljenja (denkverbot), dakle, kroz zabranu u obliku jednostavne cezure/ukidanja analize. U ovom kontekstu, cezuru ili zabranu ne treba posmatrati kao oblik zabrane koja je data direktivom, a koja bi zamaskirala neku manje vidljivu varku režima, već, kao što smo malopre spomenuli, treba je posmatrati kao simptom nesputane moći. Kraće rečeno, imamo zabranu koja dolazi sa dva izvora, ali su oba proiz-

vod intenzivne, deregulisane rasne diskriminacije od strane globalnog kapitalizma, koji sprečava istorijsko mišljenje i razmišljanje o istoriji kolonijalizma/ropstva i antisemitizma/Holokausta kao sastavnim, inherentnim delovima kapitalizma i njegove ekonomije, ideologije i politike.

Rasizam predstavlja jezgro ideološke logike globalnog kapitalizma, a rasna diskriminacija je njegova unutrašnja, administrativna, pravna i na kraju ekonomska procedura, koja reguliše prostor društvenog i političkog u okviru globalnog kapitalizma, za koji možemo da kažemo da je prvenstveno ekonomski sistem, ali i sistem reprezentacije, teorije i diskurzivnosti.

Ponovićemo, imperijalni Jevrejin i dekolonijalni antisemita su retoričke figure, aktivirane direktno od strane kapitala, koji stvara ovakve figure. Imperijalni u ovom smislu ne znači da su svi Jevreji povezani sa kapitalom, već upravo suprotno – kapital se povezuje sa Jevrejima kroz figuru imperijalnog Jevrejina. Ovo je važno pojasniti, zbog postojećih antisemitskih klišeja. Stoga u ovom procesu želimo da razotkrijemo homogenizaciju strukture moći koja nastavlja da proizvodi ove uloge/figure. Stoga, to znači da dekolonijalni antisemita nije izveden od imperijalnog Jevrejina, niti je imperijalni Jevrejin proizveo dekolonijalnog antisemitu, već su oba proizvedena od strane režima, hegemonije kapitala koja ih na kraju smešta u situaciju konflikta kako bi ista hegemonija sama sebe oslobodila od odgovornosti.

## Drugi deo

U drugom delu bavićemo se heterogenim performativnim strategijama kao glavnom moći hegemonije koja označava urođene systemske karakteristike kapitalističke kolonijalne matrice moći. Drugim rečima, „fiksiraćemo” strategije depolitizacije koje su trenutno na delu i vratimo ih u centar kapitalističke moći. Suštinski, ovde postoji proces koji pretvara esencijalni rasizam, uključujući i antisemitski rasizam, u emancipatorsku ili integrativnu proceduru, koja integriše rasno određeni identitet u hegemonističku matricu, i to do stepena u kome identitet pristaje da se realizuje rasno, u okviru rasne društvene lestvice, a ne politički ili u suprotnosti (imperijalnom) monopolu klasifikacije.

Naime, to znači da je proces rasne diskriminacije, tj. rasizam, u stvari jezgro organizacije savremenog globalnog kapitalističkog društva koje podržava proces identitetske politike koja nije samo multikulturalni proces, ni kulturna različitost u okviru društva, već proces konstantne rasne diskriminacije u savremenom društvu. Identitetska politika koju smo smeštali u okviru kulturalizacije savremenog kapitalističkog društva, u stvari predstavlja proces rasne diskriminacije. Taj proces nekada nije bio posmatran na taj način, ali u pitanju je proces koji se transformisao iz starih kolonijalnih procesa kontinuiranog rasizma u neoliberalni globalni savremeni skup različitih diskriminacija.

Ovo znači da proces rasne diskriminacije u širem smislu implicira da je društveni konflikt koncentrisan (ili da bi trebalo da bude koncentrisan) oko borbe za pozicije u okviru hijerarhija, koje su aksiomatski određene. Čitava dinamika društvenog konflikta je stoga singularizovana u jednu tačku iz koje je odstupanje (ali ne i odvajanje) omogućeno – ali samo ako se odstupanje završava na nekoj drugoj lokaciji u okviru istog hegemonističkog društvenog prostora.

Naravno, takav konflikt je u političkom smislu već završen. On je završen i pre nego što je počeo zato što su granice konflikta, organizovane na takav način, oduvek bile zasnovane na neograničavanju „datosti” društvu da se „slobodno” samoorganizuje, sve dok se ne suprotstavi imperijalnom monopolu u definisanju ciljeva društvenih hijerarhija i mogućnosti politike. Istovremeno, homogena kontrola (struktura) bila je u rukama onih (kolonijalnog centra Prvog sveta kapitala), koji su definisali svrhu društvenog prostora, dok bi društvene borbe bile označene kao kulturne, identitetske ili rasne, i kao one koje su stvorile izgovor



homogenom centru da omogući neslućenu slobodu za heterogenu diferencijaciju, dokle god ona ne bi postala politička.

Štaviše, istaknuto mesto u okviru rasno diskriminiranih hijerarhija društva je omogućeno, ali samo ako bi rasno subjektivizirani protagonist pratio putanju spomenute procedure. Zato, homogeni/heterogeni paradoks savremenog režima eksploatacije funkcioniše kao ratifikacioni mehanizam koji pretvara esencijalni rasizam, uključujući i antisemitski rasizam, u emancipatorsku ili integrativnu proceduru koja integriše rasno diskriminisan identitet u hegemonističku matricu do stepena u kome identitet pristaje da se realizuje rasno, u okviru rasne društvene lestvice, ne politički ili u suprotnosti (imperijalnom) monopolu klasifikacije. Aktuelnu Vladu Izraela, koja sprovodi aparthejd, ne bi trebalo da posmatramo kao nekakav šok ili kontroverziju; imperijalna uloga Izraela, ako je posmatramo u ovom kontekstu, samo je odraz napredovanja Jevrejina kao rasno diskriminisanog entiteta na rasnoj društvenoj lestvici koju održavaju strukture moći Zapada.

U ovom smislu, figura imperijalnog Jevrejina može da se posmatra kao stepen do kojeg jevrejska (ili bilo koja druga) politika postaje, ili može postati podložna hegemonističkom (rasističkom) supernarativu, koji na kraju pretvara ili derogira delovanje politike na politiku identiteta. U širem smislu, „dualnost“ između imperijalnog Jevrejina i dekolonijalnog antisemite može da se posmatra kao epistemička osnova, koju je odredio Prvi svet kapitala kao najrazvijeniju tačku procedure rasne diskriminacije. Što znači da – ako smo već primetili da rasna diskriminacija funkcioniše kao klasifikacijska matrica koja putem zadržavanja monopola na samu klasifikaciju održava ili sadrži proces rasne diskriminacije unutar kapitalističke ekspanzije – onda ove dve pozicije mogu da se posmatraju kao nametanje unapred određenih rezultata ovih procesa. Dekolonijalni antisemita u ovom kontekstu predstavlja epistemičku subverziju kritičara rasističke ideologije od strane režima, dok se imperijalni Jevrej (kao obećanje potencijalne integracije potlačenog) predstavlja kao jedina pozicija koja može da ublaži stradanje – a to je uloga koja je ovoj figuri dodeljena od strane kapitalističkog/kolonijalnog režima, iako naravno nikada nije verbalizovana kao takva od strane istog tog režima.

Ako singularizacija nomosa evrocentričnog svetskog poretka (koji prema mišljenju Karla Šmita (Carl Schmitt) počinje od otkrića Novog sveta) znači da je jedna žrtva korišćena za konstrukciju paradigmatičke pozicije koja služi za racionalizaciju ugnjetavanja drugih, imperijalni Jevrej u okviru hegemonijske epistemologije može da se posmatra kao perverzno obećanje žrtvama da je jedini način da se olakša stradanje prihvatanje pozicije u okviru epistemičkog horizonta izvršioca zločina.

U geopolitičkom smislu, a to je već poznata kolonijalna strategija, jedan identitet je suprotstavljen drugom prema klasičnom „zavadi pa vlada“ modelu, ali spektar značenja koji proizvodi pojava imperijalnog Jevrejina postoji upravo na raskršću gde se susreću koncepti kolonijalnog spasenja i realnost kapitalističke eksploatacije. To znači da status „legitimne žrtve“ može biti unapređen u status „imperijalne žrtve“, što omogućava izvršiocu zlodela da legitimizuje sopstvenu ulogu u proizvodnji žrtve, a što opet znači da time kolonijalni rasistički zločin postaje legitiman.

Ovo je proces koji predstavlja jezgro globalnog kapitalizma. Posle pada Berlinskog zida, predstavljeno je kao zastarelo držati se bilo koje vrste podela, sem striktnog dualizma centar-margina, gde je „margina“ transformisana u unutrašnji proces podele, fragmentacije te klasifikacije kao umnožavanje. Ono što ovde predlažemo je da se ovi procesi unutrašnje fragmentacije, sa istovremenim umnožavanjem, nazovu rasnom diskriminacijom, tj. rasizmom (racialization).

Naime, u prošlosti smo imali, recimo to tako, dva režima: socijalizam i kapitalizam, kao i bezbroj kon-

stelacija između njih; danas pak imamo jedan sistem koji proizvodi stalnu fragmentaciju unutar oba koncepta koja su se pojavila tokom istorije. Stoga, ako smo u prošlosti razgovarali o životu i smrti, danas imamo diferencijaciju u okviru same kategorije. U tom smislu, najveći prekid se desio kad je devedesetih, što se poklapa sa „nestankom“ granica u vremenu posle Hladnog rata, Agamben (Giorgio Agamben) osmislio konceptualnu podelu u okviru kategorije života, tako što je predstavio novi proces razlikovanja unutar biopolitike između „forme života“ i golog života. Mada, propustio je priliku da isto uradi i sa kategorijom „smrti“. Ova diverzifikacija je paralelna sa razvojem politike identiteta u devedesetim u formi multikulturalizma, koji je posmatran kao kulturni fenomen, a možda smo propustili priliku da ovu praksu nazovemo procesom rasne diskriminacije koja je u vezi sa diverzifikacijom ili kapitalističkim rasizmom.

U ovom smislu, Agamben je primetio, pozivajući se na Benjamina (Walter Benjamin) da: „Ono što zakon ne može da toleriše – što prepozna kao pretnju sa kojom je nemoguće da se pomiri – jeste postojanje nasilja van zakona; a nije tako zato što su posledice tog nasilja nekompatibilne sa zakonom, već zbog njihovog postojanja van zakona.“[8] Tu, gde je trebalo da postoji revolucionarno nasilje, danas vidimo čisto kolonijalno nasilje. Ovo predstavlja „napredovanje“ binarnosti centar/margina, gde se na margini nasilje sprovodi kao čista proizvodnja smrti, dok kontrola nad centrom kontroliše stepene komodifikacije.

Kapital ima bezbroj imena: kognitivni kapital; nematerijalni kapital; finansijski kapital. Na isti način, ne samo da su žrtve već klasifikovane, nego su i podeljene unutar iste klasifikacije. Ovaj proces je važan jer kapitalizam kao hrišćanski projekat razvlašćenja ne dozvoljava nijednom „identitetu“ (uključujući i imperijalnog Jevrejina) da stekne poziciju iz koje bi mogao da označi kapitalizam kao takav, te su u izvesnom smislu ovi identiteti suprotstavljeni jedan drugom, bez uviđanja da su oni samo rezultat procesa rasne diskriminacije, rasizma koji je žrtvama „spolja“ predstavljen kao jedna vrsta politike identiteta. Naime, neophodno je naglasiti da kapitalistički rasizam (racialization), kao glavni element kapitala, može biti istorijski povezan sa procesima rasne diskriminacije, od kolonijalizma pa sve do danas, u svim mogućim istorijskim modalitetima.

Stoga, dekolonijalni antisemita i imperijalni Jevrej mogu da se posmatraju kao binarnost, gde je dekolonijalni antisemita posmatran (ili proizveden) kao pozicija koja negira ekskluzivnost žrtvi, dok prefiks „imperijalni“ može da se posmatra kao pozicija koja je spremna (ili koja bi bila spremna) da prihvati tu ekskluzivnost, sve u ime kompenzacije za profiliranje politike kao konsenzualnog projekta, a ne projekta koji bi trebalo da proizvodi antagonizme.

Da ne bude zabune, kapitalizam kao hrišćanski projekat razvlašćenja ne dozvoljava nijednom „identitetu“ (uključujući i imperijalnog Jevrejina) da stekne poziciju iz koje bi mogao da označi kapitalizam kao takav, on samo dozvoljava „identitetu“ da se profiliše kao protohrišćanski. Uostalom, zapadna reakcionarna mitologija vidi Jevreje kao protohrišćane, koji bi u nekakvom apokaliptičkom činu otkrovenja konačno „ponovo otkrili istinsku, univerzalnu“ formu spasenja.

Drugim rečima, obećanje oslobađanjem od strane kapitala konsekvantno dobija svoj „konkretni“ rezultat u obliku unapređenog statusa žrtve, ili drugačije rečeno, radi se o procesu fragmentacije i podele koji za cilj ima produkciju „legitimne“ žrtve. Ono što smatramo obećanjem oslobađanja od strane kapitala je stoga paradoksalna i cinična mera, gde je oslobađanje predstavljeno kao beskrajn broj fragmentacija, ali ne bilo koje vrste. To što vidimo pred sobom je proces rasne diskriminacije koji organizuje kapitalizam.

Ovde dakle možemo da vidimo kapitalistički rasizam kao osu kontrole na kojoj se stvara beskrajn broj

različitih oblika kapitalističke ekspanzije.

Uostalom, motivi za kolonijalnu ekspanziju, koji su zasnovani na konceptu transfera motiva počinioca zločina na žrtvu, na način koji sugeriše totalitarističku revnost, supremacijsku agendu ili (zaista perverzno) imperijalističku tendenciju, koja navodno već postoji kod same žrtve, u tom smislu označavaju kolonijalnu hegemoniju samo kao instrument putem kog neke žrtve mogu biti uzdignute do statusa „legitimne“ žrtve i stoga predstavljene kao imperijalne žrtve. Konsekvantno, ove procedure su pretvorile proces hegemonizacije društvenog prostora u legitimni proces stvaranja okvira u kome se materijalno i epistemičko delovanje režima koncentriše oko različitih stupnjeva proizvodnje žrtve i biva proizvedeno tj. viđeno kao legitimni, sirov materijal za konstrukciju ideologije.

Čvrstina performativne „zabrane antirasizma“, koju smo ranije spomenuli, stoga je čvrstina koja se koristi u zaštiti potpune političke, ideološke praznine koja stoji iza globalizovane, kapitalističke mašine. Ovde smo ukazali na to da je jedini način da se sprovede analiza taj koji bi označio, naglasio momenat kada i u kojem se same kategorije sudaraju jedna sa drugom. Kad ne koristimo monolitnu kategoriju imperijalnog Jevrejina, nego je predstavljamo kao posledicu procesa rasne diskriminacije, uviđamo i glavnu logiku globalnog kapitalizma. Sa druge strane, sve ovo je dobro skriveno zahtevom u okviru sistema globalnog kapitalizma da se ne priča o rasizmu, uz izgovor da nema rasizma u savremenom, globalnom društvu. Rečeno na drugi način, sve dok rasna diskriminacija i dalje ostaje glavna logika diferencijacije društvenog, političkog i ekonomskog prostora u okviru globalnog kapitalizma, u okviru normativnog zahteva, ostaje zabranjeno da se razgovara o tome.

Stoga, predlažemo promenu interpretacije politike identiteta kao striktnog procesa takozvane kulturalizacije u interpretaciju iste politike kao rasne diskriminacije ultimativnog rasizma koji organizuje globalni kapitalizam.

Dakle, rasizam je neodvojivi deo kapitala; rasna diskriminacija nije samo proces proizvodnje prenesenih značenja – što znači da nije u pitanju samo brz proces narativizacije kapitala o nekakvim imanentnim stupnjevima razvlašćenja; rasna diskriminacija je proces koji je neodvojiv od kapitala. U ovom smislu, proces interne rasne diskriminacije samog kapitala funkcioniše kao „oblikovanje (presvlačenje kože) zmijske“, koji se predstavlja kroz promenu od kognitivnog do finansijskog kapitala i slično, a gde oblikovanje nije kulturno, već rasno. Možda će sledeća faza ovog oblikovanja biti (ili to već jeste) ideja o ljudskom kapitalu, koja bi se predstavila kao simbol prisvajanja svrhe i spektra značenja koje nosi čovečanstvo, i omogućila kapitalizmu da predstavi svoje protivnike kao potpuno antihumane (pošto već postoje različite vrste nehumanih) „totalitarne“ agitatore.

Kao što je Mbembe primetio: „Ono što odvaja naše doba od prošlih vremena, prekid nakon kog nema nazad, apsolutna podela našeg vremena koja lomi duh i deli ga u mnoge, iznova je nepredvidivo, raspršeno i bespomoćno postojanje; postojanje koje je nepredvidivo, raspršeno i nemoćno, ali se prikazuje prurušeno u proizvodljivost i apsolutnu moć da se odlučuje o smrti bilo kad, bilo gde, na bilo koji način i iz bilo kog razloga.“[9]

Ideja o bespomoćnom postojanju u kontekstu između rasne diskriminacije i reprezentacije, teorije i diskurzivnosti, ne treba dakle da se tretira u binarnom smislu koji bi implicirao postojanje odnosa dihotomije između (bespomoćnog) potčinjenog i osvajača (koji seje smrt). „Maska proizvodljivosti/arbitrarnosti“ treba da se posmatra kao svojstvo hegemonističke moći da odlučuje o smrti u bilo kom trenutku, dok bespomoćno postojanje ne treba biti

interpretirano kao apriori pozicija, već kao svojstvo koje je obeležilo smanjenje distance, neutralizaciju antagonizama između paradigmatičkih protagonista u okviru kosmologije moći – tlačitelja i potlačenog.

Naravno, moć da se odlučuje o smrti leži u rukama tlačitelja, ali proizvoljna/arbitrarna dimenzija u nekropolitičkoj formi moći kao takva mora da se posmatra kao dimenzija koja kodifikuje transgresiju ubistva, ali i koja razbija istorijski kontekst u kome je transgresija registrovana kao urođena, sistematska transgresija kapitalističko/kolonijalne moći koja je zamišljena i sprovedena na taj način. Proizvoljnost/arbitrarnost, kako je primetio Mbembe, „postiče sopstveni cilj i sama sebe potvrđuje kroz sopstvenu suverenost, prema tome dozvoljava moći da bude sprovedena kao pravo da se ubija i investira...”[10]

U ovom kontekstu, proizvoljnost/arbitrarnost može biti viđena kao izgovor za konstruisanje ideologije na bazi transgresije. Naravno, kao idealizacija ubistva, ali i kao oblik normativizacije ubistva kroz prepisivanje dramatičnih svojstava takvog čina u registar puke reprodukcije poretka – njegove ekonomske vitalnosti, ideološke smelosti i njegove sposobnosti da filtrira dramatične, apriori osobine istorijskog perioda ka polju reprezentacije. Dakle, na način koji bi pripisao istorijsko i političko značenje samoj metodi kojom je neka transgresija reprezentovana i/ili ponovo izvedena. Kolonijalizam je kao takav, kao metod ekspanzije kapitala, strukturiran kao ideološko delovanje. Stoga su kolonijalizam, ekspanzija, segregacija i genocid pripisani ideološkom procesu. Tako gledano, ubistvo se posmatra kao instant ideologija.

Pošto rasna diskriminacija/rasizam (racialization) pruža nekakav „unutrašnji sat” ili „set uputstava” koja koristi kapitalistička, rasistička ideologija, figura dekolonijalnog antisemite u ovom kontekstu se posmatra kao otelotvorenje zabrane, koja je organizovana na temelju „razbijanja svih zabrana”, ali samo prema sposobnosti režima da sam sebe postavi „antagonistički” prema sopstvenoj rasističkoj ideologiji. Prema tome, proizvoljnost ove operacije nije više proizvoljna, već je ideološka. Na izvestan način, ova figura stvara koherentnu vezu između rasne diskriminacije i sistema koji ga omogućava, ne zato što se fokusira na određenu „rasu”, nego zato što ukazuje na funkciju rase kao izgovora ili konstitutivnog stuba u bazenu imaginarnog iz kog se izvlači ideološka koherentnost.

Konture reprezentacije su zbog toga oblikovane kao konture u okviru kojih istorija, kao registar u kome su suprotstavljeni politički i ideološki antagonizmi, biva podređena tj. stavljena u kontejner u kojem bi politički i/ili političko-ideološki prefiksi društvenog konflikta bili izbrisani. Da li postoji bolji način da se eksternalizuje unutrašnja logika nego da se predstavi kao takva, samo bez sistemskih konotacija vezanih za režim koji je organizovao istu logiku.

U ovom smislu, rasna diskriminacija/rasizam (racialization) određuje istorijsku održivost i političku apriornost neke transgresije, poništavajući istu tu transgresiju kao nešto što je dosledno i neodvojivo od kapitala, ali je ujedno pripisujući registru u kome će veza transgresije i sistema, koji ju je proizveo, biti eliminisana.

U ovom smislu, dekolonijalni antisemita može da se posmatra kao prekid ove eliminacije. Eliminacija ove veze ne služi za brisanje centralne uloge bilo koje rase u procesu rasne diskriminacije, već upravo predstavlja instrument za konstrukciju središnje uloge oko paradigmatičkog, belog, heteroseksualnog, hrišćanskog muškarca koji dolazi iz Prvog sveta i koji označava rasizam kao negativan društveni mehanizam na delu, ali samo ako isto društvo nije uspelo da integriše specifičnu verziju rasizma Prvog sveta u sopstvenu ideološku logiku.

Zato, proizvoljnost/arbitrarnost ne funkcioniše kao

maska nedostatka nekakve temeljne „mogućnosti” ili „novog oblika”, koje kapitalizam kao sistem obavezne transgresije može da dostigne, već kao prikaz ideologije koja je zasnovana na potpunoj praznini, još preciznije, na ništavilu koje je ispunjeno i dramati-zovano transgresijom. Nekropolitički format ove integracije jasno odražava rasizam kao legitiman teren na kome je rasno podređivanje kodifikovano kao deo modernističkog narativa, te samim tim, kao „eratični” okvir koji podstrekuje borbu za isticanje mesta identiteta, kulture i rase samo u okviru hijerarhija eksploatacije. Imperijalni je Jevrejin, u ovom kontekstu, takva pozicija koja oblikuje ili koja je proizvedena kao ona koja bi trebalo da definiše politiku države kao politiku koja bi trebalo da se brine samo o tome kako osvojiti istaknuto mesto unutar hijerarhija koje sprovede politiku kao nekropolitiku.

### Treći deo

Već smo utvrdili da je suština današnjih debata situacija u kojoj su konfrontirane dve kontradiktorne pozicije: imperijalni Jevrejin i na drugoj strani dekolonijalni antisemita. Obe pojave su se razvile u prošlog deceniji, nakon 2001. godine. Ako smo odstupili od dve očigledno kontradiktorne pozicije – imperijalnog Jevrejina i dekolonijalnog antisemite, to nije zbog toga što su oni postavljeni tu kao pozitivistički pojmovi, već su i jedan i drugi i dalje proizvodi, te kao takvi nastavljaju biti deo procesa hegemonске transformacije kapitala. Ako bismo postavili ovu analizu u filozofske okolnosti i da zaokružimo sa onim sa čim smo započeli, odnos između dve pozicije koje smo do sada jasno identifikovali, predstavljaju se kao kontradikcije, gde je jedna pozicija A, a druga –A.

Zato je moguće govoriti o poziciji zastoja, jer je situacija na početku bila nepomičan, sam sebi identičan univerzum u kome se kontradiktorne osobine podudaraju, ali kao što znamo, stvari se menjaju, o čemu je govorio Slavoj Žižek,[11] i nikada nisu direktno A i ne-A, već mogu se samo postepeno menjati iz A u ne-A.

Mi smo konceptualizovali ovu postepenu promenu kao rasne diskriminacije (racijalizacije) koje organizuje globalni kapitalizam. Kapitalizam, koji je perfidan i nekropolitički režim koji uništava sve i svakoga, ne samo da je istrebio milione Jevreja, već je u nameri da to sakrije, počeo da paralelno sa procesom diverzifikacije proizvodi performativnu figuru moći koja je danas suprotstavljena svim drugima u procesu hegemonističke rasne diskriminacije koju sprovodi kapital.

Koristeći Žižekovu terminologiju: Kako prelazimo sa prvog identiteta suprotnosti (Jevrejin kao ništa) ka Jevrejinu kao nečemu (nečemu imperijalnom), od Ničega ka Bivstvu? Kako bi razrešio ovu nemogućnost, ovaj zastoj, čovek prelazi u period Postojanja, u oscilaciju između dva pola. Danas je ovo postojanje rasna diskriminacija globalnog kapitalizma. Ovo možemo da tvrdimo u trenutku u kome u potpunosti uzimamo u obzir radikalnu retroaktivnost dijalektičkog procesa: proces postojanja, kako ga vidi Žižek, nije sam po sebi nužnost, već je postojanje (postepeno, nepredvidivo, pojavljivanje) same nužnosti, tačnije, nužnosti kapitala. Sve više, posle 2001, Žižek tvrdi da je samo uzdizanje nužnosti u strukturalni princip kontingentnog polja multipliciranosti kontingentan akt: za koji bi čak moglo da se kaže da je posledica kontingentne („otvorene”) borbe za hegemoniju.

U izvesnoj meri, formiranje imperijalnog Jevrejina je u stvari proces kontingencije nužnosti, tj. sam proces kroz koji se nužnost javlja iz nužnosti je kontingentan proces. To je „performativni” proces konstruisanja (oblikovanja) onoga što je „otkriveno”.

I dalje, iako nemamo ništa sem realnosti koja je ne-Sve i kontingencija, problem i dalje ostaje; mogli bismo postaviti pitanje slično onome koje je Žižek

postavio Kventinu Melasou (Quentin Meillassoux). U ponovnom razmatranju njegovog eseja *After Finitude*,[12] Žižek razvija tezu da pravi problem, koji se javlja nakon što izvedemo osnovni spekulativni gest Melasoa (premeštanje nepredvidivosti naše zamisli o stvarnosti u samu stvarnost), nije više to što možemo reći o stvarnosti-po sebi, već kako se naše subjektivno stanovište i sama subjektivnost uklapa u stvarnost. Žižek zaključuje: „Za ovo, potrebna nam je teorija subjekta koja nije ni ona o transcendentalnoj subjektivnosti, ni ona u kojoj se subjekat svodi na deo objektivne stvarnosti.” Isto pitanje u suprotnom smeru možemo postaviti Žižeku, obema stranama u analizi i sebi samima takođe. Uostalom, gde se naše subjektivno stanovište i sama subjektivnost uklapaju u stvarnost, što Žižek objašnjava time što tvrdi da je problem na kraju u „tome kako se fenomeni javljaju u okviru plošne gluposti stvarnosti koja samo jeste, kako realnost samu sebe duplira i počinje da sama po sebi biva.”

Upravo to je bilo pitanje na samom početku razmatranja zašto pisati ovaj tekst, da bi se odgovorilo kako ova globalna, kapitalistička stvarnost u svojoj plošnoj gluposti, što je zapravo užasavajući proces rasne diskriminacije i hegemonizacije, već konstruiše naše pozicije, te od nas pravi lak plen koji mogu da uklone obe strane, duplirajući samu sebe (nova logika globalnog kapitalizma) i počinje da sama po sebi biva – i/ili da se sama sebi pojavljuje kao takva.

Sa engleskog na srpski prevela Jelena Maksimović

#### FUSNOTE

- [1] <http://www.okcir.com/Articles%20VII%202/Mignolo-FM.pdf>
- [2] Cf. Walter D. Mignolo, *Epistemischer Ungehorsam. Rhetorik der Moderne, Logik der Kolonialität und Grammatik der Dekolonialität*, preveo Jens Kastner i Tom Waibel, Turia + Kant, Vienna, 2012.
- [3] Cf. Santiago E. Slabodsky, “But there are no longer any anti-Semites! Vicious Circles, Jewish Destinies, and a Complementary Framework to Read De-colonial Discourses,” u *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge*: Vol. 7., br. 2, čl. 5, 2009.
- [4] Sve reference na Slabodskog dolaze iz njegovog teksta objavljenog 2009.
- [5] Cf. Achille Mbembe, “Provincializing France,” u *Public Culture*, Volume 23, br. 1, 2011, str. 85-119.
- [6] Ibid.
- [7] Joan Copjec, *Read My Desire: Lacan Against the Historicists*, Harvard: MIT Press, 1994.
- [8] Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception*, The University of Chicago Press, (Chicago, 2005), str. 53.
- [9] Cf. Achille Mbembe, *On the Postcolony*, University of California Press, Berkley, Los Angeles, London, 2001, str. 13.
- [10] Ibid.
- [11] Cf. “Slavoj Žižek i Ben Woodard, intervju” u *The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism*, Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek i Graham Harman, ur., re.press Melbourne, Australia, 2011.
- [12] Cf. Quentin Meillassoux, *After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency*, Continuum, 2008



# GLOBAL CAPITALISM'S RACIALIZATION/S

Marina Gržinić and Šefik Tatlić

## Introduction

From January 2011 to July 2011 the authors of this text were into a harsh discussion regarding the text by Walter Mignolo *Dispensable and Bare Lives. Coloniality and the Hidden Political/Economic Agenda of Modernity* published online.

[1] Gržinić was even earlier and is still in a discussion on the same topic in Vienna. In fact the discussion was reopened recently, or better it became public in Austria, with the publication of the German translation of the book by Mignolo in Austria.[2]

We want to reflect on these internal/external debates and the consequences for our theoretical and political work and possible alliances for intervention in global capitalism.

Let's initially give some very short context regarding the source of the dispute and this is Walter Mignolo text *Dispensable and Bare Lives* that is at the core of the debate or through which much larger framework of dispute was opened in the field of theory and critical thinking. The text *Dispensable and Bare Lives* by Mignolo in our analysis reworks racialization as the major point of the way how the history of colonialism and anti-Semitism can be re-read together in their differences. Mignolo in the last part of the text, after giving a history of the process of capitalist racialization in relation to colonialism, exposes a situation that a different reality is today organized regarding the position of Jews in the globalized world. The outcome of envisioning such a process is that Mignolo exposes effects of the processes of racialization in regard to the nature of neoliberal global capitalism secularization that produces new forms of discrimination and oppression. The result of such an analysis is that when pointing to a neoliberal global capitalist process of racializations in the connection to racism and Anti-Semitism, Mignolo was proclaimed that he reproduced anti-Semite clichés, to the point to be classified almost as an anti-Semite.

What is stated in Mignolo's text is in nuce a question posed as followed: Why could not some local bourgeoisie in Africa, former Eastern Europe or in the Middle East be responsible for discrimination of their own kind? Again, this should never be related to ethnic members of a certain nation as complicit to their own segregation, but why would it be so impossible to see certain classes as actually complicit to their colonial masters? In such a way the described situation to which Mignolo is coming, from a position of reading that is a decolonial move within theory, retraces the matrix of racialization as the main capitalist matrix from the colonial time to today.

What is coming more and more obvious and transcend the debate regarding the text of Mignolo is that paradoxically to say Mignolo anti-racism (Mignolo accused different forms of racism being a product of capitalism, colonialism and the Holocaust) are now seen as an obverse move, he is in fact accused of repeating anti-Semite clichés, or we can say that Mignolo is identified to be a decolonial anti-Semite. This figure "decolonial anti-Semite" that we now bring in order to name the attacks against Mignolo is a figure identified, elaborated and reworked by Santiago Slabodsky[3] in recent debates about the possibility to connect two major human atrocities and this is colonialism and the Holocaust. Slabodsky makes an even more radical step in his

analysis as he proposes two figures or two roles ascribed to different positions within a geopolitical differentiation of the global world. Santiago Slabodsky talks about the decolonial anti-Semite on one side and the Imperial Jew on the other.[4]

Achille Mbembe[5] is speaking of a similar case and this is the post-colonial anti-Semite presently identified in France. This coinage had ultimately "opened" a space in the First world for racist hegemonization of so-called other others, especially of those to whom a highest degree of anti-Semitism is being ascribed and are all conveniently here and there the targets of latest capitalist neocolonial interventions.

We switch from time to time in the text from de-colonial to post-colonial but we spoke from the point that takes into consideration the critique of post-colonialism by decoloniality studies; post-colonial studies presents today, after being completed a very important historical work in the 1970s and 1980s, the mainstream academic context, so to say gives an apolitical frame in which the discourses regarding colonialism are taking place.

In the following text we do not want to go into a dispute regarding the text *Dispensable and Bare Lives* specifically, but we want to focus on a situation that is larger than it. As the two figures, on one side the post/de-colonial anti-Semite and on the other the Imperial Jew are putting under question the whole endeavor of post-colonial and de-coloniality studies. This was recently put forward again in the debates that are presently publicly envisioned in Vienna, and are connected with the publishing of the German translation of the aforementioned Mignolo's book.

What is at stake here is the mode with which the structure of global capitalist's racialization operates with anti-Semitism. We want to expose the following that today we have to see anti-Semitism as part of a broader matrix of capitalist racializations.

It is necessary to see the ways in which the racialized population responds to a role that was "assigned" to it in the process of neoliberal global capitalist racialization. In this sense, there is no need, in the present debates regarding the text by Mignolo, for an overt emphasis to be given (to something which is well known) and that is now in this context repeated as a mantra that "Throughout the European history, before, during and after the Jewish emancipation, harm was done to Jews, pogroms against Jews were conducted and Jews (including the so called 'secular Jews') were discriminated against on many levels," because racism as a capitalist ideology assigns these roles, though what is to identify is that this "assignment" is a perfidious operation that had to be identified as such and even more to understand that the process of racialization is presented as a positive process and a role of the capitalist/colonial system.

Precisely to this operation Slabodsky points his finger himself, as well. He identifies two figures that are all the time reworked but without being so precisely identified in present debates in global capitalism. From the presentation of the debates going on in the last period, we can say that we found ourselves almost in a deadlock position when trying to present an analysis to

understand historically what happened to the condition, figure and agency of Jews especially when this analysis includes critical notes. The reason is that the changes in neoliberal global capitalism that include the changes of the nation state into war state in global capitalism, will tout court classify those critiques as being anti-Semitic.

To answer such a question the proposal is to see the position of Jews within the larger framework of the history of capitalism and therefore to understand Jewish position as well historically. The aim is to ask what and how happened to the Jews in the process dictated by capital after 1945, being part of the social and political changes of capitalism, not as a process, but as entanglement of dispossession, control and ideology.

In the analysis of the discussion that follows, we will have 3 paths.

First, it is our task to understand how the decolonial anti-Semite is constructed, where it is situated, as this figure now blocks any further analysis or alliances and establishes new hierarchies in the present space of theory, politics and intervention.

Second, we will develop the systematization of the processes of global capitalism, so to say in Adorno's words, we will try to trace the global capitalism's fascist ticket that has been re/developing from the 1945 to today. The line will be the reproduction of capital with at once two disruptive processes that work as multiplication/normalization: heterogenization of exploitation hierarchy on the one side and the homogenization of the colonial center (the alleged exploitation of all by neoliberal capitalisms) on the other. In this part we will actualize the thesis that performativity that has been developed until now in global capitalism (the empty performative process by repetition, developed by Gržinić) is actually more flexible than we think and it is taking a profit of the so-called differentialization of exploitation that (under the pretense that there exists a mutual consensus on global capitalism, developed by Tatlić) presents itself as equalization of exploitation. In this case, we have to rethink the arguments concerning the heterogeneity of homogeneity of the capitalist matrix of power that functions as a connection between reenactments and the institutional reproduction of text.

Third, we will reflect on a larger context where this situation leads all of us.

## Part one

According to Santiago Slabodsky there exists clearly today "a renewal of the imperial role of the Jew after 1945/8." This renewal, according to Slabodsky, is not possible to dismantle and even make redundant. We talk about the Imperial role and not about naming of all the Jews to be imperial. This role is formed in the last 50 years after the Holocaust and it DESIGNATED / DETERMINED another place to (for) the figure of the Jew. We have to make recourse to this figure of the Imperial Jew in order to contextualize the debates around Mignolo text and even more the branding of Mignolo and his text as decolonial anti-Semitic text.

What we have envisioned in global capitalism especially after the 2001, gave birth to a new figure of contestation and that is the post-colonial or, better to say in a reference to Mignolo, decolonial anti-Semite. Therefore the question posed is where this figure resides and what its counter-figure is. What we envisioned is the formation of a new figure of a Jew and that is the Imperial Jew. This figure that is at stake in the transformation of capitalism and is itself the stake that has a deadly double function, is, as produced and when produced, operative as such and presents a new reality in the whole process that reorganizes the social and political process of contemporary hegemony.

Following Slabodsky's analysis we can emphasize his proposal that the imperial role of the Jew or the Imperial Jew, is a paradoxical figure of power, and that has to be seen as the result of a history of re-evaluation of typologies of anti-Semitism. As Slabodsky clearly shows first we have historically the universalization of the figure of the Jew as the universal Other that was used by the hegemonic processes of capitalism and its liberal ideology in order to fabricate a second grade humanities that could be disposed, discriminated and annihilated, to be today re/produced by this same neoliberal capitalist ideology into an almost mirror changed logic that is the (imperial, only valid) figure of universal suffering. Therefore it is possible to identify that it is a double process of universalization in this genealogy of the typologies of anti-Semitism, which are both paradoxically to say the outcome of a history and presence of an invigorated anti-Semitism and racism. From the universal other (Nothing) to the universal emblem of suffering (Being) there is a passage that hides capitalism processes of annihilation, dispossession, discrimination, exploration and expropriation that are as well historical processes and changes accordingly to the historical understanding of capitalism development.

After the WWII and specifically in the time of global capitalism that sees its major "enemy," a religious enemy, in the figure of the Muslim, anti-Semitism produces a new ideological framework. This framework is the alliance of Christianity and Judaism (against the Muslim, mostly migrants in the post-WWII Europe) and therefore because of its proper engagement in the most brutal annihilation of the Jews in the past it is now producing or supporting its other pole: the universalization of the Jewish suffering in the Holocaust as the only and the most exceptional figure of suffering. This is then imposed as the matrix that rearranges and historically rewrites accordingly what is to be seen of bigger importance or less importance in the genealogy of capitalism through conduct of events of annihilations, mass murdering, dispossession, ethnical cleansing. The move to this universal figure of suffering that is imposed onto all the others must be seen historically and presently. It is necessary as Slabodsky rightly states for the present position of Jews to understand as well what this move from nothing to everything means in the history of Jews, and as well that the imperial position of Jews will not be given, pace Slabodsky, as easily out of the hands.

The decolonial option on the other side tries to renegotiate this situation and dismantle this position of the universal suffering of the Jew that is now seen as imperial and is, as such, the one that hegemonizes everything else; it as well makes particular and less important the annihilations of millions of slaves in colonialism that is a point at the core of the decolonial discourse (that is not at all post-colonialism!), which speaks about the transformations of historical colonialism and its invigoration to the point where we could start to talk of the world after colonialism and the regime of the postcolonial.

In nuce, the decolonial option tries to demonstrate that the processes of racializations to which are subjected both the black body and other bodies of color as well as the Jews are both/all part of the mechanism of reorganization of global capitalism. At its core there is a process of racialization/s. Racism is its main ideological logic that fuels global capitalism and as well racism is not just an identity politics but something internal to the whole agenda of transformation of the nation state in global capitalism. Before, it was necessary to have a massive production of differences and today it is necessary to state that what is missing is identity, where this identity is already racialized, or better to say imperially contextualized. The decolonial analysis insists on two points; first is to build a genealogy of racialization that includes two systems of annihilation, one is colonialism and the other is anti-Semitism and on the other to criticize the imperial positions of Jews as the new position produced through the system of

discourses and representational formats in the present global capitalism.

The Jews see this critique as being a new anti-Semitism and, to be precise, we have in Mignolo case a specific figure that is produced and this is the figure of the decolonial anti-Semite or post-colonial anti-Semite, this latter was proposed by Achille Mbembe. Mbembe[6] is speaking of a similar case and this is the post-colonial anti-Semite presently identified in France. This coinage had ultimately "opened" a space in the First world for racist hegemonization of other others.

In a way, anti-Semitism in the West during the 1960s, 1970s and the 1980s began to represent a kind of outdated position ("Old School") within the imaginaries that conducted reorganization of racial matrixes, while it was at the same time transcribed to the agendas of variety of leftist agendas broadly organized on critique of the Israeli anti Palestinian politics, critique of western support to such politics, but mostly on critique of liberalization of capital.

Anti-Semitism, which was a genuine pretext to Eurocentric institutional discourses was now, by the same discourses, saturated by "racist" pretexts to that measure to which a situation was created in which racism was redefined as racism only if it is prefixed as anti-Semitic.

Since anti-Semitism as specific or paradigmatic racist practice tended to function as a linchpin, or as a congregational hub of the white, Eurocentric racism in the West till the end of the WW2 and the Holocaust, post WW2 anti-Semitism continued to feed various reactionary agendas but found itself in a non-synchronous position in the new paradigmatic shift based on liberalization of capital and/or reorganization of capital through various liberal agendas. The reorganization of the western hegemonic matrix was therefore centered on the singularization of the spectrum of meaning racist segregation produced into an epistemic container designated as anti-Semitism.

The position of the decolonial anti-Semite, although functioning as a specific part of potential defamation of those aspects of decolonial discourses that venture into the field of critique of reorganization of racial hierarchies, also functions as sort of an epistemic (and institutional) hub through which racist nature of contemporary colonial atrocities are filtered to be poised against the decolonial discourse as political discourse. Since anti-Semitism presents just a part of the First world's racist imaginary, the overwhelming emphasis given to anti-Semitism as the racism simply conceals inherent racist structures in those epistemic narratives and institutional discourses most eager to assign ultimate racist prominence only to anti-Semitism.

These are, at the same time, the discourses that were or are most prominently anti-Semitic. Since decolonial discourse should be political discourse with an agenda to de-universalize particular truths and realities, it could be said that the decolonial anti-Semite as dislocation of critic, appears exactly at the threshold of the limits given to political analysis in liberal democracy. In other words, it appears as the barrier to the analysis able to de-universalize particular agenda in form of an agenda also able to sustain homogeneous system of control through heterogeneous approach to rearrangements of its racist ideologies through the very construction of ideological agenda on the basis of commodification and murder.

The firmness of prohibition of "racism," or in wider sense, stereotypical "rigidness" in representational stunts through which western power structures insist they were founded on (anti-fascist foundations EU speaks about), has nothing to do with political barriers to racism or with political articulation of the process of racialization of identity. It has everything to do with the construction of the institutional and economic basis on

which utter fascism and racism could be conducted under the performative aegis of defence of anti-fascist, and for that matter, anti-racist values.

At this point we can also put forward the main critique to Mignolo position. The critique is not because it was implied he was an anti-Semite, but because in the aftermath of the debates this polarization was not brought to the light, the attacks were not exposed as the clash of two paradigmatic figures (the decolonial anti-Semite and the Imperial Jew) and as such were not exposed and elaborated further. In fact, the troubled figure of "post-colonial anti-Semite" was already clearly identified in 2007 as reported by A. Mbembe inside the French theoretical postcolonial analysis. Mignolo himself did not go into the analysis of his conditions established in 2007 and earlier that determined as well his work. Under the assumption that this was not clear in the time of writing of the text this was not taken as a possibility of discussion some years later, which means in the time of our initiated debate regarding the text in 2011.

We as well put forward this critique in relation to Mignolo based on the analysis by Deleuze when discussing the way Foucault used the concept of power. In short, Deleuze said that for power to be the force that it is in history as elaborated for Foucault it is necessary to trip over itself, that means it must stumble on itself or it risks becoming totalizing in such a way that it would be undifferentiated from existence itself. This was proposed as well by Joan Copjec's discussion on the Real as the self effacing quality that must exist in order to maintain consistency of any discursive construction.[7] Copjec in elaborating the Real made use of Deleuze's discussion of Foucault's use of power as just described in order to propose the way how to deal with the Real.

These two figures of the imperial Jew and decolonial anti-Semite are two tropes that block the processes of alliances and prevent to see that both are the product of capitalism in its work of dispossession. For the decolonial discourse it is very important to attack the implication that the exploitation is universal, but it is important also to understand that exploitation is being universalized/represented as universal through production of the figures such as the imperial Jew. This universal figure is not the universal other but it is the universal emblem of suffering that is seen as the universal one and hegemonizes the other discourses. It is possible to state that at the core is a paradoxical PROHIBITION to think or even in some cases it is suggested not to use the word anti-Semitism at all anymore, saying that with this it will not be possible for the anti-racist (!) to connect their struggles and their critiques with the critique of anti-Semitism. Why? As they are now seen as genuine anti-Semites. The figure, more precisely, the meaning decolonial anti-Semite realizes in contemporary institutional and critical discourses in general should not be seen exactly as a disruption of the distance between the anti-Semitism and decolonial anti-Semitism, but as a disruption of the "decolonial critic" to that measure to which the same critic tackled the paradigmatic role of race issue or racism and has shown that itself can have a role in the hegemonic colonial procedures.

Whether functioning as a connotation, bodies of judgment or an implication, decolonial anti-Semitism in a way could be seen as a reenactment of the reactionary analysis that in the early 20th century tended to find various "Semitic" elements in class based interpretations of the social conflict. On the other hand, this figure, or the meaning it evokes, is not being constructed through an analytical process, but exactly through silence or *denkverbot*, the prohibition in the form of simple caesura of analysis whatsoever. The caesura or prohibition in this context should not be seen as forms of prohibition derived from a directive that would mask some less visible artifice of the regime, but, in regard to the previous remark, should be seen as a symptom of power that does not stumble



on itself. In short, we have a prohibition coming from two sources, but in fact both being the product of an intensified deregulative racialization by global capitalism that prevents historical thinking and to think the history of colonialism/slavery and anti-Semitism/Holocaust in their inherent relations to capitalism and its economy, ideology and politics.

Racism is the core ideological logic of global capitalism, racialization is its more internal administrative and judicial and lastly economical procedure that regulates the space of the social and political of global capitalism and we will say very much economical but as well the system of representation, theory and discursivity as well.

To repeat again the Imperial Jew and the decolonial Anti-Semite are rhetorical figures activated by capital itself that puts itself in the role of formation of this figure. The imperial means not at all the connection of Jews with capital, but on the contrary it is capital in such a way that connects itself with the Jews through the figure of the Imperial Jew. This is as well very important to expose clearly and straightforwardly because of anti-Semite clichés. In this process therefore we want to expose the homogenization of the structure of power that continues to produce these roles/figures. That means that the decolonial anti-Semite is not a derivative from the Imperial Jew nor the Imperial Jew produces the decolonial anti-Semite, both are produced by the regime, the hegemony of capital that ultimately puts them in a conflict situation to exclude itself from responsibility.

## Part two

In this second part, we will take account of the heterogeneous performative strategy as a main hegemonic power that denotes inherent systemic features of the capitalist colonial matrix of power. In other words, we will “fix” strategies of de-politicization that are at work in the present moment and return them back to the center of capitalist power. In basis, we have a process that converts essential racism, including Anti-Semitic racism, to an emancipatory or integration procedure that integrates certain racialized identity into a hegemonic matrix – to that measure that identity is consent to realize itself racially, within the racial scales, not politically or in adversarial fashion against the (imperial) monopoly on classification.

That means that a process of racialization is actually at the core level of the organization of contemporary global capitalist society that supports the process of identity politics that is not simply a multicultural process, not simply a cultural differentiation in the society, but a process of steady racializations within the racial scale of contemporary society. The identity politics that we were so much pushing into the culturalization of contemporary capitalist societies is a in fact a process of racialization. This latter we did not see as such but it is the process that transformed from the past colonial processes of steady racism into a neoliberal global contemporary set of discriminations.

It means that the procedure of racialization in wider sense implies that the social conflict is (or should be) congregated around the struggle for positions within the hierarchies, which were axiomatically determined. The whole dynamism of a social conflict was therefore singularized onto one point from which departure (not separation) is allowed – but only if that departure ended on a mere other location within the same hegemonic social space.

Of course, such a conflict in political sense is already over. It ended before it began because the limits of a conflict organized in such a way were always based on non-limitation “given” to society to organize itself “freely” as long as it did not tackle the imperial monopoly to define the purpose of social hierarchies and possibility of politics. At the same time, homogeneous control (structure) stood in the hands of those (coloni-

al centre of First world of capital) who had defined the purpose of a social space while the social struggles were prefixed as cultural, identity and racial struggles which had created the pretense that homogeneous centre allowed unprecedented liberty for heterogeneous differentiation, as long as it did not become political.

Furthermore, prominence within racialized social hierarchies was made possible only if racially subjectivized protagonist went along the lines this procedure underlined.

Hence, homogeneous / heterogeneous paradox of contemporary regime of exploitation functions as a ratificatory mechanism that converts essential racism, including anti-Semitic racism, to an emancipatory or integration procedure that integrates certain racialized identity (identities) into a hegemonic matrix – to that measure to which that identity is consent to realize itself racially, within the racial scales, not politically or in adversarial fashion against the (imperial) monopoly on classification. Current Israeli apartheid government therefore should not be perceived as a shock or controversy; the imperial role of Israel, if seen in this context is just a reflection of progression of the Jew as racialized entity on the racist scales sustained by Western power structures.

The figure of an Imperial Jew in this sense could be seen in a context that marks the degree of succumbing of Jewish (or any other) politics to the hegemonic (racist) super - narrative that ultimately converts or derogates politics to identity politics. In a wider sense, the “duality” between the Imperial Jew and the decolonial anti-Semite could be seen as an epistemic layout set by the First world of capitalism as the most developed point of procedures of racialization.

Meaning, since we have already noticed that racialization functions as classificatory matrix that, by sustaining a monopoly on classification, it sustains or comprises the processes of rationalization of capitalist expansion, these two position actually might be seen as an imposition of already determined outcomes of these processes. The decolonial anti-Semite in this context might be seen as regime’s epistemic subversion of the critic of racist ideology, while the Imperial Jew (as a general promise of potential integration to the subjugated) might be seen as an only position that could alleviate suffering – which is a role that is assigned to this figure by the capitalist/colonial regime, although it is never verbalized as such by the same regime, of course.

If the singularization of the nomos (of the origin of the Eurocentric global order, which Carl Schmitt dates from the discovery of the New World) means that one specific victim had been used for construction of a paradigmatic position that serves as rationalization for the oppression of other victims, the Imperial Jew within the hegemonic epistemology might be seen as a perverse promise to the victims that the only way to ease the suffering is to accept to be situated within the epistemic horizon of the perpetrator.

In geopolitical sense, as it is already known to be a colonial strategy, one identity is pitted to go against another in classical divide et impera fashion, but the spectrum of meaning, figure of an Imperial Jew produces exists exactly on a junction where the concepts of colonial salvation and the reality of capitalist exploitation meet. This means that the status of a “legitimate victim” can be upgraded to the status of “imperial victim,” which allowed the perpetrator to legitimize its role in production of the victim, therefore, allowing the perpetrator to make the colonial racist atrocity legitimate.

This shows a process that is at the core of global capitalism. After the fall of the Berlin wall it was presented as obsolete to reside on any type of division besides a strict dualism of binaries inside – outside,

but the “outside” binary was transformed into an internal process of divisions, fragmentations, classifications as multiplication. What is the proposal here and now is to name these processes of internal fragmentation with their simultaneous multiplications as racializations.

Before, we had two regimes, so to say, socialism and capitalism and the myriad of constellation in between them; today we have one system that produces a steady fragmentation inside each of the concepts that were historically brought to light. Therefore, if we had in the past a talk about life and death, today we have a differentiation within the category itself. The major cut happened when Agamben produced in the 1990s, that is consequent with the post cold-War “disappearing” of borders, a conceptual division from within the category of life presenting a new process of distinction inside biopolitics that is between the form-of-life (mode-of-life) and bare life. Though he missed to do the same with death. This diversification going along with the blossoming of identity politics in the 1990s in the form of multiculturalism was seen as a cultural phenomenon, but maybe we missed to call it a process of racialization being connected to the diversification or racializations of capital itself.

In this sense, Agamben has, referring to Benjamin, noted that “What the law can never tolerate – what it feels as a threat with which it is impossible to come to terms – is the existence of the violence outside the law; and this is not because the ends of such a violence are incompatible with law, but because of its mere existence outside the law.”[8]

There, where revolutionary violence should have existed, we now see pure colonial violence. This is an “upgrade” of inside/outside binary where on the outside the violence is deployed as pure production of death, while the control over the inside controls the levels of commodification.

Capital got a myriad of names: cognitive, immaterial, and financial. Therefore, as well the process of classification of the victim, the production of a list of victim(s) started to be divided from within. This process is also important as the capitalist Christian project of dispossession does not allow any “identity” (including the Imperial Jew) to acquire a position from which it could denote capitalism as such, in a certain way these identities are pitted one against the other, without understanding that they are a product of the processes of racialization, presented in the “outside” as a kind of identity politics. What is necessary is to put forward the racializations of capital itself as the main element that can be historically connected to the racialization processes of colonialism until today in all the possible historical modes.

Therefore, the decolonial anti-Semite and Imperial Jew in a way may be seen as a binary on the lines where the decolonial anti-Semite is being seen (or produced) as a position that negates the exclusivity to the victim, while the Imperial prefix may be seen as a position ready to embrace that exclusivity as the compensation for profiling of the politics as a consensual, not antagonist project.

Make no mistake, capitalism as Christian project of dispossession does not allow any “identity” (including the Imperial Jew) to acquire a position from which it could denote capitalism as such a project, it would only allow an “identity” to profile itself as proto-Christian. After all, western reactionary mythology sees the Jews as proto-Christians who would in some apocalyptic act of revelation finally “rediscover” the “true, universal” format of salvation.

In other words, the promise of liberation by capital therefore gets its “concrete” result in the form of the upgrade of the status of the victim, to say it differently, it is a process of fragmentation and division, hence

production of a "legitimate" victim.

What we have as the promise of liberation by capital, therefore is a paradoxical and cynical measure where the liberation is presented as an infinity of fragmentations, but not of any kind. It is a process of capitalism's racialization at work here.

Here, we could see the capitalism's racialization as a control axis on which infinity of differential forms of capitalist expansion is being conceived.

After all, the motives for colonial expansion which are based on a concept of transfer of the motives of the perpetrator to the victim in the fashion that implied totalitarian zeal, supremacist agenda or (perversely enough) imperialist tendency existed on behalf of the victim, consequently denoted colonial hegemony only as an instrument through which some victims would be elevated to a status of a "legitimate" victim and therefore presented as Imperial victims. After all, these procedures have converted the process of hegemonization of the social space into a legitimate process of creation of a framework in which, material and epistemic operation concentrated around different levels of production of a victim, would be seen as legitimate raw material for construction of an ideology.

The firmness in performative "prohibition of anti-racism," we have mentioned earlier, is therefore just a firmness deployed in protection of utter politically ideological emptiness that stands behind the globalized capitalist machine. At this point we have shown that the only way is to conduct the analysis in a way to present the moment when the categories themselves stumble onto themselves. When we do not operate with a monolithic category of Imperial Jew but present it as an outcome of the process of racialization we see the main logic of global capitalism itself. On the other hand, this is as well hidden by the demand in global capitalism not to talk about racism, under the saying that there is no racism in contemporary global societies. Or, it is prohibited as a normative demand to talk about it, while racialization still remains the main logic of the differentiation of the social and political and economical space of global capitalism.

We suggest having a turn on interpretation of identity politics as a strict process of so called culturalization into interpretation of identity politics as global capitalism's racializations.

They are internal to capital itself; racialization is not just a process of producing tropes - that means it is not only about a fast process of capital's narrativization of its, so to say, immanent levels of dispossessions; racialization is a process inherent to capital itself. The process of internal racialization of capital itself functions as a "molding of the snake," that presents itself as changing from cognitive to financial capital, etc., where molding is not cultural but racial. Maybe the next stage in molding would be (or already is) a notion of human capital, that would present a token of appropriation of the purpose and spectrum of meanings humanity carries and allow to capitalism to represent its antagonists as ultimate anti-human (since we already have a variety of non-humans) "totalitarian" agitators.

As Mbembe has noted, "What distinguishes our age from previous ages, the breach over which there is apparently no going back, the absolute split of our times that breaks up the spirit and splits it into many, is again contingent, dispersed and powerless existence: existence that is contingent, dispersed, and powerless but reveals itself in the guise of arbitrariness and the absolute power to give death anytime, anywhere, by any means, and for any reason." [9]

The notion of powerless existence in the context between racialization and representation, theory and discursivity, should not be treated in binary terms that would have implied an existence of dichotomy relation among the (powerless) subjugated and (death bring-

ing) subjugator. The "guise of arbitrariness" should be seen as a property of hegemonic power to give death any time, while the powerless existence should not be seen as an apriory position, but as a property that has marked the closing of the distance, the neutralization of the antagonism between the paradigmatic protagonists in cosmology of power - the subjugator and the subjugated.

Of course, while the power as the power to give death resides in the hands of the subjugator, the arbitrary dimension in necropolitical format of power as such should be seen as a dimension that codifies the transgression of murder, yes, but it should also be seen as a dimension that shatters historical context in which the transgression would be registered as inherent, systemic transgression of power conceived and exercised in such a way.

The arbitrariness, as Mbembe noted, "accomplishes its own work and validates itself through its own sovereignty, and thereby permits power to be exercised as a right to kill and invest..." [10]

In this context, arbitrariness might be seen as a pretext to construction of ideology around the transgression. Idealization of murder, yes, but also as a form of normativization of murder through transcription of dramatic property of such an act to a register of mere reproduction of the order - its economic vitality, ideological prowess and its ability to filter dramatic aprioristic features of a historical era toward the field of representation. Hence, in a way that would ascribe historical and political meaning to a mere method in which some transgression was represented and/or reenacted. Colonialism as such, as a method of expansion of capital, is structured as an ideological operation. Therefore, colonialism, expansion, segregation, genocide as such are attributed to an ideological process. So, murder is seen as an instant ideology.

As racialization provides a kind of an "internal clock" or a "set of guides" used by capitalist racist ideology, the figure of decolonial anti-Semite in this context can be seen as an embodiment of prohibition organized on the basis of "shattering of all prohibitions," but only toward regime's ability to posit itself "antagonistically" toward its own racist ideology. Hence, the arbitrariness of this operation is not arbitrary any more, but it is now ideological.

In a way, this figure makes a coherent connection among racialization and the system that sustains it, not because it focuses on a certain "race," but because it points toward a function of a race as the only prefix or constitutive pillar of a pool in which ideological coherence is being derived from.

The contours of representation consequently can be seen formatted as contours within which, history as a register in which political and ideological antagonisms are confronted, would be subjected to a form of container for deletion of political and/or politically ideological pretenses from the social conflict. What better way to externalize internal logic but to present it as such, only without systemic connotations with the regime that has organized the same logic.

In this sense, racialization determines the historical viability and political aprioristic of some transgression deleting the same transgression as consistent and inherent to capital and assigning it to a register in which the connection of transgression and the system that produced it would be eliminated.

In this sense, the decolonial Anti-Semite might be seen as a disruption of this elimination. The elimination of this link does not serve as an erasure of pivotal roles of any race in the process of racialization, but exactly as an instrument for construction of a pivotal role around the paradigmatic, white, heterosexual Christian male from the First world who would denote racism as a negative mechanism in force, but only in

those social strata that failed to integrate specific First worlds version of racism into its own ideological logic.

Therefore, arbitrariness does not function as a mask of an absence of some profound "possibility" or a "new form" capitalism as a system of mandatory transgression could attain, but as a depiction of an ideology based on utter emptiness, more precisely, based on nothingness that is being filled and dramatized with transgression. Necropolitical format of this integration clearly reflects the racism as legitimate terrain on which racial subjection would be codified as part of a modernist narrative, hence, as an "erratic" framework that fosters struggle for prominence of an identity, culture and race within the hierarchies of exploitation. Imperial Jew in this context is a produced position that represents formation of politics of a state on gaining prominence in these hierarchies exactly through deployment of necropolitics.

### Part three

We stated that what is at the core of the debates today is a situation of confrontation between two contradictory positions: the Imperial Jew and on the other side the decolonial Anti-Semite. Both figures were developed as early in the previous decade after the 2001. If we had departed from two obviously contradictory positions: the Imperial Jew and the decolonial anti-Semite it is not because they were there as positivist notions, but they were both a product and still are in processes of capital hegemonic transformations. To put the analysis in more philosophical terms and to round up with what we started the relation between the two positions that are until now clearly identified, present themselves as contradiction, one is A and the other is -A.

This is why it was possible to talk about a deadlock position, as the situation at the beginning was an immovable self-identical universe in which contradictory features coincide, but as we know things change as exposed by Slavoj Žižek, [11] and they are never directly A and non-A, they can only gradually change from A to non-A.

This gradual change we conceptualized as global capitalism's racializations. Capitalism that is a perfidious and necropolitical regime that destroys everything and everybody had not only annihilated millions of Jews, but as well in order to hide this, started to produce along its process of diversification a performative figure of power that is now pitted against all the others in a process of hegemonic racialization conducted by capital.

To use Žižek's vocabulary: How do we pass from the first identity of the opposites (The Jew as nothing) to a Jew as something (the Imperial one), from Nothing to Being? To resolve this impossibility, this deadlock, one passes into Becoming, into oscillation between the two poles. This becoming is today global capitalism racializations. We can state this in the moment we fully take into account the radical retroactivity of the dialectical process: the process of becoming, as stated by Žižek, is not in itself necessary, but the becoming (the gradual contingent emergence) of necessity itself, more accurately, of capital necessity. And more, after 2001, Žižek claims that the very elevation of a necessity into the structuring principle of the contingent field of multiplicity is a contingent act, one can almost say: the outcome of a contingent ('open') struggle for hegemony.

To a certain extent the formation of the Imperial Jew is actually a process of contingency of necessity, that is to say, the very process through which necessity arises out of necessity is a contingent process. It is a "performative' process of constructing (forming) that which is 'discovered.'"

Still, though we have nothing besides reality that is not-All and contingency, a problem persists; We can posit it as a question similar to the one Žižek posits to Quentin Meillassoux. In rethinking Meillassoux's



After Finitude,[12] Žižek elaborates that the true problem that arises after we perform the basic speculative gesture of Meillassoux (transposing the contingency of our notion of reality into the thing itself) is not so much what more we can say about reality-in-itself, but how does our subjective standpoint and subjectivity itself fit into reality. And Žižek concludes: "For this, we need a theory of subject which is neither that of transcendental subjectivity nor that of reducing the subject to a part of objective reality." The same question we can posit in reversal to Žižek, to the both parties included in the analysis and to us as well. In short, after all where our subjective standpoint, and subjectivity itself, fit into the reality, that Žižek elaborates stating that in the end the problem is "how do phenomena themselves arise within the flat stupidity of reality which just is, how does reality redouble itself and start to appear to itself."

Precisely this was the question at the very beginning why to write this text, to answer how this global capitalist reality in its flat stupidity that is a horrifying process of racializations and hegemonizations that already frame our positions as well making us an easy prey for being disposed by both sides of the coin redoubles itself (the new logic of global capitalism) and starts to appear to itself as itself.

#### FOOTNOTES

[1] <http://www.okcir.com/Articles%20VII%202/Mignolo-FM.pdf>

[2] Cf. Walter D. Mignolo, *Epistemischer Ungehorsam. Rhetorik der Moderne, Logik der Kolonialität und Grammatik der Dekolonialität*, translated by Jens Kastner and Tom Wai-bel, Turia + Kant, Vienna, 2012.

[3] Cf. Santiago E. Slabodsky, "But there are no longer any anti-Semites! Vicious Circles, Jewish Destinies, and a Complementary Framework to Read De-colonial Discourses," in *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge*: Vol. 7: Issue. 2, Article 5, 2009.

[4] All the references from Slabodsky are coming from his text published in 2009.

[5] Cf. Achille Mbembe, "Provincializing France," in *Public Culture*, Volume 23, Number 1, 2011, pp. 85-119.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Joan Copjec, *Read My Desire: Lacan Against the Historicists*, Harvard: MIT Press, 1994.

[8] Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception*, The University of Chicago Press, (Chicago, 2005, p. 53.

[9] Cf. Achille Mbembe, *On the Postcolony*, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 2001, p. 13.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Cf. "Slavoj Žižek interviewed by Ben Woodard," in *The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism*, Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and. Graham Harman, editors, re.press Melbourne, Australia, 2011.

[12] Cf. Quentin Meillassoux, *After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency*, Continuum, 2008.

# KONTRA (RE-)PRODUKTIVNI RAD

Marina Višmit

Ovaj tekst je prilagođena verzija izlaganja koja je prezentovana na izložbi *Beyond Re/Production: MOTHERING – Dimensionen der sozialen Reproduktion im Neoliberalismus*/[Dimenzije socijalne reprodukcije u neoliberalizmu], Kunstraum Kreuzberg/Bethanien, Berlin, 30. mart 2011.

Ovaj tekst će pokušati da smesti debate o upravljanju socijalnom reprodukcijom u istorijski okvir marksističkih feminizama, koji su redefinisali rad u domaćinstvu kao pitanje kritičke političke ekonomije i klasne borbe, kao i u savremenu aktivističku i teorijsku praksu. Kao sferu intervencije, uzeću diskusiju o upravljanju socijalnom reprodukcijom, koja se trenutno nalazi visoko na listi prioriteta politike u Velikoj Britaniji, i bez sumnje ovde u Nemačkoj, pošto je ovo jedna od vodećih zemalja koje promovisu makroekonomske politike štednje u Evropskoj uniji. Intervencija se sastoji u propitivanju šta znači upisati društvene prakse koje ne proizvode tržišna dobra u formu dnevnice, u konkretnom smislu, kao i u formu vrednosti u širem smislu. Kontekst ovog istraživanja je zahtev za nadoknadom za neplaćeni i nevrednovani rad, i kako su se takvi zahtevi razvijali u istorijskom i političkom smislu primer je inicijativa „Nadnice za rad u domaćinstvu“ (Wages for Housework), temeljni ili garantovani dohodak, njujorške umetničke grupe W.A.G.E. (Working Artists and The Greater Economy), i zahtev koji se pojavljuje sada, kao prapratna pojava, od strane države, da nekada plaćeni i institucionalizovani oblici rada i društvenih davanja budu bez naknade i da budu vršeni na dobrovoljnoj osnovi, kao vrsta društveno korisnog rada koji vrše ljudi koji (još) nisu uhapšeni, što je naznačeno u predlogu britanske koalicione Vlade u cilju stvaranja „Velikog društva“. Teorijski, kao i politički, temelji ovog istraživanja su feminizam, pogotovo italijanski autonomistički i materijalistički feminizam, koji je iznedrio kampanju „Nadnice za rad u domaćinstvu“, kao i teorije vrednosne forme koje dolaze sa pozicije levog kritičkog i hegelijanskog marksizma, čiji su predstavnici Moise Postone (Moishe Postone), Kris Artur (Chris Arthur), i na kraju tekstovi o „komunizaciji“ Bruna Astarijana (Bruno Astarian), objavljeni u časopisima *Endnotes* i *Theorie Communiste*.

Želela bih da napravim uvod u ovo istraživanje tako što ću ga povezati sa pozadinom istraživanja o društvenim praksama, koje trenutno radim, i koje su otporne na pokušaje upisivanja u formu vrednosti kapitala, pošto ih je teško komodifikovati – rad u domaćinstvu, umetnost koja ne proizvodi objekte – i kako se ovaj problem prevazilazi ili ne prevazilazi procesom ponovnog opisivanja, tržišnom cenom, što je slučaj sa praksama koje se nazivaju „uslugama“. Drugi aspekt bila bi proizvodnja subjektiviteta koji se rađa iz borbi koje nužno obuhvataju i identifikaciju i negaciju, konsolidaciju i rasipanje društvene kategorije ili identiteta; u ovom smislu feministička, ali i komunistička politika su dva primera na kojima radim već neko vreme (iako isti paradoksi, ili pre dijalektika, mogu biti pronađeni u svakom društvenom pokretu koji pokušava da prizove grupni identitet koji je marginalizovan kako bi i prevazišao potlačenost tog identiteta, kao i da promeni društvene uslove koje taj totalitet čine mogućim). Ono što je zajedničko ovim dvema stranama istraživanja je pitanje strategije. Opšte je poznata činjenica da kapital samo čini jačim ono što ga ne ubije, što važi i za „preterane zahteve“ kao što je inicijativa „Nadnice za rad u domaćinstvu“ ili za temeljni dohodak, koje se sprovode do nivoa u kome

pojačavaju kapacitet države da nadgleda građane u korist kapitala koji je u stanju da iskorišćava one koji primaju tu vrstu „socijalne pomoći“. Tako da „preterani zahtevi“, kojima je cilj da podignu društvene borbe na drugi nivo, imaju tendenciju da nose paradoksalni karakter, gde su njihovi stvarni praktični ciljevi toliko u suprotnosti sa zahtevima koje motiviše profit, da uopšte ne predstavljaju zahteve kapitalu koje on ne može ispuniti (ili kako je Silvija Federiči (Silvia Federici) napisala „Nadnice protiv rada u domaćinstvu“), već se mogu samo realizovati u revolucionarnoj situaciji gde bi kapital i država bili eliminisani iz procesa odlučivanja. Kao što je Karl Marks definisao u prvoj knjizi *Osnovi političke ekonomije* (Grundrisse), kad je pisao o socijalističkim predlozima za „novac za plate“: „Ovaj zahtev će biti ostvaren samo pod uslovima u kojima neće moći biti ni postavljen.“ Slično se može reći za socijalno demokratske zahteve koji se iznose u militantnom duhu, što je slučaj mnogih rasprava i zahteva koje danas postavljaju pokreti za obrazovanje, na primer „obrazovanje mora biti besplatno“; čini se da su ovi zahtevi upućeni u savetodavnom tonu kapitalističkoj državi koja je izgubila svoj put, ili političkom subjektu kome takav zahtev može biti upućen samo refleksivno, kao subjektu Kantovog estetskog suda. Ali to ne znači da ovakve inicijative ne mogu da razviju pravu moć, kad se imaju u vidu strogo ograničeni horizonti kapitala danas u Evropi i Sjedinjenim Državama.

Dakle, da bih počela istorijski pregled, želim da se pozovem na iskustvo italijanskog autonomističkog marksizma – operaizma, u dve njegove tačke: prva je negacija rada, a druga redefinisavanje neproduktivnog rada u produktivni rad. Stanovište o negaciji rada je korisno sumirao Mario Tronti, kad je pisao o „odbijanju da se radi“ i o odbijanju političkog identiteta koji proizlazi iz pozicije radnika u okviru društvenih odnosa kapitala: „Da bi se borila protiv kapitala, radnička klasa mora da se bori sama protiv sebe utoliko koliko predstavlja kapital.“ U ovom smislu, diskusija o „radništvu“, od samog početka, barem u razmišljanju Tronija i Ranijera Panzierija (Ranjo Panzieri), morala je pre da obuhvata odbijanje pojma produktivnosti, na način na koji je on konstruisan u društvenim odnosima, nego kao valorizaciju produktivnosti odvojenu od kapitalističke kontrole: na ovaj način kapital se razume kao društveni odnos, a ne kao parazitska moć, kako su ga definisali kasniji postautonomisti u svojim teorijama. Mada, mora biti na jasnom da ova druga definicija proizlazi iz autonomističkog „Kopernikanskog obrta“, koji je započeo takođe Tronti, i koji konstatuje da je rad primarna, a ne zavisna varijabla u razvoju kapitala. Drugo stanovište je redefinisavanje rada u domaćinstvu, u socijalnoj skrbi i slično, u produktivni rad, o čemu su pisale autonomističke feministkinje, kao što su Mariarosa Dala Kosta (Mariarosa Dalla Costa), Silvija Federiči (Silvia Federici), Leopoldina Fortunati (Leopoldina Fortunati) i druge, što je perspektiva koja podupire zahteve kampanje „Nadnice za rad u domaćinstvu“.

Ove feminističke aktivistkinje i teoretičarke iz sedamdesetih su odgovorne za ukazivanje neophodnosti neplaćenog rada u sistemu proizvodnje koji je fokusiran na plaćeni rad. Ovaj argument može da se odnosi na proizvodnju viška vrednosti (zavisnost profita od neplaćenog rada) iz perspektive podela u okviru radničke klase: vrednost rada plaćenih radnika zavisi od neplaćenog rada domaćica. U ovom slučaju, revolucionarna perspektiva je bila ona koja

je težila da konsoliduje frakcije klase eksploatisane na najrazličitije načine, tako što će ukazati na jedinstvo interesa u borbi protiv eksploatacije – a pitanje nadnice biće sporedno, a ne ključno pitanje u određivanju političkog subjekta klasne borbe.

Nadnica razdvaja radnike jedne od drugih i proizvodi oblik discipline i identifikacije između interesa rada i kapitala (mada treba reći da nadnica čuva dijalektičku neusklađenost između tih interesa, dok na primer rasprostranjenost duga danas prisilno smanjuje tu razliku, gde bi ova neusklađenost mogla da postane mesto borbe). Rešenje kojim se kolektivizuje rad u domaćinstvu i socijalna skrb ovde bi postalo nedovoljno, sve dok rodna podela na plaćeni i neplaćeni rad, i pozicija te podele u okviru širih odnosa kapitala i rada ostanu nepromenjene.

Strateška važnost redefinisavanja „ženskog rada“ u produktivni rad, u smislu kapitala, takođe je važna, pošto su muški „produktivni radnici“ bili najradikalniji i najaktivniji deo italijanskog radničkog pokreta, a ovo je bio način da se feministički pokret ujedini sa njima – okupljanje feminističkog i radničkog pokreta na osnovu eksploatacije – kao i da se proširi delovanje radničkog pokreta u oblast društvene reprodukcije, što je viđeno u praksama kao što su odbijanje da se plaćaju komunalije, „proleterski šoping“ tj. krađa robe, masovna skvotovanja i slično. Takođe, sproveden je diskurs odbijanja da se radi, uz ukazivanje na to da štrajk domaćica ima drugačije značenje od štrajka u fabrici – štrajk domaćica bi u krajnjoj instanci bio radikalniji, jer se povlačenje rada iz fabrike u velikoj meri oslanja na nastavak rada u domaćinstvu.

Iako je inicijativa „Nadnice za rad u domaćinstvu“ oduvek bila kontradiktorna, još od kada su predložili uvođenje još jednog „socijalnog programa“ ili „povlastice“ (kako se to zove u Sjedinjenim Državama), taktički su pomešali „socijalnu nadoknadu“ (državna socijalna pomoć koju kapital daje delu populacije koja mu ne služi za njegovo samovrednovanje, ili delu populacije koju je kapital istrošio) sa nadnicom koja se plaća onima koji su formalno zaposleni.

Ova vrsta socijalne nadnice je protivteža „porodičnoj nadnici“, koja ubrzano nestaje, a koja je implicirala da je jedna i to muška plata u porodici bila dovoljna za potrebe članova porodice koji ne rade i zavise od njega – ovo je moćna fikcija, pošto je bila korišćena da bi se nadnice žena veštački održale na niskom nivou još od vremena industrijske revolucije do danas, čime su žene takođe bile isključene iz glavnih, ali i radikalnih radničkih organizacija. Takođe, ideja „Nadnice za rad u domaćinstvu“, i kada nije stupila na snagu u obliku grotesknog povratka komodifikovanog rada u domaćinstvu, prvenstveno rada migranata u domaćinstvima srednje klase širom sveta, može da bude oživljena od strane države u obliku upravljanja stanovništvom koje nije aktivno u zvaničnoj privredi, kao što je program „Bolsa familia“ u Brazilu ili nekakvi elementi platforme levice u Nemačkoj koji se provlače ovde (u Nemačkoj) već tri godine, kako su me Feličita (Felicita) i Kristiane (Christiane) obavestile.

Povratak klase sluškinja ovde je od ključnog značaja, pošto je to naravno odraz mnogih promena u okviru globalne kapitalističke akumulacije – transnacionalne migracije i regulacije tih migracija u zapadnim zemljama, feminizacije te migracije. Takođe, došlo je do dramatičnog porasta broja žena koje rade – delom zbog zakonâ na Zapadu koji garantuju jednaka prava – a nisu u stanju da obavljaju kućne poslove, uz malu decu i troškove brige o njima. Ovaj narativ je u stvari alegorija o srećnim okolnostima liberalnog feminizma ili feminizma koji zahteva jednaka prava, koji je uspeo u mnogim slučajevima da odstrani pitanje roda u smislu eksploatacije u poslovnom okruženju, da bi ga samo premestio u klasu „drugih žena“, koje su rasno diferencirane i koje ilegalno rade, pošto je država blagostanja propala u neoliberalnoj eri. U ovom smislu, komodifikacija rada u domaćinstvu

nasilno sprovodi klasne odnose i klasne podele u okviru feminizma, ali to treba posmatrati kao jedan u seriji poraza koje su društveni i radnički pokreti pretrpeli u neoliberalizmu, čime su unazađene žene na posebne načine paralelno sa opštom društvenom regresijom, a ne kao poraz za koji je odgovoran liberalni mainstream feminizam – njegovu moć možemo da čitamo isključivo kao simptom moći neoliberalizma.

Jedna od velikog broja lekcija, koje možemo da vidimo u idejama „Nadnice za rad u domaćinstvu“, jeste odnos izpodbijanja oko toga kako je vrednosna forma, nadnica u ovom slučaju, primenjena u društvenim odnosima, konkretno u društvenoj reprodukciji, zatim kao prekretnica u načinu kapitalističke akumulacije, pa i u trenucima krize (u vremenu i italijanskog autonomizma i „Nadnice za rad u domaćinstvu“, koji su se odvijali s kraja šezdesetih, početkom sedamdesetih, pa nadalje do događaja koji su najavili neoliberalnu eru). Nadnica može biti kategorija izpodbijanja, poluga za ispitivanje čitavog načina proizvodnje, sa stanovišta roda, kao i način da se povežu radničke borbe sa društvenim borbama i „borbama zajednice“.

Ova diskusija može biti nastavljena i danas kroz razmatranje duga u smislu nadnice, to jest prostora klasne borbe, i u smislu erozije antagonizama među klasama, kao i ponovnog uspostavljanja tih antagonizama na drugim osnovama. Takođe, još važnije je ukazati na to kako je dug korišćen umesto nadnice za pristup robama, uslugama i za samorazvoj (kod preduzetničkih projekata i celoživotnih obrazovnih projekata), što nagoveštava figura „ljudski kapital“ koja je danas objektivno postala neizbežni oblik života. U ovom smislu, dug danas, kao nekada „otkriće“ neplaćenog rada, ukazuje na ubrzan nestanak mogućnosti za kolektivnu akciju radničke klase u okviru radnog mesta – ne samo zato što se najveći deo rada, ako ne i u potpunosti, odvija van zvaničnog radnog mesta, na šta su ukazale italijanske autonomističke feministkinje, već zato što akumulacija omogućena dugom proizvodi identitete vezane za potrošnju, a ne produkciju – ovo je jedna od ključnih subjektivnih političkih posledica restrukturiranja odnosa rada krajem sedamdesetih – uprkos činjenici da se izvlačenje viška vrednosti drastično uvećalo tokom tog perioda.

To ne znači da želimo naturalizovati razlike između potrošnje i produkcije; naime, čitava struktura ekonomije koja se održava na spekulativnoj imovini i industriji usluga to čini neodrživim. Ovakva naturalizacija takođe ima specifične političke posledice, što je dokazano u medijskim izveštajima o nedavnim neredima: termin „potrošnja“ se koristi da izoluje, patologizuje i depolitizuje pljačku, što je drugačije u odnosu na produktivnu „politiku“ protesta, napad na „legitimne“ mete.

Vraćajući se na prvo stanovište, na negaciju rada, pozivam se na citat iznet u Theorie Communiste: „Društveni karakter proizvodnje ništa ne predočava unapred; on samo utiče na to da osnova vrednosti bude kontradiktorna.“ Razlog zašto je osnova vrednosti kontradiktorna je to što društveni karakter kapitalističke proizvodnje stvara mogućnosti za bezbroj različitih i naprednih oblika ljudske saradnje, šireći sfere potreba, želja, omogućavajući tehnološki napredak koji bi učinio od „opšteg intelekta“ stvarno efikasnu snagu, zajedničko dobro, ali on smanjuje ove kapacitete do jednog nivoa vrednosti koja se predstavlja kao samorastuća forma i privatno vlasništvo (u tehničkom smislu se može dodati da je osnova vrednosti kontradiktorna, pošto je njena osnova rad, a ipak kapital stalno mora izbacivati rad iz procesa proizvodnje), što se dodatno smanjuje u periodima krize i rata. Teoretičari koji se bave „komunizacijom“, to jest neposrednim vraćanjem komunizmu, kome prethodi slom u okviru odnosa rada i kapitala, kao i propadanje politika koje se temelje na afirmaciji rada i radničkog identiteta, što oni nazivaju programatizmom, povezuju negaciju ili ukidanje rada sa ukidanjem upotrebne vrednosti, pošto ih ne zado-

voljava eliminacija apstraktnog rada i tržišne vrednosti kao ona dva termina koja služe samo obeležavanju kapitalističkih funkcija inače neutralnih, termina kao što su „rad“ i „vrednost“, čime se i dalje bavi sve do današnjih dana pre-kritička levica.

Bruno Astarijan piše: „Ali onda, ako je upotrebna vrednost identična korisnosti, ukidanje vrednosti je ograničeno na ukidanje tržišne vrednosti (koja se realizuje u procesu robne razmene, nap. urednice). Istina je da komunistička teorija u svojim programskim ciljevima nudi različite verzije ukidanja vrednosti, koje su sve ograničene na eliminisanje tržišne vrednosti putem planiranja. Aktivnost ostaje ista (rad odvojen od potrošnje i ostatka života), a planiranje garantuje pravdu, jednakost i zadovoljenje potreba, koje se smatraju egzogenim, skoro prirodnim datostima. Naprotiv, čim se komunikacija razume kao radikalna transformacija aktivnosti, svih aktivnosti, kao personalizacija života koja je posledica ukidanja klase, upotrebna vrednost otkriva svoju apstraktnu dimenziju korisnosti za (solventnu) potražnju, čije osobine su nepoznate i samim time prosečne, apstraktne.“

Ovde treba naznačiti, pošto se površno bavimo problematikom koja prožima francusku i britansku teoriju komunikacije, da se „komunistička teorija u svojim programskim ciljevima“ odnosi na ortodokсни marksizam, koji je institucionalno delovao u staljinističkoj francuskoj komunističkoj partiji u 20. veku, a mnogi od spomenutih normativnih principa, kao što je neutralnost upotrebne vrednosti, u drugim su nacionalnim i kritičkim kontekstima, kao što je nemački kritički marksizam, kao i u kontekstu teorije koja se bavi kritikom vrednosti, bili problematizovani već nekoliko decenija unazad.

Šta se dešava ako mislimo o reprodukciji sa društvenim karakterom proizvodnje (ili unutar njega) na način kontradiktorne vrednosti, koja čini vrednost kontradiktornom, koja postavlja reprodukciju unutar termina „kontraproduktivni rad“ – pojam koji koristi Kris Artur da bi označio nezavisni subjektivitet rada u okviru i u suprotnosti sa njegovim prisvajanjem od strane kapitala (izvinjavam se što ovde nisam objasnila ovaj hegelijanski pojam)? Kao što piše Silvija Federiči, koju ste nedavno mogli čuti na predavanju u Berlinu, politički značaj redefinisavanja reproduktivnog rada je dvojak – ne samo da je doveo u pitanje samodovoljni i prirodni status produktivnog rada kao jednak sa plaćenim radom – ne zato što sav plaćeni rad prema Marksovom mišljenju nije produktivan, već zato što se plaćeni rad oslanja na nevidljivi dodatak i taj je neplaćeni rad – nego je pretvorio reproduktivni rad u prostor osporavanja zato što ga je spoznao kao upisanog u krugotok akumulacije: „[...] s time što smo prepoznali 'reproduktivni rad' kao teren akumulacije, i samim tim kao teren eksploatacije, bili smo u stanju da vidimo reprodukciju kao teren borbe, i što je najvažnije, da zamislimo antikapitalističku borbu protiv reproduktivnog rada koja neće uništiti nas ili naše zajednice... Ovo je omogućilo da razmišljamo na nov način o svakom aspektu svakodnevnog života – o odgajanju dece, odnosima između muškarca i žene, homoseksualnim odnosima, seksualnosti uopšte – u odnosu na kapitalističku eksploataciju i akumulaciju“.

Ona dodaje: „[Pojavila se] mogućnost da se kaže da je seksualnost za žene bila način da se započne razmišljanje na potpuno novi način o seksualnim odnosima, uključujući i homoseksualne odnose. Upravo zbog feminističkog i gay pokreta počeli smo da razmišljamo o načinima na koje je kapitalizam eksploatisao našu seksualnost i učinio je 'produktivnom'“.

I pored svih ovih novih definicija produkcije i reprodukcije, koje su se javile u različitim istorijskim okolnostima i zato sa naše istorijske ili teorijske tačke prednosti ne mogu biti smatrane „greškama“, i dalje se suočavamo sa kontradikcijom da širenje definicije produktivnog rada na ovaj način jeste njegovo pretvaranje u afirmaciju rada i zahtev za nadnicom – što je naravno dijalektički zahtev („Nadnice protiv rada u



domaćinstvu”), „nemogući zahtev” i strateški zahtev, što je isto način na koji je garantovan temeljni dohodak formulisan u nekim marksističkim argumentima, koji se zalažu za ovaj sistem. Ali takav zahtev unapred prisvaja politiku utemeljenu na analizi širenja realnog prisvajanja kapitala/robnih odnosa, finansijalizacije, kao i u generalizaciji duga u rastućoj privatnoj društvenoj reprodukciji koja je orijentisana na profit, a ignoriše posledice biopolitike u širenju sfere države u privatno domaćinstvo, koga su privatnim učinile ekonomske potrebe kapitala. Isto tako, površno gledano, takav zahtev je potvrdio i konsolidovao nadničarski odnos te istovremeno pretvorio dom u mesto gde rade žene (ili za bilo koga koji ne radi van domaćinstva), umesto da se preispita rodna podela rada i njena intimna korelacija sa oblikom nadnice. Na neki način, koncept nadnice za rad u domaćinstvu se suprotstavlja premisama od kojih je krenuo, što je pretpostavljalo uništenje klasnog odnosa uništenjem pozicije koju žena zauzima u njemu. Mogući odgovor, koji bi potvrdio dijalektičku i stratešku prirodu ove kampanje, jeste da je korišćenjem robe moguće eliminisati robu.

Na kraju, iako pozicionirani u istorijskom kontekstu i u političkom momentu, „preterani zahtevi”, a posebno „Nadnica za rad u domaćinstvu”, suočavaju nas sa neadekvatnostima i tada, a pogotovo sada, kada razdvajanje između rada i sredstava reprodukcije, i od strane kapitala ali i rada, treba da bude postavljeno, a ne razrešeno, na stranu koja će neizbežno odgovarati kapitalu i državi. Subjektivna dezidentifikacija sa radom i rodom ne može na sebe da preuzme pozitivnu valentnost „ekscesa” (ako polazemo pravo na obećanje sistema, koje nije bilo namenjeno nama, razotkrićemo laž sistema), što može da bude normalizujući čin samo u trenutnim uslovima normalizovane katastrofe, ali ona može da obelodani imperativ negacije kao praktičnu politiku. Ne radi se samo o tome da je nekakva strategija „ekscisivnih zahteva (za nadnicom)” funkcionisala na izvestan način kao radikalna politika u fordističkoj eri države blagostanja, a sada nije u stanju da tako funkcioniše, već nas danas kapital suočava sa tim zahtevima, zahtevima koji pretpostavljaju „uslove u kojima se ti zahtevi ne mogu više postavljati.”

Da se vratimo diskusiji upotrebne vrednosti u Astarijanovom citatu koji sam navela ranije. Možemo se usuditi da kažemo da je ovde problem u tome što upotrebna vrednost rada u domaćinstvu nikad nije preispitivana u zahtevu inicijative „Nadnice za rad u domaćinstvu” (ili u bilo kom zahtevu koji želi izjednačavanje rada i nadoknade, registracije nekakve aktivnosti kao rada, kako bi bila prepoznata kroz nadoknadu). To znači da taj rad može postati kapitalistička roba sa upotrebnom vrednošću i vrednošću razmene kao bilo koja druga roba. Ali, ako bi sama upotrebna vrednost bila predmet kritike, rad u domaćinstvu kao prirodna datost koja se odvija van odnosa rada i kapitala, i koja je suštinski važna za reprodukciju tog odnosa, ali nije komodifikovana u tom smislu, delovala bi kao čudna aktivnost koja se sprovodi za nadnicu, kao rad u fabrici ili marketingu.

To je delom razlog što sam zainteresovana za analiziranje rada u domaćinstvu u vezi sa umetničkim praksama koje ne proizvode objekte, koje sežu do Manifesta o održavanju umetnosti (Maintenance Art Manifesto, 1969) i performansa američke umetnice Mijerli Laderman Ukeliz (Mierle Laderman Ukeles), čije održavanje se poklapa sa delovanjem radničkog ili autonomističkog feminizma. U pitanju je rad u domaćinstvu koji je izveden kao umetnost u muzeju, koji je istovremeno i bio povezan sa oblašću rada i usluga koje su bile ponovo upisane, ne samo kao mogući materijal za takvu umetnost već i kao sam sadržaj onoga što je tada apsurdno, ali ipak sugestivno nazvano dematerijalizovanom umetnošću, na način na koji danas pričamo o nematerijalnom radu, i koji je anticipirao tu delatnost. Pod tim podrazumevam avangardne tendencije, počevši od Dade, Fluksusa, do konceptualne umetnosti i postkonceptualnih, relacionih, društvenih i nevidljivih praksi

danas. Za potrebe ove analize, referiram na posebnu vrstu lingvističke „dematerijalizacije” i one bazirane na aktivnosti, koje su prihvaćene na početku prelaska u takozvani postfordizam na Zapadu.

Rad u domaćinstvu koji se pojavljuje kao umetnost, na neki način ponavlja gest ponovnog definisanja rada u domaćinstvu kao rada – prezrena i depolitizovana sfera društvene prakse je na neki način uzdignuta do nivoa vidljivosti i kritičkog razmatranja, tamo u političkom smislu, ovde u estetskom, čime je oslabljena premisa na kojoj se bazirala ona podela rada, istovremeno time je recipročno kontaminirana „superiorna” pozicija (ako rad u domaćinstvu treba da bude plaćen, onda sve treba da bude plaćeno, što je logički i materijalno nemoguće, hajmo onda da ukinemo kapital; ako rad u domaćinstvu nije toliko različit od umetnosti, onda se ni umetnost ne razlikuje toliko od rada u domaćinstvu).

U tekstu Maintenance Art Manifesto stoji: „Ubijam se od pranja, čišćenja, kuvanja, obnavljanja, podrške, održavanja i slično. Takođe (do sada odvojeno od ovih aktivnosti), „bavim se” umetnošću. Od sada ću raditi te svakodnevnne poslove održavanja i isterati ih do svesti te izložiti ih kao umetnost. Živeću u muzeju, kao što to inače radim u domaćinstvu sa svojim mužem i bebom, tokom trajanja izložbe (Je l' da? Ili, ako ne želite da sam tu noću, dolaziću svaki dan.) i radiću sve ove stvari kao javne umetničke aktivnosti: praću i glačaću pod, brisaću prašinu, opraću zidove (tj. 'skinuću slike sa zidova, obrisati prašinu, opraću skulpture, ponovo ću vratiti slike na zid')...”

Prelazim sa teme inicijative „Nadnice za rad u domaćinstvu” i u ovoj diskusiju barem ukratko moram da spomenem W.A.G.E., grupu koju sam spomenula u uvodu, koja zahteva finansijsku kompenzaciju (uglavnom u obliku institucionalnog budžeta) za umetničke prakse koje ne proizvode rezultate koje je lako materijalizovati institucionalno ili ekonomski. Oni žele „kapitalističku vrednost” u zamenu za „kritičku vrednost” koju oni pružaju, čime se nadaju da će prekinuti magičnu vezu između umetnika i posmatrača, subjektivno i strukturno. Odgovor na ovaj zahtev naravno može da bude isti kao teza koja je izneta u ovom tekstu, a to je kako zahtevati bolje uslove reprodukcije, kada sami ti uslovi treba da budu iskorenjeni. O tome Paolo Virno kaže: „Danas se umetnički rad pretvara u rad za nadnicu, a problem je naravno kako osloboditi ljudsku aktivnost uopšte od plaćenog rada.” Zato mislim da je vredno, kao što pokušavam da uradim u svom istraživanju koje je orijentisano na umetnost, da razdvojim barem malo te nivoe, pokušavajući utvrditi da umetnost nije slična životu u svom radikalnom odnosu, već u mimetičkom odnosu – gde se „mimetičko” odnosi na ideju mimezisa koji potiče iz rada filozofa kao što su Adorno, Benjamin i Rože Kaloa (Roger Callois) – između njih je impliciran prekid u smislu fuzije, isto koliko i u smislu odvajanja. Dalje, smatram da nema smisla baviti se odnosom umetnosti i politike, a da se ne ispita kako se umetnost i rad međusobno približavaju i udaljavaju u odnosu na kapital.

Prateći ovu ambivalentnu nit, želim da završim sa otvorenim pitanjem, na koje sam se ovlaš osvrnula u početku, a to je problematična dijalektika između afirmacije i negacije u feminističkoj i komunističkoj politici. Dijalektika afirmacije i negacije je možda najinteresantnije nasleđe jedne od struja autonomističkog marksizma o kome sam ovde govorila. Nadnice za rad u domaćinstvu/društvena nadnica može da se posmatra, možda u sukobu sa argumentima koje sam do sada prezentovala, kao jedan od najočiglednijih primera toga. Ovde postoji afirmacija identiteta radnika, kako bi se razmontirao odnos rada i kapitala kroz neverovatno širok i nemerljiv koncept rada – takođe kroz afirmaciju pozicije radnika kao potlačene klase u okviru odnosa između kapitala i rada. Tako bi se otragao delić bogatstva koje je rad proizveo u cilju širenja autonomije/opsega akcije radničke klase, bez pripadanja radničkoj klasi – da pokažem koliko si koristan za kapital upravo da bih istrigla nekakvu nezavisnost iz tog odnosa klasični je gest svih klasnih borbi. Paralel-

na sa tim je afirmacija kolektiviteta žena, kako bi se ukazalo na nemogućnosti i nepravdu roda (između ostalog i rodnu podelu rada, kao što ukazuju „Nadnice za rad u domaćinstvu” i druge materijalističke verzije feminizma) kako to razgllašava heteroseksualna re/produktivna matrica, rod kao naturalizovana logika atomizacije i kontrole. Možda je vredno dodati koncept „roda” kao potpune apstrakcije u kapitalu i spomenuti neke od argumenata Šulamit Fajerston (Shulamith Firestone) o „polu/klasi” iz knjige The Dialectic of Sex, kao i artikulacije Mišela Fukoa (Michel Foucault), Melije ili Gaja Hokenhema (Melia ili Guy Hocquenghem), koji izjednačavaju logiku seksualne preferencije i robu, ili rad Deniz Rajli (Denise Riley) o problemu kategorije „žena” u feminizmu, ali čini mi se da ovde nema vremena da se to detaljno uradi.

Istorija feminističkih pokreta pokreće dosta pitanja o identifikaciji i dezidentifikaciji, to jest koji su problemi i potencijali kolektivne identifikacije kao grupe koja je potlačena kako bi se prevazišla i ta potlačenost i grupni identitet koji je održava. Ovo je naravno u vezi sa Marksovom idejom o radničkoj klasi koja više ne mora da bude radnička klasa, ako bi se kapitalističko klasno društvo promenilo u nešto drugo (Kako izbeći identifikaciju sa stuktornom ulogom koja ti je dodeljena u društvu od strane struktura moći, istovremeno koristeći tu ulogu da bi se preispitala i uzdrmla premisa čitavog tog sistema? Šta je struktura „radikalne identifikacije”?). Ovo su pitanja koja možemo da postavimo filozofski, baveći se pojmovima kao što su identitet, negativnost, univerzalnost, čime bismo označili centralni problem onoga što je kasnije nazvano politikom identiteta i tvrdeći da su ove politike izgubile radikalnu poziciju kad su zahtevale da budu smeštene u postojeće stanje stvari. Ovo može da se poveže sa načelom koje je prisutno danas u francuskoj političkoj filozofiji, kod Žaka Ransijera (Jacques Rancière) i Alena Badjua (Alain Badiou), o tome kako jedina moguća promena mora da dođe iz dezidentifikacije sa situacijom, što znači i dezidentifikaciju sa političkim identitetom ili kolektivitetom koji reprodukuje „logiku situacije”, to jest zalaganje za politički identitet koji se bavi ugnjetavanjem i slobodom u ime onoga ko je ugnjetavan i iz pozicije onoga ko je ugnjetavan. Kako se ovakva pozicija odnosi prema društvenim pokretima gde je identitet afirmisan kao teren ponovnog osmišljavanja identiteta (feministički separatizam, crnački nacionalizam i slično), koji se posmatra kao prolazna faza u artikulaciji dugoročnih pokreta za društvenu promenu, koji se temelje na prevazilaženju kapitalizma/patrijarhata/rasizma?

Prema Ransijerovom mišljenju, sinonim ove „dezidentifikacije” ili premeštanja, koje ima veze sa prethodno spomenutim prekidom reprodukcije afektivnih i društvenih pozicija koje je odredio hegemonijski poredak, francuski su radnici iz 19. veka koji su želeli da učestvuju u kulturi, koju je buržoaska desnica proglasila za univerzalnu, umesto da se zadovolje svojom ulogom radnika, čime su se usprotivili distribuciji čovečanstva, samoj premisi univerzalnosti koja je vladala u tom društvu. Oni su negirali rad tako što su po celu noć pisali poeziju. Ali ova ideja „dezidentifikacije” takođe treba da bude podvrgnuta raspravi, sa svim svojim kontradiktornostima i nepredvidivostima, jer to može izazvati vrlo različite vrste pokreta, pokreta koji govore o promeni, ali koji u stvari ništa ne menjaju, ili koji su za primenu univerzalnosti, bez razmatranja strukturne nejednakosti, koji su samo za „redistribuciju” razumnog koje već postoji. Ovde možemo da se pozovemo na Marksa, koji govori o zabrani sindikata posle Francuske revolucije, zabrani koja se dogodila na osnovi „zavereničkih” zakona koji su zabranjivali okupljanje ljudi „sličnih pozicija ili zanimanja”, pošto su oni ugrožavali „slobodu, jednakost i bratstvo” nove republike, čime je ova revolucija za Marksa postala buržoaska – možda na isti način na koji Žak Ransijer zabranjuje političku ekonomiju u svojoj političkoj filozofiji ... i sa tim bih završila.

Sa engleskog na srpski prevela Jelena Maksimović

# COUNTER (RE-)PRODUCTIVE LABOUR

**Marina Vishmidt**

This text is modified from a paper delivered at the exhibition *Beyond Re/Production: MOTHERING – Dimensionen der sozialen Reproduktion im Neoliberalismus*/[Dimensions of social reproduction in neoliberalism], Kunstraum Kreuzberg/Bethanien, Berlin, March 30, 2011.

This text proposes to situate the debate about the management of social reproduction in the historical framework of Marxist feminisms that redefined domestic labour as a question of critical political economy and class struggle, as well as in the present state of activist and theoretical practice. I will take as my sphere of intervention the debate about the management of social reproduction which is currently high on the agenda in the UK, and no doubt here as well in Germany, as Germany is one of the leading countries promoting austerity macroeconomic policies in the EU. The intervention will consist of inquiring into what it means to inscribe social practices which do not produce market commodities into the wage-form, more narrowly, and into the value-form more broadly. The context of the inquiry will be the demand that unpaid or unvalued labour be remunerated, and how this has unfolded historically and politically – examples such as Wages for Housework, the basic or guaranteed income by the New York-based artist rights group W.A.G.E. (Working Artists and the Greater Economy) – and the concomitant demand arising now, from the side of the state, that previously waged and institutionalized forms of labour and social provision be un-remunerated and performed on a voluntary basis, like a kind of community service done by people who have not (yet) been arrested, as in the UK coalition government's proposals for the "Big Society." The theoretical, as well as political, touchstones of this inquiry are feminism, particularly the Italian Autonomist and materialist feminisms which gave rise to the Wages for Housework campaign, and the value-form theory proceeding from left critical and Hegelian Marxism as exemplified by Moishe Postone, Chris Arthur and the writing around "communisation" by the likes of Bruno Astarian, Endnotes, and *Theorie Communiste*.

I would also like to preface this inquiry by connecting it to its background in my ongoing research into social practices which are resistant to inscription in the form of value in capital as they are problematic to commodify – domestic labour, art which does not produce objects – and how this problem is or is not overcome with the re-description, and economic pricing, of such practices as "services." Another aspect would be the production of subjectivity that arises out of struggles that necessarily include both identification and negation of, consolidation and dispersion of, of a social category or identity; in this respect feminist politics as well as communist politics are two examples which I have worked with for some time (although the same paradoxes, or, rather, dialectics, can be found in any social movement that has to invoke a group identity which marginalizes in order both to overcome the oppressions of that identity and to change the social conditions that make it possible, that is, the totality). What these two sides of the inquiry have in common, for me, is the question of strategy. There is the truism that whatever doesn't kill

capital only makes it stronger, and that also goes for "excessive demands" such as Wages for Housework or the basic income which have been implemented only to the degree that they enhance the surveillance capacities of the state on behalf of capital's ability to exploit the recipients of such "benefits." Thus "excessive demands" meant to raise social struggles to another plane tend to bear the paradoxical character that their real practical goals are so contrary to the profit motive that far from posing demands to capital that it cannot fulfill (or, as Silvia Federici once wrote, "Wages Against Housework"), they could only be realized in a revolutionary situation where capital and the state have been eliminated from the equation. As Marx put it in the first notebook of the *Grundrisse* when writing about the socialist proposals for "labour-money," – "This demand can be satisfied only under conditions where it can no longer be raised." Much the same can be said for social democratic demands made in a militant spirit like many of the arguments and demands posed by the education movements in the current period, such as "education must be free"; as demands, they seem to be addressed in an advisory spirit to a capitalist state which has lost its way, or to a political subject which can only be addressed in a reflexive capacity, like the subject of Kant's aesthetic judgment. But it is not to be discounted that such invocations may yet develop real power, looking at the severely curtailed horizons for capital at present, certainly in Europe and the United States.

So, to begin historically, I would like to take the experience of Italian Autonomist Marxism, or *Operaismo* as it is also called, from two standpoints: one, the negation of labour, and the other the redefinition of unproductive as productive labour. The negation of labour standpoint of the period is usefully summed up by Mario Tronti's thinking on the "refusal of work" and the refusal of political identity stemming from the worker's place in the social relations of capital: "To struggle against capital, the working class must fight against itself insofar as it is capital." In this sense, what is discussed as "workerism" does, from the very start, at least as far as Tronti or e.g. Raniero Panzieri were concerned, entail a rejection of productivity as constituted in capitalist social relations rather than a valorisation of a productivity severed from capitalist control: this is capital understood as a social relation, not as a parasitic power the way that much subsequent post-autonomist writing has figured it. Though it can't be avoided that this latter does follow from the autonomist "Copernican turn," initiated also by Tronti, that is, labour is the primary rather than the dependent variable in the development of capital. The other standpoint is the redefinition of housework, care work, etc. as productive labour by the autonomist feminists such as Mariarosa Dalla Costa, Silvia Federici, Leopoldina Fortunati, etc. which is the perspective that underlay the Wages for Housework demand.

These feminist activists and theorists in the 1970s were responsible for pointing out the necessity of unpaid labour to the system of production centred on waged labour. This argument can be seen as addressing surplus value production (the dependence of profit on unpaid labour) from the viewpoint of di-

visions within the working class: the labour-power of waged workers is dependent on the unwaged labour of housewives. The revolutionary perspective here was one that aimed to consolidate fractions of the class exploited in very different ways by showing a unity of interests against exploitation – making the question of the wage ancillary rather than definitive for determining the political subject of class struggle. The wage divides workers from one another and produces a form of discipline and identification between the interests of labour and capital (though it should be noted, that the wage preserves a dialectical mismatch between those interests, while the prevalence of debt today, for example, coercively closes the gap where that mismatch can become a site of struggle). The solution of collectivising housework and care work would here also be insufficient, so long as the gendered division of waged and unwaged labour and its place in the larger capital-labour relation remained unchanged.

The strategic importance of re-defining "women's work" as productive work in terms of capital in this way was also important, since male "productive workers" were the most radical and mobilized part of the Italian worker's movement, and this was a way both to unite the feminist movement with them – to bring together the feminist and the worker's movement on the ground of exploitation – and to expand the worker's movement into social reproduction, as also seen from the practices of self-reduction, proletarian shopping, mass squatting, and so forth. It also enacted the discourse of refusal of work, while pointing out that a housewives' strike had a very different meaning from a strike in the factory: a housework strike would inevitably be more radical, since the withdrawal of labour at the factory relied in great measure on continued labour in the home.

Yet, Wages for Housework was always contradictory, since by proposing that yet another "social program" or "entitlement" (as they're called in the U.S.) be introduced, they were tactically confusing the "social wage" (welfare state concessions by capital for the part of the population it does not require for its self-valorisation or which it has exhausted) with the wage as it was paid to the formally employed. This kind of social wage was counterpoised to what was even then an increasingly fictitious "family wage" which implied one salary by a male breadwinner would be enough to cover the needs of a family of non-employed dependents – a powerful fiction, since it had been used to keep working women's wages artificially low from the time of the Industrial Revolution up to the present, and excluded women from the mainstream, as well as the radical, workers' organizations. Also, the idea of Wages for Housework, when not enacted in the grotesque outcome of the return of commodified housework, namely migrant domestic labour to the homes of the global middle class, can be readily recuperated by the state as a form of management of populations inactive in the formal economy, as with the *bolsa familia* in Brazil or some elements of the German Left Party platform which have been circulated here (in Germany) in the past three years, as Felicitia and Christiane inform me.

The point about the return of a domestic servant class is crucial, of course, as it reflects so many shifts in global capitalist accumulation – transnational migration and its regulation in Western countries, the feminization of that migration. There is also the dramatic increase in the numbers of women entering the workplace – partially as a result of equal-rights legislation in the West – who are not in a position to do double-duty in the home as well, especially not with young children and the costs of child-care. This narrative is in fact an allegory of the fortunes of liberal or equality feminism which succeeded in many cases in removing gender from the terms of workplace exploitation, only to displace it to a raced and illegalized class of "other women" as the welfare state melted away in the neoliberal era. In this sense, the commodification of



domestic labour violently enforces the class relations, and class divisions, of feminism, but should be seen as one of the series of defeats suffered by working-class social movements in neoliberalism which have turned back the clock for women in specific ways as in line with a general social regression, rather than a defeat to be laid at the door of the limited vision held by liberal mainstream feminism – and the power of the latter may be read strictly as a symptom of the power of the former.

So one of the huge number of lessons I can see in the ideas of Wages for Housework is the relationship of contestation over how the value-form, here the wage, is applied to social relations, specifically social reproduction, to a turning-point in the mode of capitalist accumulation, to a moment of crisis (with the Italian Autonomist and Wages for Housework episodes occurring from the late 1960s early 1970s onwards, around the events which were setting the stage for the neoliberal era). The wage can become a contested category, a lever for interrogating a whole mode of production from the standpoint of gender, and a way to link workplace struggles to social or “community” struggles.

This discussion could also link into the present day through what it might mean to consider debt in terms of the wage that is as a site of class struggle, both in terms of the erosion of class antagonism, and its reconstitution on different grounds. But also, importantly, how debt has been used instead of the wage for access to goods, services, as well as the self-development (entrepreneurial and education life projects) implied in the figure of “human capital” which has become objectively unavoidable as a form of life. In this sense, debt now, as the “discovery” of unpaid labour did then, signals the erosion of prospects for collective working-class activity based in the workplace – not only because so much, if not most, capitalist work happens outside the official workplace, as the Italian autonomist feminists pointed out, but because debt-fuelled accumulation produces identities tied to consumption, not production – this could be seen as one of the key subjective political consequences of the post-1970s restructuring of the labour-capital relation – even as surplus-value extraction has intensified drastically over this time.

This is not to naturalize the distinction between consumption and production; the whole structure of economies running on asset bubbles and service industries make that untenable. Such a naturalization also has specific political consequences, as is plainly in evidence in coverage of the recent riots: the label of “consumerism” is used to isolate, pathologize and de-politicize looting, as distinct from the productive “politics” of protest, or attacking “legitimate” targets.

Taking on then the first point, the negation of labour, I would like to refer to a quote by *Theorie Communiste*: “The social character of production does not prefigure anything: it merely renders the basis of value contradictory.” The reason that the basis of value is rendered contradictory by the social character of capitalist production is that this character creates the possibilities for infinitely various and expansive forms of human co-operation, expands the spheres of needs, desires, enables the technological development that could make the “general intellect” a really effective force, a commons, etc. yet contracts all these capacities to the miserable format of self-expanding value and private property (technically, it could also be added that the basis of value is contradictory since this basis is labour yet capital has to constantly expel labour from the production process), which are further reduced by periodic crises and war. Writers working on “communisation,” that is, the immediate and unmediated turn to communism following the tendential breakdown in the capital-labour relation and the decay of any politics based on the affirmation of work or workers’ identity, which they call programmatism, link the negation

or abolition of labour to the abolition of use-value, not being content with the elimination of abstract labour and exchange value only as denoting the capitalist functions of the otherwise innocent terms “labour” and “value,” as so much pre-critical Left analysis continues to do even now.

As Bruno Astarian writes: “But then, if use value is considered identical to utility, the abolition of value is limited to the abolition of exchange value. And it is true that communist theory in its programmatic forms offers various versions of the abolition of value that, in the end, are limited to the elimination of exchange through planning. The activity stays the same (work, separated from consumption and from the rest of life), and planning guarantees justice, equality and the satisfaction of needs, considered exogenous, almost natural givens. On the contrary, as soon as communization is understood as a radical transformation of activity, of all activities, as a personalization of life due to the abolition of classes, use value reveals its abstract dimension of utility for a (solvent) demand unknown in its peculiarities and thus average, abstract.”

It should be noted here, to touch briefly on a problematic that pervades French and British communication theory, that “communist theory in its programmatic form” is referring to a kind of orthodox Marxism, as institutionalized in the Stalinist French Communist Party in the 20th century, for example, many of whose normative principles, such as the innocence of use-value, has in other national and critical contexts, such as the German critical, and value-critical, theory strain, been problematized for several decades already.

But what happens if we think reproduction with or inside the social character of production which renders value contradictory, put reproduction into the term “counterproductive labour” – a term used by Chris Arthur to indicate the independent subjectivity of labour within and against its subsumption by the subject of capital (apologies for the unexplicated Hegelian idiom here)? As Silvia Federici, whom some of you might have seen speaking here recently (in Berlin), has written, the political significance of re-defining reproductive labour was twofold – not only did it undermine the self-sufficient and natural status of productive labour as equated with waged work – not because not all waged work is productive in Marx’s terms but because waged labour relied on an invisible supplement of unwaged labour – but it turned reproductive labour into a site of contestation because it was seen as inscribed into the circuits of accumulation: “...by recognizing that what we call ‘reproductive labor’ is a terrain of accumulation and therefore a terrain of exploitation, we were able to also see reproduction as a terrain of struggle, and, very important, conceive of an anti-capitalist struggle against reproductive labor that would not destroy ourselves or our communities. ...This has allowed a re-thinking of every aspect of everyday life – child-raising, relationships between men and women, homosexual relationships, sexuality in general– in relation to capitalist exploitation and accumulation”

As well as “The ability to say that sexuality for women has been led to a whole new way of thinking about sexual relationships, including gay relations. Because of the feminist movement and the gay movement we have begun to think about the ways in which capitalism has exploited our sexuality, and made it ‘productive.’”

But with all these redefinitions of production and reproduction, which arose in different historical circumstances and thus cannot just be considered from our historical or theoretical vantage to be an “error,” we still face the contradiction that expanding the definition of productive labour in this way is to turn it into an affirmation of labour and a demand for a wage – which is of course a dialectical demand (Wages Against Housework), an “impossible demand” and a strategic

demand, which is also how the Guaranteed Basic Income is framed in some of the Marxist arguments favouring it. But it pre-empts a politics based on the analysis of the spread of real subsumption/commodity relations, of financialization, as in the generalization of debt in increasingly privatised and for-profit social reproduction, as well as turning a blind eye to the biopolitical ends of expanding the sphere of the state into the private household made private by capital’s economic needs. Likewise, on the face of it, it validated and consolidated the wage relation; as well as, turning the home into a workplace for women (or whoever is not working outside it) rather than challenging the gendered division of labour, and its intimate correlation with the form of the wage. So in a way the wages for housework concept counters the premises it starts from, which is the demolition of the class relation by means of the demolition of the position of women within it – to which a response that would affirm the dialectical and strategic nature of the campaign could respond that it is going through the commodity to eliminate the commodity?

Ultimately, although positioned in its historical context and political moment, “excessive demands” and Wages for Housework in particular here, confront us as inadequate then and more so now, when it is the disjuncture between labour and the means of reproduction, from the side of capital as well as labour, which needs to be pushed, not resolved, in a way inevitably favourable to capital and state. The subjective dis-identification with labour and gender cannot take on a positive valence of “excess” (if we claim the promise of the system which is not intended for us, we will expose the lie of the system), which can only be normalizing under the current conditions of normalized disaster, but can help disclose the imperative of negation as a practical politics. It is not simply that the particular strategy of “excess (wage-) demands” worked in some fashion as a radical politics in the welfare-state Fordist era and is no longer capable of doing so; it is that capital is confronting us with these demands now, the demands that presuppose “conditions where [they] can no longer be raised.”

Returning to the discussion of use-value in the Astarian quote I cited earlier, it could be ventured that the problem here can also be seen in that the use-value of housework is never questioned in the Wages for Housework demand, (or any demand equating labour and payment, the registration of activity as labour so that it can be recognized in payment): meaning it can become a capitalist commodity with a use-value and an exchange-value like any other, whereas if use-value itself were put under the critical knife, housework as a natural given lying outside the capital-labour relation, essential for reproducing that relation but not commodifiable in its terms, would start to seem as weird thing to perform for a wage as factory work, or marketing.

This is part of why I’m interested in analysing housework in conjunction with post-object art practices, going back, for instance, to the Maintenance Art Manifesto (1969) and performances of American artist Mierle Laderman Ukeles which took place roughly at the same time as workerist or autonomist feminism – this was actually housework performed as art inside the museum, and was both implicated in and anticipated a milieu of work and services being re-inscribed not just as possible material for but as the very substance of what was then ludicrously but suggestively called dematerialized art, much as they talk about immaterial labour now. By this I mean avant-garde tendencies stretching from Dada to Fluxus to Conceptual Art and post-conceptual, relational, social, and invisible practices in the current period. For the purposes of this analysis, however, I am referring to the specific kind of linguistic and activity-based “de-materializations” which were embraced around the early turn to so-called post-Fordism in the West.

Housework returning as art in some ways repeats the gesture of re-defining housework as work – an abject and de-politicized sphere of social practice is as it were elevated to visibility and critical consideration, there in politics, here in aesthetics, thus eroding the premises which supported that division of labour, and reciprocally contaminating the “superior” pole (if housework should be paid for, then everything should be paid for, which is logically and materially impossible, thus let’s get rid of capital; if housework is not so different from art, then art is not so different from housework)

As the Maintenance Art Manifesto said: “I do a hell of a lot of washing, cleaning, cooking, renewing, supporting, preserving, etc. Also (up to now separately) I ‘do’ Art. Now I will simply do these maintenance everyday things, and flush them up to consciousness, exhibit them, as Art. I will live in the museum as I customarily do at home with my husband and my baby, for the duration of the exhibition (Right? Or if you don’t want me around at night I would come in every day), and do all these things as public Art activities: I will sweep and wax the floors, dust everything, wash the walls (i.e. ‘floor paintings, dust works, soap sculpture, wall-paintings’) ...”

Crossing over with Wages for Housework in this discussion, I’ll briefly mention also W.A.G.E., a group I referred to in the introduction, who campaign for the financial compensation (in institutional budgets, mainly) for artistic practices which don’t produce results that are easy to reify institutionally or economically: they want “capitalist value” in return for the “critical value” they provide, thus hoping to break the magic link between artists and spectators, subjectively and structurally. The reply to this could of course be the same as the point being made throughout this paper that is how to demand improved conditions of reproduction under conditions which themselves need to be eradicated. As Paolo Virno says with reference to the above, “Nowadays artistic labour is turning into wage labour while the problem is, of course, how to liberate human activity in general from the form of wage labour.” Thus it is worth, as I attempt to do in my more art-oriented research, to separate these levels out a bit and try to claim not the similarity of art to life as radical, but the mimetic relation – with “mimetic” referring to a notion of mimesis that can be derived, in different ways, from the work of Adorno, Benjamin, and Roger Callois – between them which implies a break from the terms of the fusion as much as with the terms of their separation. Further, I would say that it doesn’t make a lot of sense to look at the relation between art and politics without first seeing how art and labour diverge and converge in capital.

Following this ambivalent thread, I’d like to end with an open question which I referred to slightly at the beginning, that is, the troubled dialectic between affirmation and negation in feminist and communist politics. The dialectic of the affirmative and negative is perhaps the most interesting legacy of the strain of autonomist Marxism I’ve been discussing here. The wages for housework/social wage demand could be seen, perhaps in tension with my arguments up till now, as one of the clearest examples of this. Here you have the affirmation of an identity as a worker in order to dismantle the whole labour-capital relation through an impossibly expansive and immeasurable concept of labour – also, by an affirmation of being a subjugated class within the capital : labour relation in order to claw back some of the wealth produced by labour to expand the autonomy/latitude for action of the working class beyond being a working class – to claim how useful you are to capital in order to wrest a measure of independence from it is the classic gesture of all welfare struggles. There is a parallel in affirming a collectivity of women in order to eventually show up the impossibility and injustice of gender (including gendered divisions of labour, as in Wages for Housework and most other materialist variants of feminism) as it is promulgated by the heterosexual

re/productive matrix, gender as naturalizing logic of atomisation and control. Here it might be worth adding a concept of “gender” as a real abstraction in capital and revisiting some of Shulamith Firestone’s “sex-class” arguments from *The Dialectic of Sex* among other articulations as in Michel Foucault, Melia or Guy Hocquenghem that square the logic of sexual preference and the commodity, or in the work of Denise Riley on the problematic category of “women” in feminism, but I can’t imagine there will be time to do this properly here.

The history of the feminist movements raises a lot of questions about identification and dis-identification, i.e. what are the problems and potentials of identifying collectively as an oppressed group in order to overcome both that oppression and the group identity that perpetuates it – this of course links to Marx’s idea about the working class having to not be the working class anymore if capitalist class society is to be changed into something else (how not to identify with the structural role allotted to you by power while leveraging that role to question and upset the whole premises of the system, what is the structure of “radical identification”?) These are questions that could be posed philosophically with terms such as identity, negativity, universality, and outline the central problematic of what later came to be called identity politics, and the claims that these lost a radical horizon in petitioning for accommodation within the existing state of things. This could also be linked to the tenet that runs through much current French political philosophy, e.g. Jacques Rancière and Alain Badiou, about how the only possible change has to come from dis-identification with the situation, which also means dis-identification with political identities or collectivities that reproduce the “logic of the situation” e.g. staking a political identity on oppression and liberation for and as the oppressed. How does this interact with social movements where identity was affirmed as ground for re-invention (feminist separatism, black nationalism, etc.), sometimes as a transitional stage of articulation with larger/long-term movements for social change based on overcoming capitalism/patriarchy/racism?

For Jacques Rancière, the epitome of this “dis-identification” or dis-placement, which ties in to the earlier point about breaking with the reproduction of affective and social positions that the hegemonic order has decreed, is the instance of the 19th century French workers who wanted to partake of the culture that bourgeois right decreed as universal, rather than being content with their roles as labourers, in this way challenging the distribution of humanity, the premises of universality itself in that society. They negated labour by staying up all night to write poetry. But this notion of “dis-identification” should also be weighed in all its contradictoriness and contingency, since it can engender a very different kind of movement, a movement to lay claim to the existing without changing it, or the application of universality without regard for structural inequity, the “re-distribution” of the existing sensible. We can refer to Marx where he discusses the outlawing of trade unions after the French Revolution under “conspiracy” laws that prohibited the associations of people in ‘similar ranks or occupations’ since they impeded the “liberty, equality and fraternity” of the new republic, which established for Marx why it was a bourgeois revolution – much as Jacques Rancière bans political economy from his political philosophy perhaps....I’ll end here.



# „OKCIDENTALIZAM”, EVROPSKI IDENTITET I SEKSUALNA POLITIKA

## Gabrijela Dice

„Kada tolerantna civilizacija dostigne svoje granice, ona ne kaže da se suočava sa političkim i kulturnim razlikama, već sa granicama same civilizacije” – Vendi Braun, Regulisanje averzije.

Scena 1: Godine 2003, Ferešta Ludin, učiteljica rođena u Avganistanu, uložila je žalbu nemačkom Vrhovnom sudu protiv zabrane nošenja marama (hidžaba) u školama. Tužilac je pet godina vodio njen slučaj sve dok on nije dospio do najvišeg suda u zemlji. Vrhovni sud okarakterisao je žalbu opravdanom, ali je negirao federalnu nadležnost zbog nedostatka odgovarajućih zakona na nivou države. Od tada, većina nemačkih država zabranila je nošenje marama, mada njih pet osobito dozvoljava hrišćansku (navike) i jevrejsku (kipa) simboličku odeću.

Scena 2: Godine 2004, konzervativni francuski predsednik Žak Širak predložio je zakon koji zabranjuje učenicama nošenje marama. Usvojen je velikom većinom sa 394 glasa (uključujući glasove socijalista) protiv 36 glasova (komunista). Elizabeta Badinter, filozofkinja, i čuvena francusko-marokanska advokatica Žizel Halimi, koosnivačica organizacije SOS Rasizam, podržale su zabranu vela kao „simbola ugnjetavanja” (Badinter), i „ponižavajući način oblačenja” (Halimi).

Scena 3: Knjiga *Mit dem Kopftuch nach Europa? Die Türkei auf dem Weg in die Europäische Union* (Sa maramom u Evropu? Turska na putu ka Evropskoj uniji, Tibi 2005) najavljena je na sajtu amazon.de uz sledeći opis: „Veće Evropske unije zvanično je odlučilo da u novembru 2004. godine uđe u pregovore sa Turskom o punom članstvu u EU. Ova odluka je naišla na masovne kritike mnogih zemalja EU. Turska će biti primljena u EU samo ako pokaže privrženost centralnim evropskim vrednostima” (amazon.de 2008).

Ove tri scene imaju neke sličnosti. One opisuju individualne, institucionalne ili diskurzivno-političke reakcije na versko-kulturno obeležje: maramu. Ova referenca u sva tri slučaja služi kao način za manifestaciju nadmoći „kultura” u kojima se ne nosi marama, a diskurs počiva u sva tri slučaja na odnosima između polova. To znači da je navodno ugnjetavanje žena koje nose maramu ovih dana postalo osnova za potvrđivanje takozvane „zajednice vrednosti” (Wertegemeinschaft) na bazi odbacivanja „orijentalnih običaja” ili – drugim rečima – građenje superiornog zapadnog identiteta (u nastavku „okcidentalnost” u značenju zapadne samoafirmacije).

## Evropski identitet kao „okcidentalnost”

Osnovna pretpostavka u narednim razmatranjima je da se „okcidentalnost” pretvorila u novu „glavnu oznaku razlika” (Leitdifferenz) u evropskim društvima nakon raspada Istočnog bloka, i naročito nakon napada na SAD 11. septembra. Pitanje „šta je evropska kultura”, ili tačnije, „šta je istorijska, ideološka, društvena, politička i institucionalna osnova evropskog identiteta” – neosporno dospeva na politički dnevni red (v. Kain 2009) Mnoštvo izjava i teorija o evropskom identitetu je objavljeno, npr. Tomas Majer (2004) u Nemačkoj, David Lovel (2003) i Brajan Graham (1998) u Velikoj Britaniji, Mišel Lamete (1998) u Francuskoj, Furio Čeruti (2001) u Italiji, i na kraju, ali ne najmanje važni, Jirgen Habermas i Žak Derida na temu rata u Iraku

(Habermas, Derrida 2005). Samo nekoliko naučnika iz oblasti društvenih nauka i dalje je skeptično po pitanju ovog koncepta. Jedan od retkih, Klaus Eder, upozorava: „Ljudi koji traže definiciju evropske kulture da bi gradili jedinstvo, mogu se naći u poziciji čarobnjakovog učenika koji ne može da se otarasi duhova koje je prizvao” (Viehoff, Segers 1990: 165, v. i Eder 2001).

Posmatrajući izjave o evropskom identitetu kao „suštinski spornom konceptu” (Walter 2008: 37), vidi-mo da se rezonovanje zasniva na društvenoj geografiji, teorijama modernosti, kao što su prosvetiteljstvo, kapitalizam, demokratija, individualizam i racionalizam. Politički naučnik Geran Ternborn sumira nasleđe evropske istorije kao „dalekosežni skepticizam prema Bogu, nauci i naciji, u kolektivnoj ideji o društveno odgovornoj državi i porodičnom individualizmu” (Therborn 1995: 353). Vilijam Autvejt naglašava rani razvoj kapitalizma, industrijalizma, slabu povezanost sa religijom, konstitucionalizam, težnju ka socijalnoj državi i građanskom društvu (Outwaite 2008). Klaus Legevi razlikuje pet oblasti u diskurzivnom opisu evropskog identiteta: 1) geografski prostor; 2) zajedničko historijsko sećanje i sudbina (Schicksalsgemeinschaft); 3) zajedničko kapitalističko tržište (ili tržišta); 4) mnogo demokratije i ljudskih prava; i konačno 5) nasleđe hrišćanskog okcidenta (Leggewie 2004: 13).

Naročito konzervativnija shvatanja činilaca identiteta govore uglavnom o zapadnom hrišćanstvu kao distinktivno evropskom nasleđu. Što se tiče hrišćanstva, ostaje kontroverzno pitanje da li je moguće pronaći vezu između hrišćanstva i demokratije. Sekularni tabor koji predstavlja, na primer, nemački sociolog Mejer, poriče takvo hrišćansko poreklo demokratije i ukazuje na istoriju spiritualno opravdavanog apsolutizma i vekove verskih ratova. On insistira na važnosti sekularizujućeg prosvetiteljstva koje je podesni osnov evropskog identiteta i demokratije, formalno smatranog za proceduralno sredstvo za političko jedinstvo i donošenje odluka. Prema Majerovom mišljenju, hrišćanska socijalna filozofija nema prava da proglašuje demokratiju hrišćanskim nasleđem (v. Meyer 2004).

Nasuprot Majeru, Hrišćansko-demokratska unija Nemačke (Christlich-Demokratische Union, CDU) u dokumentu o imigraciji govori o Evropi kao „zajednici sa vrednostima hrišćanskog okcidenta” (Wertegemeinschaft des christlichen Abendlandes), zasnovanoj na „hrišćanstvu, judaizmu, klasičnoj filozofiji, humanizmu, rimskom pravu i prosvetiteljstvu”. Izostavljanje iber-arapskih kulturnih dostignuća, koja takođe pripadaju evropskom tlu, dosta nam kazuje. Enrike Dusej je u tekstu „Evropa, modernizam i evrocentrizam” (2000) ukazao na to da je ovo priča koju su napisali pobednici i koja je bila prepravljena nekoliko puta, jer osim španske arapske civilizacije ni „grčka” tradicija, kao ni tradicija Pravoslavne crkve ne vide sebe kao deo zapadne tradicije, a Aristotel je inicijalno služio kao merodavna referenca i u helenskom i u arapskom svetu. Uzimajući ovo u obzir, političke rasprave u vezi sa hrišćanstvom nisu toliko motivisane interesovanjem za religiju, već razlikovanjem prave (hrišćanske/jevrejske) i lažne (muslimanske) religijske/kulturne pripadnosti.

Građenje identiteta znači razlikovanje sopstvenog identiteta od drugog identiteta. Stavljeno u Fukoove

termine razvijene u Mikrofizici moći, formiranje novih diskursa – u našem slučaju evropskog identiteta nakon što je podela na blokove isparila – nastaje poništavanjem novokonceptualizovanih različitosti (Foucault 1976). Ovo u našem slučaju znači da stvaranje jasne binarne podele na imaginarni Istok – ‘otpadničke države’ izvan granica i muslimanska imigracija unutar granica – i prosvetljeni Zapad, kao da zauzima važnu stratešku poziciju u preispitivanju formiranja evropskog identiteta. Građenje ove binarne distinkcije nazivaće se u nastavku ‘okcidentalizam’. Kritika okcidentalizma – u značenju sistematskog ohrabrivanja neorasizma, služeći se retorikom ‘emancipacije’ i prosvetljavanja – biće početna tačka ovog istraživanja. U nastavku, najpre ću napraviti razgraničenje između pojmova okcident/okcidentalnost/okcidentalizam i njihove suštinske povezanosti sa kolonijalizmom i rasizmom. Srž ovog članka, zatim, bavi se seksualnom politikom, to jest sistematskim mešanjem okcidentalnosti i rodni konstrukcija. Članak će zaključiti neke misli o metodološkim pitanjima koja se tiču perspektive istraživanja „Kritika okcidentalizma”.

## Okcidentalizam

Pojam okcidentalizam odnosi se na pretpostavku da postoji okcident, koji stoji u binarnoj suprotnosti u odnosu na pretpostavljeni orijent. Oksfordski engleski rečnik definiše „okcident” kao „zapadne zemlje, civilizacija i kultura”[1].

Ova definicija pretvara okcident u politički termin. Upotreba pojma „kultura” (u jednini) aludira na implicitni osećaj (okcidentalne) nadmoći. Vendi Braun objašnjava: „[...] ‘mi’ imamo kulturu, dok kultura ima ‘njih’, ili, mi imamo kulturu dok oni jesu kultura. Ili, mi smo demokratija, dok su oni kultura” (Brown 2006: 151). Zanimljivo je da većina nemačkih rečnika i enciklopedija ne sadrži reč ‘okcident’ sve do šezdesetih godina. Slično kao i drugi vladajući principi, kao muževnost ili heteroseksualnost, okcidentalnost funkcioniše kao ‘tiha norma’[2], koja se ne pominje jer predstavlja pretpostavljenu univerzalnu, neoznačenu kategoriju.

Upotreba neologizma ‘okcidentalizam’ zasnovana je na terminu ‘orijentalizam’, koji je skovao osnivač postkolonijalne teorije Edvard Said. Said je analizirao ‘orijentalnog drugog’ kao nešto što su izmislile i oblikovale evropske kolonijalne inicijative na osnovu „ontološke i epistemološke razlike između ‘orijenta’ i ‘okcidenta’” (Said 1978: 1). Današnja realnost orijentalizma jasno se razlikuje od Saidovog opisa, koji je, kada je reč o seksualnoj politici, bio vođen slikom ženstvenih poligamnih gospodara harema i poslušnih žena. Ova analiza je bila adekvatna za kolonijalni period, ali više nije adekvatna za globalizovana društva sa transnacionalnim muslimanskim dijasporama. Ideje o ‘orijentalnom’ drugom su toliko promenjene da je Aziz al Azmeh još 1993. godine skovao termin neorijentalizam (ibid. 60). Prema njegovom mišljenju, savremena okcidentalna fantazija sada sjedinjuje islam u ‘homogenu suštinu’ (ibid. 62). U mome istraživanju, koje se bavi odnosima između polova i seksualnom politikom, termin neorijentalizam koristi se više za ideju autokratskih ‘orijentalnih’ glava porodice i seksualno i mentalno ugnjetavanih muslimanskih žena ‘pod velom’, što je zamenilo stare orijentalne fantazije o feminiziranim pašama i erotizovanim haremskim igračicama.

Može se naglasiti i drugačiji aspekt orijentalizma: najpre tu je logika o proizvodnji (o stvaranju) Drugog (Othering), koju je Said objasnio koncentrišući se na sliku imaginarnog orijenta u skladu sa britanskom i francuskom kolonijalnom fantazijom; zatim, može se naglasiti dobit koju ima okcident iz procesa orijentalizovanja. U prošloj deceniji, postkolonijalni teoretičari latinoameričkog porekla, kao što su Venecuelanac Fernando Koronil i Argentinac Valter Minjolo, okarakterisali su koncept orijentalizma kao previše ograničen, previše teritorijalan i previše istori-

jski ograničen (Coronil 1996; Mignolo 2000; Coronil 2002). Umesto toga, oni govore o 'okcidentalizmu'. Uvodeći ovaj termin, oni su osavremenili kritičku snagu orijentalizma. Proširivši pojam i izmenivši ga, oni su ga izoštrili, razjasnivši da predmet kritičkog poduhvata ne treba da bude proces proizvodnje 'drugog', već građenje okcidentalnog sebstva (sopstva, bića). Fernando Coronil objašnjava: „Okcidentalizam, kako ga ja ovde definišem, nije suprotnost orijentalizmu, već je uslov njegovog postojanja [...] predstavlja skup reprezentacijskih praksi koje učestvuju u produkciji građenja sveta, koje (1) izdvaja komponente sveta u povezane jedinice; (2) razdvaja njihove odnosne istorije; (3) pretvara razliku u hijerarhiju; (4) naturalizuje ove reprezentacije i tako (5) učestvuje, mada nesvesno, u umnožavanju postojećih asimetričnih odnosa moći” (Coronil 1996: 7f).

Cilj kritičkog gesta latinoameričkih postkolonijalnih kritičara je uspostavljanje onoga što Valter Minjolo naziva „postokcidentalnim umom”, što se takođe odražava u naslovu Koronilovog karakterističnog eseja „Izvan okcidentalizma”. Enrike Dussel se drži iste linije mišljenja sa drugačijim rečnikom u tekstu „Izvan evrocentrizma” (Dussel 1998). Prema njihovom gledištu, pozicija njihovog mišljenja ne opisuje se adekvatno idejama postkolonijalizma ili postorijentalizma (Lowe 1991) jer je, prema Dusselovom mišljenju, evrocentrizam jedini entnocentrizam koji je uspeo da postane univerzalan kroz „iracionalnu praksu nasilja” (Dussel 2000: 472). Autori kao što je Minjolo, bave se načinom kako izgraditi kritički instrument preko koncepta kao što su „subalterni znanje” i „granično mišljenje” u „trećem epistemološkom prostoru/prostorima”. Ovaj tip postkolonijalne teorije ne samo da tvrdi da poseduje ideju o umu koji je izvan okcidentalizma, već i ponovo ispituje pojam modernosti kao 'mnoštvene' (Eisenstadt 2002) ili 'uvezane' (Randeria 1999) modernosti, i time dovodi u pitanje evropsku političku teoriju koja posmatra modernost kao okcidentalnu i neostvarenu (oprimerenu Habermasovim „Projektom modernosti”).[3]

## Istorija termina

Godine 1995, antropolog Džeims Karier objavio je antologiju pod nazivom Okcidentalizam. Slike zapada, koja pristupa temi iz tri povoljna smera: prvo, kao kritički pojam u goreobrađenom smislu, da bi problematizovao pretpostavke zapadnih antropologa; drugo, kao opis za kulturne mešavine do kojih dolazi kada se elementi zapadne modernizacije prenesu na 'orijentalne' kulture; treće, termin okcidentalizam se takođe može koristiti za fantazije Zapada u orijentalnoj (arapskoj, srednjoistočnoj i dalekoistočnoj) imaginaciji (v. Carrier 1995). Amerikanci Ian Buruma i Avišai Margalit govore 2004. godine o trećem značenju u svojem pamfletu Zapad u očima njegovih neprijatelja, analizirajući na taj način antizapadnu netrpeljivost dalekoistočnih (kineskog) i arapsko-muslimanskih društava. Takvo tumačenje ideološkog neprijateljstva ne-zapadnog mišljenja je bilo vrlo dobrodošlo na Zapadu posle 11. septembra.[4]

Sledeća upotreba termina okcidentalizam ne pripada upotrebi Buruma–Margalit, ali je bliska postkolonijalnom mišljenju Minjola i Koronila. Kritika okcidentalizma odnosi se na epistemološka nastojanja decentralizacije, kao što su Provincijalizovanje Evrope (Chakrabarty 2000), Izvan evrocentrizma (Dussel 1998), Nepromišljeni eurocentrizam (Shohat, Stam 1996). Nasuprot Koronilu i Minjolu, koji se bave bitnim materijalnim posledicama kolonijalizma i ose sever-jug, moja tvrdnja je drugačije motivisana: s jedne strane pretpostavkom nove razlike između orijenta i okcidenta na početku muslimanske imigracije u posleratnu Evropu i porastom muslimanske populacije, a sa druge strane pomeranjem ose istok-zapad nakon kolapsa komunizma i ose orijent-okcident s buđenjem palestinskog pitanja, rata protiv terora i otpadničkih država od strane Amerike i njenih saveznika, pojave bombaša

samoubica, i navodnog propovedanja mržnje muslimanskih sveštenika u zapadnim društvima.

## Imigracija, ksenofobija i neorasizam

Evropski okcidentalizam razlikuje se od jedne do druge zemlje. Značajan broj imigranata u Francuskoj, Engleskoj, Holandiji dolazi iz bivših kolonija (iz Severne Afrike, Pakistana, Indonezije). Oni se suočavaju sa različitim imigracionim režimima: sekularni laicizam u Francuskoj, separatistički multikulturalizam u Holandiji (Michaelowski 2005) i politike različitosti u Engleskoj (Modood 2002). Njihove osobenosti proizvode različite teoretizacije kasnomodernog rasizma kao što je „neorasizam” Etjena Balibara (Balibar 1991) u Francuskoj, Svakodnevni Rasizam Filomene Esed (Essed 1995) u Holandiji i „kulturni rasizam” Stjuarta Hla (Hall 2000) u Engleskoj.

Bivše kolonijalne sile opisuju sebe često modelom očinske brige prema bivšim podanicima. Nasuprot tome Austrija, koja ne priznaje svoju habzburšku postkolonijalnost, primenjuje striktan migracioni režim uskraćujući deci imigranata državljanstvo na osnovu takozvanog krvnog prava (ius sanguinis). Prateći ovaj obrazac Nemačka je odbila bilo kakvu vezu između svoje nacionalne imigrantske politike i kolonijalne prošlosti[5], i primenjivala je iste restriktivne modele za dobijanje državljanstva kao Austrija do 2005. godine, što ostavlja sve imigrante (i njihovu decu i unuke) u poziciji (legalnih) tuđinaca ili stranca (Ausländer). Kao rezultat toga, u Nemačkoj se rasizam prema imigrantima naziva Ausländerfeindlichkeit (neprijateljstvo prema strancima).

Postoji obimno istraživanje o istoriji političke metafore Ausländerfeindlichkeit i migracione politike koja ga podržava (v. Terkessides 2004; Bojadžijev 2007; Karakayali 2008). Radi kritičkog pogleda na nemački okcidentalizam zanimljivo je pogledati koliko je 'kulturni rezultat' pojam Ausländerfeindlichkeit u stanju da postigne. Stranac je neko ko nije rođen u toj zemlji bez obzira na to koji pasoš ima.[6] Ali, biti rođen u toj zemlji znači isto tako biti Nemač, što je posle Holokausta nacionalna pripadnost koje se stidimo. Dakle diskriminisanje ne-Nemaca jedan je od malo načina da se ponovo uspostavi nemačkost (biti Nemač) kao pozitivna nacionalnost.[7] Nisu samo stranci iz dalekih zemalja poslužili kao sredstvo za nacionalnu reafirmaciju, već i 'drugi Nemci' iz bivše NDR, takođe iziritirani jer su sebe doživljavali kao socijaliste i postnacionaliste, i odbijali su da učestvuju u postfašističkoj 'kolektivnoj krivici' (Kollektivschuld). Ovo je jedan od razloga što je Hladni rat bio toliko važan za formiranje zapadnonemačkog identiteta. Ideja 'sloboda i demokratija', ono najbolje što je Federativna Republika Nemačka imala, našla je svoj put do kasnijeg antimuslimanskog rasizma. Možemo reći da su prava na ličnu slobodu poslužila kao kriterijum za utemeljenje nemačkog nacionalnog osećanja, što je kasnije uspostavilo zapadnu 'emancipaciju-liberalizaciju' kao način protivljenja ropstvu muslimanskih žena.

Ali pitanje religije nije uvek bilo u prvom planu. Nemačka 'Kultura dominacija' (Dominanzkultur cf. Rommelspacher 1995) uz pomoć radničkih ugovora stavila je pridošlice na početku imigracije pedesetih godina prošlog veka u kategoriju klase i time olakšala okcidentalnu superiornost putem „etničkog kodiranja društvenih (pod)sistema” (v. Esser 2007: 313; v. ethnische Unterschichtung, Esser 2001). Rano tajno istraživačko novinarstvo o položaju turskih 'gastarbajtera'[8] u industriji čelika (Wallraff 1985) razotkrilo je na emblematičan način položaj u kakvom bi Nemci voleli da vide imigrante i to putem naslova Ganz Unten (Sasvim nisko, 2005).[9] Očigledni rasizam poprimio je oblik klasizma. Religiozna pripadnost imala je samo sporednu ulogu u ubeđenju da Turci moraju ostati na dnu hijerarhije na poslu. Kada je bilo govora o resentimentu (ozlojeđenosti) u registru rase, ljudi bi govorili o 'predrasudama'.

U međuvremenu su evropske zemlje zaista okarakterisale rastuću ozlojeđenost prema imigrantima kao rasizam. U razdoblju posle Holokausta, koncept rase kao biološkog entiteta nije bio ni podesan niti poželjan. Etjen Balibar i drugi zato govore o 'rasizmu bez rase' (Balibar 1990: 28). Ključna karakteristika ovog takozvanog kulturnog i/ili diferencijalnog neorasizma je pretpostavka o nepromenljivim razlikama između okcidentalnih i 'drugih' naroda. Manuela Bojadžijev pojašnjava: „Diferencijalizam i kulturalizam obeležavaju dve različite stvari: dok kulturalizam označava diskurzivno odvajanje od biologizma, diferencijalizam pokreće premeštanje od rasne hijerarhije ka društvenoj segregaciji” (2008: 23).

U Nemačkoj je postojao snažan otpor nazivanju neprijateljstva i ozlojeđenosti prema imigrantima 'rasizmom'. Pojam 'rase' bio je u velikoj meri delegitimizovan posle Holokausta. Zatim, poseban „posleratni tabu” (Nachkriegstabu, Bielefeldt 1998: 12) zabranjivao je priznavanje svake povezanosti sa rasizmom, jer je nemačka liberalna elita bila ubeđena da je izvukla pouku iz procesa 'mirenja sa prošlošću' (Vergangheitsbewältigung). Kao što je ranije pomenuto, pojam Ausländerfeindlichkeit reorganizovao je antiimigrantski neorasizam u etničko shvatanje državljanstva (Kerner 2005: 232). Sa pomeranjem Ausländerfeindlichkeit-a prema turskim i arapskim 'gastarbajterima' iz klasizma u kulturni rasizam, zajednička religija diskriminiranih imigranata, muslimanska vera, odjednom je dospela u centar problema. 'Islamizovanje migranata' (Schiffauer 2007: 117), kao prelaz iz „etnološkog u versko svrstavanje” turskih imigranata (Yildiz 2009: 466) ujedinilo je značajne razlike između različitih muslimanskih denominacija (v. Rumpf, Gerhard, Janssen 2003) i smanjilo složena životna iskustva u monolitiku i protivprosvetiteljsku religioznu odanost[10].

Pojmovi kao što je Leitkultur (vodeća kultura),[11] zajednica od vrednosti (Wertegemeinschaft) i povratak davno zaboravljenim frazama kao što je 'hrišćanski Zapad' (Christliches Abendland), pojavili su se u poziciji protiv navodne opasnosti od gubitka sopstvenog kulturnog identiteta. Kao što je Levent Tezcan ukazao: „[...] 'rasprava o nemačkoj vodećoj kulturi' reakcija je na ideju da je multikulturalizam pobedio. Da je tako, pokrenulo bi se pitanje kako će biti uređeni odnosi moći između 'kultura' u budućnosti” (Tezcan 2008: 60). Veoma je neobično što prvi put u Nemačkoj nemački političari pričaju o jevrejsko-hrišćanskom nasleđu. Kancelarka Merkel upotrebila je ovaj složeni pridev javno u obraćanju na pedesetoj godišnjici EU kao tada predsedavajuća Savetodavnog odbora: „Evropa počiva na zajedničkim vrednostima i duhovnim korenima. Verski koreni našeg jevrejsko-hrišćanskog nasleđa osnova su našeg društva” (Merkel 2003). Iz očiglednih razloga Nemačka nema tradiciju povoljnog evociranja jevrejskog nasleđa u 20. veku. Osvrt na jevrejsko-hrišćansko nasleđe govori nam više o izuzimanju treće monoteističke religije, islama, iz evropske 'zajednice vrednosti' – iako su špansko-arapska filozofija, nauka, medicina i poezija, naravno, i same ukorenjene na evropskom tlu – nego o novom vrednovanju jevrejskih kulturnih dostignuća u Evropi[12]. Vezujući se na Sigrid Nekeel i Levanta Tezkana želela bih da imenujem trenutnu opsednutost navodno 'orijentalnim drugim' – kao 'islamski kompleks' (islamischer Komplex cf. Nökel, Tezcan 2005: 10). Pojam naglašava činjenicu da ne postoji ni homogeni islam niti monolitna muslimanska civilizacija. Reč 'kompleks' čak dalje aludira na kompleksnost i psihološku inhibiciju.

## Okcidentalizam kao metarasizam

Antimuslimanski rasizam kao varijacija kasnomodernog rasizma razvio se sa postkolonijalnom migracijom iz bivših kolonija u Englesku, Francusku, Portugaliju, Holandiju i migraciju privremene radničke snage iz Turske, sa Bliskog istoka i iz severne Afrike, u Nemačku. Fenomen je dostigao vrhunac kada su muslimanski fundamentalizam i terorizam postali vidljivi kod kuće i u inostranstvu. Do tada je Zapad, zajedno sa Semjuelom Hantingtonom, već postao ubeđen da mu se dešava



'sudar sa civilizacijom' koja nije kompatibilna sa okcidentalnim sistemom vrednosti.

Nevolja sa kulturološkim rasizmom je u tome što ga nije lako identifikovati kao rasizam jer se pojavio kao navodno pouzdano – i naučno održivo – rasuđivanje. Netrpeljivost prema strancima često izgleda kao razumna reakcija na prisustvo previše stranaca ili, drugim rečima, kao odgovarajući odgovor lokalnih građana koji pripadaju nižoj klasi na navodnu opasnu netrpeljivost. Balibar naziva ovu strukturu „metaraszizmom” (1990: 30). Socijalni psiholog Mark Terkesidis je dokumentovao ovaj način razmišljanja upitnikom EMNID instituta za društvena istraživanja. Prema toj studiji, svaki treći nemački državljanin podržava „desničarske tendencije izazvane problemom stranaca” (Terkesidis 1991: 104). Kao što kaže Terkesidis, „prosvetljeni ljudi na visokim pozicijama” ne doživljavaju sebe kao rasiste, već kao neutralne posmatrače efekta koji 'previše stranaca' ima na ljude niže klase. Ovaj način razmišljanja jedan je od mnogih razloga zašto borba protiv desničarskog radikalizma nije poprimila oblik antirasizma. Umesto toga, uveden je još striktniji migracioni režim da bi se otklonili 'uzroci' Ausländerfeindlichkeit-a.

Ovu ulogu preuzeli su novinari, stručnjaci, zakonodavci, politički savetnici i istraživački centri. Imajući to u vidu, volela bih da izoštrim pojam okcidentalizma nazivajući ga „metaraszizmom elite”. Karakteristično je za ovu vrstu rasizma da negira sopstveno postojanje. Obrazovana elita sebe vidi kao prosvetlenu, a u nemačkom slučaju kao dodatno pročišćenu kroz proces 'mirenja sa prošlošću' (Vergangenheitsbewältigung). Vrsta okcidentalizma koja se ovde razvila krije se iza 'sposobnosti problematizovanja' ili 'sistema znanja'[13]. Samopojmanje okcidentalnog metaraszizma ne priznaje da 'opravdano kritikovanje' muslimanskog fundamentalizma može sadržavati rasističke elemente. Iako su UN i Evropski centar za kontrolu rasizma i ksenofobije 2002. godine okarakterisali 'islamofobiju' kao rasizam koji je „jednako neprijatan i nepoželjan kao antisemitizam i drugi diskriminatorski globalni fenomeni” (Allen 2004: 1), nemački uticajni mediji ne priznaju njegovo postojanje. Konzervativne dnevne novine Di Velt (Die Welt) objavljuju: „Šta je islamofobija? To definitivno nije antimuslimanska verzija antisemitizma [... to je] glupa i prazna kategorija, izmišljena da utiša rasprave o svirepostima koje se vrše u ime islama poslednjih godina”. [14]

Govoreći o ovoj vrsti argumenta, antropolog Mati Buncl ukazuje na zanimljivu razliku između savremene islamofobije i istorije evropskog antisemitizma: „Islamofobi nisu naročito zabrinuti da li su muslimani dobri Nemci, Danci ili Italijani. Oni pre dovode u pitanje mogu li muslimani da budu dobri Evropljani. Islamofobija, drugim rečima, ne služi toliko za nacionalnu purifikaciju već kao sredstvo ojačavanja Evrope” (Bunzl 2005: 502).

### Okcidentalistički pakt polova

Svaki put kada se priča o 'redosledu vrednosti' (Wertordnung) ili vodećoj kulturi (Leitkultur) pojavljuje se kao centralni problem emancipacija/liberalizacija zapadne žene. U okcidentalističkom diskursu odnosi među polovima – naročito položaj žena – nisu usputne kontradikcije, kako ih je nekada nazivao marksizam, već njegovo obeležje. Jedan od najočiglednijih razloga je to što politički diskurs nakon 'ikonskog' ili 'vizuelnog obrta' funkcioniše uglavnom kroz vizuelnu reprezentaciju u medijima. Kao posledica toga, žena prekrivena velom (ili maramom) postaje glavna oznaka te 'drugosti'. Ali prekrivanje velom se može pretvoriti u problem samo ako otkrivenost funkcioniše kao kulturna norma. Šafik Šaglah i Farad Kosrokar tako razlikuju 'otvoreni' okcidentalni i 'prekriveni' orijentalni rodni sistem (u: Scott 2007: 154). Dženifer Fluri govori o „ogoljenom velu”. [15] Dakle, otkrivanje i sakrivanje posmatraju se kao dva različita režima vidljivosti. Međutim, za okcidentalno oko samo prekrivanje je vidljivo. Prekrivanje maramom postaje glavna metafora za ugnjetavanje žene. Sloboda okcidentalne žene da bude otkrivena sada je

predstavljena kao ono suprotno prekrivenosti orijentalnosti.[16]

Sloboda žene je prazna kategorija ako nije ispunjena jednakošću. To nas dovodi do centralne tačke okcidentalnog diskursa i njegove opsednutosti maramom: pitanje žena predstavlja najveći izazov obećanoj jednakosti u zapadnom načinu razmišljanja jer se demokratija, jednake mogućnosti i pravda smatraju osnovnim okcidentalnim superiornostima. Više od 200 godina nakon kartezijanskog feminizma ('um nema pol'), više od 160 godina nakon prvog pokreta za prava žena (1848, Deklaracija o osećanjima, Seneka fols, SAD), i skoro 100 godina od osvajanja prava glasa, žene zarađuju manje, vezane su za podizanje dece i brigu o starijima prema polnoj podeli rada, gube šansu za ozbiljnu karijeru zbog porodičnih obaveza i imaju kraću mladost nego muškarci, jer njihova vrednost zavisi sve više od seksualne privlačnosti i mladosti zbog rastuće važnosti vizuelnog.

Ovaj argument izgleda kao lako oboriv jer – ako se isključi kratak zenit radikalnog feminizma sedamdesetih i osamdesetih godina prošlog veka – ne postoji novi talas ženskog otpora i protesta na vidiku. A razlog za to je u tome što se pojavljuje struktura koju bih nazvala 'okcidentalna dividenda'. Upotrebljavajući terminologiju Roberta Konela (1995), muškarci koji su seksualno, društveno ili etnički manje privilegovani koriste 'patrijarhalne dividende', jer oni misle da imaju pravo da poseduju moć nad ženama a posebno nad 'svojim' ženama, čak iako se nalaze nisko na lestvici muške hijerarhije. Na sličan način, bele žene uživaju okcidentalnu dividendu nasuprot neoorijentalnim 'drugima' (muškarcima ili ženama).[17] Nasuprot orijentalnim ženama, okcidentalne žene mogu da sebe smatraju slobodnim – makar u izboru muških partnera – da se osećaju kao seksualna bića, pošto su slobodne da pokažu svoje seksualne kvalitete. Jedna strana diskursa prosvetljenosti je time reprezentovana, tačnije, njen zahtev za transparentnošću i vidljivošću. Kao otelotvorenje izostanka emancipacije žena, slika 'žena pod maramom' podseća na nepotpunu liberalizaciju okcidentalnih žena. Socijalna psihološkinja Bridžit Romelšpacher tvrdi da što je veći ponor između pretvaranja i realnosti to je veća želja da se dokaže sopstvena naprednost kroz prisiljenu retoriku 'emancipacije' i liberalizacije (v. Rommelspacher 2002).

Diskurs vodeće kulture (Leitkultur) tvrdi da je emancipacija žena već ostvarena. Ali u tradiciji prosvetiteljstva, sloboda žena je shvaćena više kao vlasništvo nad sobom, što znači pravo da govori u javnosti, pravo na kontakt, pravo na razvod i abortus. Budući da su ova prava uglavnom zagarantovana, muški deo smatra da je obezbedio sva moguća prava. Srećom, ova prava ne ugrožavaju konvencionalno muško pravo na ženski dodatni rad po kući. Upavo suprotno: razmetljiva priča o slobodi zapadnih žena čini da se ovo ne smatra muškom privilegijom. Time se objašnjava zašto su veoma konzervativni političari u poslednje vreme oduševljeni ženskom emancipacijom. Svaka optužba za seksizam može biti prebačena na 'orijentalnu glavu porodice'. Dosledno tome, Margaret Jeger naziva ovaj neoorijentalistički obrazac 'etniciziranje seksizma' (v. Jäger: 1996).

Obrazac muške dominacije, seksizam i deljenje na rase izaziva nešto što želim da nazovem 'okcidentalistički pakt polova'. Žigosanjem 'orijentalne žene' kao ugnjetavane, odjednom liberalizacija žena – u novom milenijumu uglavnom smatrana za zastareli diskurs – ponovo postaje seksi i smatra se neophodnom. Međutim, drugi korak je napravljen pre prvog, ne na materijalnom osnovu već samo u muškom priznanju da je emancipacija/liberalizacija (orijentalnih) žena zaista ispravna i neophodna. Stoga, okcidentalna žena se predstavlja kao već emancipovana/liberalizovana. Ova logika pretvara polni sistem ne samo u osnovni znak prosvetiteljstva, već u osnovno merilo samog okcidenta. 'Orijent' tako dobija epistemološki status. Teoretičarka queer kulture Sara Ahmed naglašava etimološku povezanost između 'orijenta' i 'orijentacije'.

Citirajući filozofa Edvarda Kaseja, ona piše: „Najzad, orijent znači orijentisati se na nešto što nije ono što izaziva orijentisanje” (Kasej u: Ahmed 2006: 115). Ahmed zaključuje: „Okcident se stvara od onoga oko čega smo organizovani kroz sam smer naše fiksacije na orijent” (ibid. 116).

Izražavanje bilo kog preostalog ženskog nezadovoljstva prepušteno je predstavnicima feminizma drugog talasa i njegovih publikacija – EMMA, u Nemačkoj. One su rizikovale i dale svojoj navodno zastareloj retorici moderno lice, što nas takoreći dovodi do nadgradnje okcidentalnog pakta (ili kompromisa) između polova: nemački mejnstrim feminizam, poznat po uticajnoj figuri Alise Švarcer, postao je predvodnik stavova u kritikovanju takozvanog orijentalnog patrijarhata (v. Marx: 2006) koji ugnjetava svoje žene. Neoorijentalistička proizvodnja drugog ovde je zamaskirana/prerušena u solidarnost sa ugnjetavanim 'orijentalnim' sestrama.[18]

Na taj način, stvara se spoj između okcidentalnog diskursa emancipacije/liberalizacije (orijentalnih žena) i državnih migracionih sistema. Feministkinje u Nemačkoj su čak pokrenule inicijativu za podršku legalnom proterivanju 'orijentalnih glava porodice' – koje su primoravale svoje kćerke da protiv svoje volje nose veo, da se udaju, ili su ih povređivali svojim disciplinskim merama – i oduzimanju boravišne dozvole. U posmatranju ovog razvoja događaja, potpuna je zabluda poraženo oplakivati 'greške' feministkinja koje, zanesene sestrinskom solidarnošću, nisu videle da su se konzervativne vlade poslužile njima. Desilo se upravo suprotno: činjenica da su ih 'vlade' upitale za stručno mišljenje o ugnjetavanju žena smatra se pobedom, konačnim ispunjenjem centralnog zahteva pokreta.

Okcidentalistički pakt između polova ipak funkcioniše kao 'asimetrični kompromis' (v. Karakayalı 2008: 249). Naličje goreopisanog procesa je da organizovani mejnstrim feminizam gubi na snazi/povlači se ka nedovršenoj emancipaciji kod kuće. Kulturološka dobit u hegemoniji ne isključuje okcidentalni patrijarhat. Feministički okcidentalizam je dobar samo za okcidentalne muškarce, jer zahvaljujući njemu nestaje problem žena u domaćinstvima. Drugim rečima, okcidentalni pakt između polova je mirovni ugovor između pobornika jedne nedovršene revolucije i okcidentalnog rodno-polnog sistema, a na račun muslimanki. Otelotvorena u maramu ova uopštena figura služi kao sažimanje u psihoanalitičkom smislu ili kao kolektivni simbol (v. Schiffer 2005: 25; citat iz Braun, Mathes 2008: 365). Moglo bi se još reći da je žena sa maramom apotropejski znak primećenog, ali nepriznatog nedostatka emancipacije/liberalizacije zapadnih žena.

### Neomuslimanka kao figura kulturološkog kritizma

Asimetrični kompromisi ne nižu se glatko jedan za drugim. Desi se da se upetljaju u protivrečnosti i nepostojeće figuracije. Na primer, okcidentalni muškarci zavide navodnim 'orijentalnim glavama porodice' na njihovoj vladajućoj moći, koja se uglavnom ne dovodi u pitanje u mikrosferi njihovih porodica. Okcidentalni i orijentalni polno-rodni sistem sasvim se drugačije ponašaju u slučaju konflikta u porodici. 'Orijentalna' glava porodice ne ustručava se da se pozove na čast i tradiciju kada se oseća primoranim da ponovo uspostavi pravi red u uloge polova u svojoj porodici. Muškarac koji koristi okcidentalni polno-rodni sistem, naprotiv, ojačao je ideološku podlogu kada je reč o autoritetu. Njegovi unutrašnji osećaji da ima prava na nešto često se pretvaraju u 'direktnu akciju'; gledajući naslove novinskih hronika, često pronalazimo priče o zapadnim muževima/momcima koji – zbog neželjenog raskida, razvoda ili gubitka novca – ubijaju čitave porodice sa decom, svojim i ženinim roditeljima.[19] Ne postoji ime/pojam za ovaj veoma čest zločin na Zapadu. Sa druge strane, navodno tipična orijentalna 'ubistva zbog časti' preplav-

ljuju vesti i koriste se kao sredstva za razgraničavanje između prosvetljenih okcidentalnih i ugnjetavanih orijentalnih žena (v. Karteweg, Yurdacul 2008). Ovdje vidimo jasan primer 'tihe norme', o čemu je ranije bilo reči: dominantni model ne može biti imenovan. Ali kao etnički kodirana devijacija, veoma sličan zločin može biti imenovan. Heterodokсна austrijska feministkinja nedavno je skovala pojam Amok-Väter (očevi u ubilačkom raspoloženju) za ovu vrstu nasilne samoafirmacije okcidentalnih glava porodice koje misle da im je oduzeto pravo glasa (v. Gregor 2005).

Međutim, kao što je ranije rečeno, najprovokativniji znak je figura žene koja nosi maramu. Okcidentalno shvatanje je razdraženo jer ne može da razluči da li je ona nosi dobrovoljno ili ne. U cilju smanjenja ove iritantne složenosti, svim muslimankama u Nemačkoj koje nose maramu jednostavno je zabranjeno da to rade. Značajan broj istraživanja navodi razloge protiv ove generalizacije – istraživanja izvedena na profesorkama muslimanske vere koje žive u Nemačkoj (v. Jonker 2003), na turskim sunitskim muslimankama druge generacije imigranata (v. Klinkhammer 2000), i na studentkinjama postdiplomskih studija (v. Karakaşoğlu 2003; Nökel 2002; Amir-Moazami 2005). Sve one jednoglasno izveštavaju o dobrovoljnom pokrivanju obrazovanih mladih žena koje pokušavaju da pronađu sklad između porodice, zemlje u kojoj žive i samoafirmacije. Istraživači govore o marami kao 'zaštićenom modelu samoostvarivanja' ili kao simbolu neorganizovanog „pokreta za emancipaciju žena iz niže klase” (Nökel 2005: 189). Ovo uskraćivanje prava na izbor postajalo je apsurdno u slučaju Ferešte Ludin. Iako je avganistanska učiteljica pronela svoju borbu za pravo da nosi maramu u školi kroz pet zakonskih etapa, ministar kulture u državi Baden-Virtemberg rekao je da je njena želja da se pokrije ne samo versko obeležje već isto tako i političko, budući da je to simbol ugnjetavanja žena i podrška islamskom fundamentalizmu.

Pored muslimanki koje insistiraju na nošenju marame svojom sopstvenom voljom, potpuno nova akterka stupa na društvenu scenu, neomuslima (nemački termin za samosvesnu posvećenu mladu muslimanku), zastupnica kulturološkog kritičizma. Sigrid Nekeel sumira rezultate svog kvantitativnog istraživanja o neomuslimanki u Nemačkoj:

„ [nova muslimanska ženstvenost] upravljena je protiv koncepta tradicionalne ženstvenosti kao i protiv definicije 'superiorne ženstvenosti', što odgovara tome kako sebe vide moderne Nemice, navodno povezujući univerzalizam sa obećanjem jednakosti, a zapravo zahtevajući posvećenost i negiranje autentičnosti” (Nökel 1999: 189).

Ovakve uznemiravajuće opservacije ne dolaze samo iz akademskih krugova. Popularna televizija takođe prenosi ovakvu poruku u okviru inteligentnih sitkoma. Uspešna serija Türkisch für Anfänger (Turski za početnike) o nemačko-turskoj porodici u kojoj se pojavljuje trinaestogodišnja neomuslimaka Jagmur, koja dobrovoljno nosi maramu. Ona je predstavljena kao autoritet za porodične vrednosti. Ona ismeva antiautoritativno vaspitanje kao bezvredno, protivljenje roditelja da uspostave pravila u vezi sa razvojem detetovog karaktera smatra velikim grehom, i osuđuje blagost prema ekscesima kao što su stupanje tinejdžera u seksualne odnose i korišćenje droge kao aktivno ugrožavanje duhovnog i fizičkog zdravlja maloletnika. Jagmur kaže svojoj novog sestri Nemici da njena nju ejdž majka teško da je voli kad je izlaže tolikim opasnostima. Nakon katastrofalnog opijanja praćenog strašnim mamurlukom, sestra zahteva od svoje majke 'pravila' kao dokaz njene ljubavi. (Dobija spisak pravila. Njena poslušnost kratko traje, ali naučila je lekciju.)

Neomuslima je u nekoj meri personalizovana kritika rastuće seksualizacije i objektivizacije ženskog tela nakon 'vizuelnog preokreta' na internetu i drugim vizuelnim medijima. Posmatrano na ovaj način, posvećene

muslimanke poseduju sebe i štite svoje telo svojom oštromnošću. U skladu sa tim, Čarls Hirškind i Saba Mahmud postavljaju pitanje: „Mogu li se naši brusthalteri, kravate, pantalone, mini-suknje, donji veš i kupaći kostimi tako lako svrstati na jednu ili drugu stranu u podeli na slobodu i zarobljeništvo?” (Hirschkind/Mamood 2002: 353). Nivedita Menon govori o iskustvu nošenja vela: „Ranije sam išla u salon lepote stalno [...] ali sada ne moram da brinem oko svog lica [...] To može da bude oslobađajuće [...] možete da idete gde god hoćete” (Menon 2005: 209).

### Tri oblika 'muške dominacije' [20]

To što muslimanke ne žele da ih posmatraju ne provocira samo okcidentalnu ženstvenost, koja se sve više definiše kroz kratkotrajnu 'moć privlačnosti' (v. nemački termin Attraktivitätsmacht, Mühlen-Achs 1998: 272). Nemogućnost dodirivanja muslimanki obučenih u pristojnu odeću smeta kulturnoj logici seksualnog prisvajanja žena iz 'inferiornih' populacija, na koje muškarci iz 'superiornih' populacija misle da imaju po tradiciji pravo. Ovaj fenomen javlja se u različitim varijacijama. Dugo je ova navika muškaraca bila privilegija koju donosi klasa i kasta u zapadnom svetu: gospodar koji upražnjava pravo ius primae noctis, gospodar koji siluje ropkinju, i buržoaski pater familias koji prisiljava svoje sluškinje na seksualni odnos, i sve to tako da se umesto naziva prekršaj koristi naziv greh.

Nasilno seksualno posedovanje 'drugih' žena ključno je za potčinjavanje etničkih manjina. Ovo ponašanje je kao jezik koji se koristi za ponižavanje muškaraca potčinjenih etničkih grupa. Treba samo razmisliti o sistematičnom silovanju u ratovima ili o tome kako se zapadni mediji oduševljavaju 'otkrivanjem' Avganistanke. Mediji su često prikazivali žene koje skidaju burke zajedno sa slikama poraženih Talibana, pokazujući da njihove žene više nisu njihovo vlasništvo.[21] Ako se ne ospori pokrivanje žena manjinske kulture, to normalizira etničku mušku dominaciju koja je pridobijena tako što su se prisvajale žene potčinjenih (poraženih) etničkih grupa.[22] Ova muška dominacija ne može biti postignuta u slučaju pokrivenih žena jer bi prisvajanje bilo očigledno viđeno kao prekršaj. Tako da je navika prebačena na domaću prostituciju s 'drugim' ženama, naručivanje nevesta iz zemalja sa jasnijom rodnom hijerarhijom i, povrh svega, sa seks-turizmom u Meksiku, na Tajlandu, u zapadnoj Africi, na Karibima i Baliju. Dvostruki standard pri osuđivanju navodno tipičnog seksualnog prestupa, 'islamski kompleks' (prisilna venčanja i ubistva zbog časti) i osuđivanju jednako tipičnih seksualnih prestupa na Zapadu (očevi i muškarci koji ubijaju cele porodice, naručivanje nevesta, prisilna prostitucija i seks-turizam) jedna je od najvažnijih karakteristika okcidentalizma.

Drugi način muške dominacije želim da nazovem panoptičkom muškom dominacijom. Ovo se odnosi na Fukoov pojam 'panoptičizam', tehnika kontrole izvedena iz moći koju ima zatvorski čuvar u osmatračnici, moći da vidi a da ga ne vide. Ovaj način nadgledanja vodi do samokontrole i subjektivizacije posmatranih osuđenika (v. Foucault 1977: 251ff.) Feministička teorija je dosta koristila ovaj koncept, posebno u kritici ženske 'mistične lepote' kao forme subjektivizacije ojačane panoptičkim muškim posmatranjem (v. Bartky 1991; Degele 2004). Sandra Bartky govori o muškom posmatraču kao „panoptičkom muškom poznavaoču” (ibid.: 51). Panoptička muška dominacija rezultira vizuelnim režimom ili zahtevanjem vidljivosti svih žena, kao što je psihoanalitička teorija filma široko objasnila. Radikalni feminizam sedamdesetih godina prošlog veka udružuje se protiv muškog posmatranja braneći se stilom oblačenja lišenog seksualnosti, kao što su tregerašice. Pokrivena 'orijentalna' žena ne samo da se štiti od muškog pogleda, već doslovno odvraća pogled, terajući posmatrača da shvati koliko je nametljivo njegovo vizuelno prisvajanje. Ovo važi i za imigrante, koji uživaju, kao što je ranije rečeno, patrijarhalnu dividendu. Grit Klinkhamer u jednom intervjuu citira kakve reakcije na svoju maramu studentkinja Hatiša doživljava u biblioteci jednog nemačkog univerziteta:

„Za mene je to oslobađajuće. Mogu slobodno da dišem i ljudi se drugačije ophode prema meni. Veoma je zanimljivo kako se Palestinci, Arapi i Turci odnose prema ženi koja nosi maramu. [...] Vernici se isto ophode prema svim ženama. Ali zanimljivo je videti (smeh) kako se poluvernici ponašaju. Neki proždiru pogledom druge žene, a kada se ja pojavim ne usuđuju se ni da me pogledaju” (citirano iz Klinkhammer 2003: 263).

Dok se prva dva gorenavedena oblika muške dominacije – etnička muška dominacija i panoptička muška dominacija – suprotstavljaju prekrivanju žena, treći diskurs – na neki način presecajući/uništavajući druga dva – nadoknađuje izgubljeno: diskurs okcidentalne muške dominacije. Zanimljivo je da ova vrsta muške dominacije nije zasnovana na prisvajanju (etnička dominacija) ili voajerizmu (panoptička dominacija), već na tvrdnji da se kulturna superiornost postiže pružanjem slobode ženama. Ovom naročitom diskursu pružanja emancipacije ženama potrebna je 'orijentalna glava porodice' da bi sebe predstavio kao prosvetčenog.

Prisustvo mejnstrim feminizma u kulturnom ratu protiv nošenja marame je od velike pomoći okcidentalnoj muškoj dominaciji, jer tradicionalne feministkinje, deklarirane protivnice muške dominacije uopšte, svedoče o pročišćenju i spasenju okcidentalnog polnoderog sistema. Uključivanje pokreta za emancipaciju/liberalizaciju na Zapadu u okcidentalistički projekat (v. Hunt 2006) dodatno umiruje fundamentalno suprotstavljanje muškoj dominaciji i proizvodi saučesništvo 'etniciranjem seksizma', kao što je ranije pomenuto. Kristina Delfi piše o raspravama oko pokrivanja velom u Francuskoj i o sličnim elementima etniciziranja seksizma: „Zar naše društvo na ovaj način ne dokazuje da ne toleriše seksizam? – Ako je seksizam 'razlika' koja označava 'druge', da li je onda odsustvo seksizma u 'našem' društvu dokaz da je seksista stranac?” (Delphy u: Scott 2007: 173).

### Okcidentalizam i 'homonacionalizam'

Okcidentalizam ne samo da stvara iluziju o oslobođenoj ženi i muškarcu koji daju drugima slobodu i prava, već tvrdi da ima posebnu vrstu prosvetčenog odnosa prema homoseksualizmu. Osim liberalizacije žena, tolerancija homoseksualnosti smatra se najvišim dokazom evropskog superioriteta. Odgovarajući nemački diskurs ipak ne ide u prilog ovoj tvrdnji, budući da je homoseksualnost potpuno legalna tek u poslednjih 15 godina. 'Gej brak' dozvoljen je tek od 2001. godine (nakon teške borbe koja je umalo stigla do Vrhovnog suda). Novi antidiskriminatorni zakoni o homoseksualnosti dopuštaju da se od tolerancije homoseksualnosti napravi značajan uslov za dobijanje nemačkog državljanstva. Standardizovani upitnici (obavezni u nemačkoj državi Baden-Virtemberg) pronalaze moguće homofobe među kandidatima za dobijanje državljanstva kako bi uskratili državljanstvo muslimanima. U jednom od pitanja u takozvanim 'muslimanskim upitnicima' (Muslimfragebögen) stoji: „Zamislite da Vam sin kaže da je gej i da planira da živi sa drugim muškarcem. Kako biste reagovali?”[23] Queer teoretičarka Jasbir K. Puar naziva ovu pojavu korišćenja homoseksualaca i homoseksualnosti u korist nacionalnog diskursa 'homonacionalizam'. U SAD ona vidi „dualni pokret u kome su određene homoseksualne opštine u SAD prihvatile nacionalni program, a i nacionalni program je prihvatio njih” (xxiv: 2007, napomena autora).

Homonacionalizam se razvija protiv okvira neorijentalizma (u starom kolonijalnom orijentalističkom diskursu muževnost je bila mnogo ambivalentija, delom feminizirana i otvorena za seksualne neodređenosti). 'Dualni pokret', koji je J.K. Puar prepoznala u SAD, dotakao je i deo gej i lezbejske zajednice u Nemačkoj. Ovo postaje očigledno u figuri 'homofobičnog muslimanskog imigranta'. Dok se iza diskursa o naturalizaciji, odobravanju državljanstva, država pretvara da štiti okcidentalni konsenzus o toleranciji, slučaj je drugačiji za homoseksualnu zajednicu. Sa njihovog stanovišta



'imigrant homofob' je naklonjen nasilju i ideološki/verski motivisanom prebijanju gejvea.

Džin Haritavorn objašnjava moć diskurzivne figure sa reakcijama na incident prebijanja dragkingova na queer festivalu u Berlinu. Dž. Haritavorn identifikuje moralnu paniku čija je kulminacija 'razbijmo homofobiju' protest kome je prisustvovalo više od hiljadu ljudi, uglavnom belaca:

„Ovi stavovi su puni ambivalentnosti ne samo u odnosu na migraciju već i, i posebno, na seksualni i rodni nekonformizam. Prisustvo 'homofobičnog migranta' pomaže očuvanju evropskog ekscelencijalizma. Njihova navodna 'mržnja' relativizuje 'našu' ambivalentnost u pogledu 'drugih' opredeljenja, čija ranjivost 'nas' podstiče na akciju. Ovo ekstremno nasilje 'imigranata' utiče na zamišljanje nove javne sfere koja štiti queer opredeljenja i ljude” (60).

Slično prethodno analiziranom okcidentalizovanju važnih delova mejnstrim feminizma, možemo videti da neoliberalna reevaluacija homoseksualne različitosti[24] pomera ranije marginalizovanu poziciju queer-a po osi bele boje i okcidentalnosti. Sara Ahmed navela je zanimljiv argument koji važi za građenje figure 'homofobičnog migranta' od strane gej aktivista. U Kulturnoj politici emocija ona postavlja sasvim blizu ljubav i strah, i stavlja ove emocije u paradoksalni odnos: „[...] strah ne podrazumeva odbranu granica koje već postoje; on pravi te granice, uspostavlja predmete od kojih subjekat, u strahu, može da pobegne” (Ahmed 2004: 67).

S. Ahmed ulazi u raspravu s Frojdovom igrom Fort Da, u kojoj dete pokušava da simbolički savlada odsustvo majke bacanjem predmeta i dobijanjem predmeta nazad. Ovde se strah prikazuje na način kako dete pokušava savladati „nemogućnost njene ljubavi” (ibid.): „[...]odvratanje od predmeta straha uključuje takođe usmeravanje prema predmetu ljubavi, koji postaje odbrana od smrti koju izgleda ugrožava predmet straha [...] Umesto da strah stoji na putu ljubavi, možemo videti da on dozvoljava subjektu da se približi predmetu ljubavi” (ibid. 68).

Homonacionalizam se može videti kao napor da se pobjedi/osvoji 'ljubav' heteronormativnog mejnstrim društva predstavljanjem predmeta straha radi dobijanja zaštite.

Kao što govorimo o etniciziranju/(neo)orijentalizovanju seksizma, možemo govoriti i, pod nekim uslovima, o etniciziranju/(neo)orijentalizovanju homofobije. Ova logika stvara od frakcije belkinja i delova gej/lezbejske zajednice predvodnike savremenih kulturnih ratova. Cena za uključivanje je neka vrsta 'duplog adresiranja' (Engel 2009: 108). Sa jedne strane, nedavno privilegovano predstavlja društveni zgoditak na toleranciji a, sa druge strane, od njih se očekuje da će funkcionisati kao 'pogranična policija' prijavljujući i kritikujući, putem emocija, seksističkih i homofobnih incidenata izazvanih od strane neokcidentalnih počinilaca. Liza Dugan naziva ovo „homonormativnost” (Duggan 2002).

Poslednja četiri odeljka – o okcidentalnom paktu između polova, o tri modela muške dominacije, figure neomuslima i homonacionalizaciji, pokazala su da kritika okcidentalizma nije samo dodatna 'osa različitosti' korisna za analizu odnosa među polovima, već značajan element hegemonskog (samo)kriticizma (Dietze 2008b) i intersekcionalna analiza. Kritika okcidentalizma dozvoljava prepoznavanje oblika 'progresivne' okcidentalne ženstvenosti, muževnosti i 'tolerisanih' seksualnih razlika kroz perspektivu orijentalizovane drugosti. Ovaj način tumačenja ne daje sveobuhvatne genealogije za trenutne rodne probleme, ali naglašava ključnu funkciju odnosa među polovima za proizvođenje etničke/bele/evrocentrične hegemonije.

## Kritika okcidentalizma kao 'korektivna metodologija'

Do ovog trenutka pribegavala sam različitim kritičkim teorijama, kao što je postkolonijalna teorija, teorija kritike migracije, kritike belackog etniciteta i kritike rase, te političkoj teoriji u tradicionalnoj analizi diskursa i/ili neomarksizmu i, iznad svega, dekonstruktivnom feminizmu, studijama o rodu i queer teoriji. Sumirajući rezultate ovog eseja čini se primerenim da se uzme u obzir i to da li perspektiva 'kritike okcidentalizma' (ili 'kritičkog okcidentalizma') nudi dodatnu dimenziju pojmu 'korektivne metodologije', koju sam razvila u drugom kontekstu sa Elahe Hašemi Jekani i Beatris Mikaelis (v. Dietze, Haschemi, Michaelis 2008: 136ff., i vezija na engleskom Haschemi, Michaelis, Dietze 2010). Pojam je odgovor na dilemu da li intersekcionalne analize često ne reflektuju heteronormativnost i seksualnost, i da li se queer teorija tek onedavno zanima za intersekcionalnost u istraživačkim poljima Queer boja, Queer dijaspora i Queer klase. U pokušaju da se model intersekcionalnosti i queer teorija međusobno povežu i budu produktivni, ispostavilo se vrlo brzo da su oblasti u kojima se može doći do korisnih rezultata bile malobrojne.

Napori da se spoji intersekcionalni i queer način mišljenja doneli su slabe i slabo razumljive rezultate. Ipak, kritika iz jedne perspektive koja ukazuje na nedostatke odgovarajuće paradigme nije samo donela odgovore, već je pokrenula i nova pitanja.[25] Tako, korišćenje kritičke perspektive kao što je kritika okcidentalizma kao korektivne metodologije znači razumevanje kategoričkih razlika ne kao granica koje treba obezbediti već kao različitost koja donosi bogatstvo. [26] U ovom smislu okcidentalizam nije korektivna metoda, jer je on samo varijacija dekonstruktivne prakse kao što je decentrovalizovanje etno- ili falogocentrizma ili heteronormativnosti. Ali kritika okcidentalizma je korektivna perspektiva koja skreće pažnju na nastajanje postkolonijalne i globalizovane hegemonije. Ili drugim rečima, slobodnim upotrebljavanjem „strateškog esencijalizma” deluje kritika okcidentalizma kao strateški kategorijalizam” (Dietze, Haschemi, Michaelis 2008: 138), koji kategoriju 'okcidenta' stavlja u centar ne bi li naglasio istorijsku novinu i određene modele diskriminacije.

Kritika okcidentalizma ima zajedničko sa drugim kritičkim pokretima protiv centrizama (kao što je androcentrizam, etnocentrizam, evrocentrizam), zabludu binarizma, dakle tendenciju da se spoji i homogenizuje drugi putem analiziranja načina kako je taj konstruisan. Ovu opasnost drže pod kontrolom teoretičari koji nastupaju iz perspektive 'mnoštva' (Hardt, Negri 2004). Manuela Bojadžijev u Die windige Internationale traži „relacionu teoriju rasizma, koja objašnjava (ekonomske) cikluse rasizma i istoriju društvene borbe” (Bojadžiev 2007: 14).[27] Inderpal Grewal i Karen Kaplan predlažu vremensko i lično cepanje pojma hegemonije i govore o Razbacanim hegemonijama (v. Grewal, Kaplan 1997). Nivedita Menon skreće pažnju zapadnom feminizmu na činjenicu da žena pod velom ne ceni ni žigovanje manjinskih običaja ni multikulturalnu 'toleranciju' navodno nepromenljivih 'drugih'. Umesto toga, ona traži „snažnije slamanje univerzalizma” (Menon 2005: 255).

Kritika okcidentalizma funkcioniše kao stavljanje u perspektivu, otkrivanje korišćenja neorijentalnih 'konstitutivnih, sastavljenih drugih' za redefinisavanje evropskog identiteta kao okcidentalnog. U ovom procesu muslimanski imigranti postaju razgraničavajući objekti. Razgraničenje (njihovo markiranje) dešava se uglavnom kroz odnose među polovima, ili drugim rečima, kroz neokcidentalni polno-rodni sistem. Oni se uzimaju za ono suprotno okcidentalnom uspehu u liberalizaciji žena i seksualnih manjina. Kritička masa belih feministkinja i queer aktivista – koja se ranije osećala marginalizovano – rado menja svoje nezadovoljstvo, s onim što je još ostalo kao seksizam i heteronormativnost, za 'okcidentalnu dividendu'. Međutim, ako se svetla okrenu ka okcidentalnom paktu između

polova, možemo videti jednu od najbolje čuvanih tajni oslobođenog okcidenta: on je isto tako asimetričan polni sistem.

Zbog opsesivnosti metaforom žene sa maramom koja je vidljiv znak hijerarhijskog rodnog sistema, asimetrična podela vlasti u sopstvenom polno-rodnom sistemu ostaje nevidljiva. Panoptički način muške dominacije je ovim ojačan. Ovaj model poseduje tihu lepotu za belog heteroseksualnog muškarca zaključioća okcidentalnog pakta među polovima: operacija otkrivanja/skidanja vela olakšava neprekidnu objektivizaciju/reifikaciju ženskog tela. Ženski 'objekt njegove želje' uživa u svojoj kratkotrajnoj privlačnosti pogrešno shvaćenoj kao moć. Za feministkinje i – pod drugim uslovima – queer ljude, kritika okcidentalizma nije samo etički/moralni imperativ već i analitičko sredstvo za dekonstrukciju okcidentalnog i heteronormativnog polno-rodno sistema uopšte.

Sa engleskog na srpski prevela Miljana Stojanović

## FUSNOTE

- [1] Kompletan citat: „Deo sveta koji se nalazi zapadno od nekog priznatog regiona; tačnije; države, civilizacije ili kulture Zapada. Izvorno se odnosi na zapadno hrišćanstvo ili Zapadno rimsko carstvo, ili Evropu, naspram Azije ili orijenta, a sada obično na Evropu i Ameriku naspram Azije i orijenta, ili povremeno Ameriku ili zapadnu hemisferu, naspramtarog sveta” (Oksfordski engleski rečnik, revizija iz marta 2009).
- [2] Uporedite korišćenje 'tije norme' u kritičkoj teoriji belila na način na koji je koristi Merilin Fraj 1983.
- [3] Kruz Ven je 2001. godine upotrebio pojam 'okcidentalizam' kako bi kritikovao evrocentričnost Zapadne filozofije.
- [4] Iranac Mohamed Tavokoli Targhi poziva se na okcidentalizam u Refashioning Iran: Orientalism, Occidentalism and Historiography (Preoblikovanje Irana: orijentalizam, okcidentalizam i historiografija), kako bi ukazao na suzbijanje iranskih doprinosa opisu orijenta u evropskoj istorijskoj nauci. Kinez Ksiaomei Čen, sa druge strane, koristi pojam okcidentalizma kako bi ukazao na pozitivni uticaj Zapada na demokratiju u Kini u Occidentalism A Theory of Counter-Discourse in Post-Mao China (Okcidentalizam – Teorija kontradiskursa u post-Mao Kini). Švajcarski kritičar globalizacije Žan Zigler nedavno se pozvao na pojam okcidenta u svojoj knjizi La Haine de L'Occident iz 2008, kako bi ukazao na 'mržnju' trećeg sveta prema spekulacijama o budućim robnim razmenama osnovnih prehrambenih namirnica.
- [5] Kien-Nghie Ha osporava ovaj diskurs u svom članku "Deutsche Integrationspolitik als koloniale Praxis" u: Dice, Bruner, Venzel 2009: 137–151.
- [6] Uskraćivanje 'emocionalnog državljanstva' (Dice 2008a) primenjuje se i na osobe koje ne 'izgledaju' kao Nemci, na primer Afronemce, bez obzira na poreklo. Sara Ahmed je briljantno opisala ovo pozivanje na epidermalnu šemu crnila kao rasističku konfliciju 'sličnog izgleda' sa nasleđem (Ahmed 2006: 123).
- [7] Etjen Balibar ukazuje na to da nijedna nacija nema 'čistu' etničku bazu pa se umesto toga stvaraju „fiktivne nacionalnosti” (1990: 15). On identifikuje konstrukcije prenaplašene nacionalnosti kao što su 'francuski Francuzi' ili 'engleski Englezi' (Cf. 76). Kanak Attak, antineoliberalistička intervencijska grupa, za sličan nemački fenomen koristi pojam 'biodeutsch' (bio-nemac) (vgl. Heidenreich 2006).
- [8] Gostujući radnik (Gastarbeiter) rani je eufemizam u istoriji radne imigracije, koji podrazumeva da će ovi 'gosti' nekada otići.
- [9] Cf. poglavlje "Gunter Valraf, The Lowest of the Low (Dno dna)" (Pilger 2005: 158–174).
- [10] Bilefeld razlikuje dve binarne konstrukcije 'islama': sekularnost značaja za evropske konstrukcije 'islama': sekularnost protiv tradicije i 'civilizovano' hrišćanstvo protiv 'varvarskog' islama (Cf. Bilefeld 2005).
- [11] Ovaj pojam Leitkultur skovao je Basam Tibi 1998. u knjizi Europa ohne Identität. Leitkultur und Wertebelibigkeit. Kovanica je preuzeta od strane CDU političara Fridriha Merza za 2000. kao freiheitliche deutsche Leitkultur, kao argument protiv multikulturalizma i takozvanih paralelnih društava.
- [12] U SAD govor o 'judeo-hrišćanskoj baštini' vrlo je čest i stekao je popularnost davno pre 11. septembra. Za razliku od Nemačke, ovakav razvoj situacije nije toliko posledica okcidentalizovanja jevrejstva koliko izbeljivanja i oduzimanja rase, nasuprot rasnom shvatanju crnila (Cf. Goldstin 2007).
- [13] Filomena Esed ukazuje u Understanding of Everyday Racisms (Razumevanje svakodnevnog rasizma) (1991) na činjenicu da 'diskursi problematizovanja' elite o 'razumljivim poteškoćama' imaju centralnu funkciju u kasnomodernom rasizmu (ibid. 10).
- [14] <http://www.welt.de/weblogs/4881/>



boess+in+berlin/77412/was+ist+islamophobie, 4.5.2009.

[15] Videti predavanje na Humboltovom univerzitetu u Berlinu od 21. 6. 2006. pod nazivom "The Naked Veil and the Retro-Modern Other" (Nagi veo i retromoderno drugo), neobjavljeni manuskript, citiran u (Braun/Mats 2007: 295).

[16] Videti odlične primere obimne literature o prekrivanju u Jegenoglu 1996, Braun, Mats 2007, i nedavno Hit 2008.

[17] Još 1993. Helma Luc je identifikovala nemački okcidentalistički (zapadnjački) prezir prema muslimanskim imigrantkinjama kao 'orijentalizam'. Ženska dividenda bele/okcidentalne hegemonije se primenjuje na razne kontekste: videti takođe žene u fašizmu (Kristina Turner-Ror 1988), žene britanskih kolonista doseljenika u Africi (Meklintok 1995), i belkinje u nemačkim kolonijama (Mamozai 1982; Valgenbah 2005; Ditrih 2007).

[18] Za poređenje sa sličnim američkim potezima videti 'globalno sestrinstvo' Roberta Morgana, kritički raspravljeno u: Dice 2006b i Hant 2006.

[19] Pod naslovom "Why do we keep calm when fathers murder" (Zašto smo mirni kad očevi ubijaju) u Berliner morgenpost-u od 22. marta 2009, uvodničar Leineman sastavlja „tatinu listu za ubilački pohod“ za 2009. godinu i nabroja dvanaest ubijenih žena, dece, članova porodice pobesnelih tata: [http://www.morgenpost.de/kolumne/leinemann/article1059465/Warum\\_schweigen\\_wir\\_wenn\\_Vaeter\\_morden.html](http://www.morgenpost.de/kolumne/leinemann/article1059465/Warum_schweigen_wir_wenn_Vaeter_morden.html), 18.4.2009.

[20] Sledeće se odnosi na La Domination Masculine Pjera Burdijea (videti engleski prevod: Burdije 2001). Burdije vidi muške i ženske pozicije kao veoma stabilne i stoga govori o habitusu unetom u društveno telo. Preuzimanjem forme 'dokse' (verovanja) habitus može biti promenjen jedino potpunom promenom sistema verovanja.

[21] Videti zanimljivu istragu vizualne politike avganistanskog vela, koja je prethodila njegovom skidanju nakon oslobođenja/okupacije posle 11. septembra, koja dokazuje da je veo 'sistem znakova otvoren za svakakve vrste politizacije preko ženskog tela kao kolektivnog simbola'. National Geographic je 1985. objavio fotografiju pod nazivom 'avganistanska devojka', na kojoj je prikazana mlada zbudjena devojka izbeglica, oterana zbog ruske okupacije. Slika je trebalo da kritikuje sovjetsku vladavinu. National Geographic je 2001. sproveo potragu za tom devojčicom i našao je – pod imenom Šarbat Gula. Obučena u burku prikazala je staru sliku pored njenog sada prekrivenog lica. Ta slika je pokrenula kritike na račun ugnjetavanja žena od strane talibanske vlasti (videti Zejger 2008).

[22] Za razvoj režima 'etničke muške dominacije' na primeru američkih rasnih režima videti Dice 2009.

[23] Moj prevod jednog od pitanja citiranih na: <http://www.berlinonline.de/berlinerzeitung/archiv/bin/dump.fcgi/2006/0123/politik/0034/index.html>, 8.8.2009.

[24] Antke Engel tumači integraciju (i okcidentalizaciju) homoseksualnosti u okviru pozitivne ponovne evaluacije razlika kao 'kulturni kapital', što donosi javnu podršku neoliberalnim promenama (Engel 2009: 102).

[25] Videti produktivnu kritiku Jasbira K. Puara o teorijama presecanja, koja samim tim preuređuje Derlizijanovo sakupljanje kategorija za kvir teoriju.

[26] Videti trud od strane autora da učini kritičku teoriju belila i kritiku okcidentalizma međusobno produktivnim (Dice 2006).

[27] Sledeće intervencije su bile centralne za nemačke kontekste: Spricht die Subalterne deutsch (2003) Hita Stejerla i Enkarnaciona Gutijereza Rodrigeza, Konjunkturen des Rassismus (2002) Aleksa Demiroviča i Manuele Bojadžijev, "Postkolonialer Feminismus und die Kunst der Selbstkritik" (2002) Marije doMar Kastro Valere i Nikite Davan, Turbulente Ränder (2007) Forschungsgruppe tranzitnih migracija, i Ha/Laure al-Samarai/Mysorekar, Re/Visionen. Postkoloniale Perspektiven von People of Color auf Rassismus, Kulturpolitik und Widerstand in Deutschland (2007).

Videti literaturu, str. 31.

# “OCCIDENTALISM,” EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND SEXUAL POLITICS

**Gabriele Dietze**

“When a tolerant civilization meets its limits, it says not that it is encountering political and cultural difference, but that it is encountering the limits of civilization itself.” – Wendy Brown, *Regulating Aversion*

Scene 1: In 2003, the Afghanistan-born schoolteacher Fereshta Ludin brought legal action against the ban on wearing a headscarf in class to the German Supreme Court. The plaintiff had pursued her claim over five years, all the way up to the court of ultimate resort. The Supreme Court found her plea warranted, but denied federal jurisdiction due to the lack of corresponding laws at the state level. Since then the majority of German states have banned the headscarf, although five of them specifically authorize Christian (habits) and Jewish (kippah) symbolic garb.

Scene 2: In 2004, the conservative French President Jacques Chirac launched a bill outlawing headscarves for schoolgirls. It passed with the sweeping majority of 394 (socialists included) to 36 (communist) votes. Philosopher Elizabeth Badinter and the famous Moroccan French lawyer Gisele Halimi, co-founder of SOS Racism, endorsed banning the veil as a “symbol of oppression” (Badinter), a “humiliating form of dress” (Halimi).

Scene 3: The book *Mit dem Kopftuch nach Europa? Die Türkei auf dem Weg in die Europäische Union* (With the Headscarf to Europe? Turkey on the Way to the European Union, Tibi 2005) is announced on amazon.de with the following blurb: “The European Council of Ministers officially resolved November 2004 to enter negotiations with Turkey to grant full membership in the EU. This decision was met with massive criticism by many EU countries. Only if Turkey will declare its adherence to core European values will it be accepted in the EU” (my translation from amazon.de, 2008).

These three scenes share some similarities. They describe individual, institutional or discursive-political reactions to a religious-cultural sign-system: the headscarf. The reference serves in all three cases as a regulation that manifests the supremacy of non-headscarf-wearing “cultures,” and the discourse rests in all three cases on gender relations. That is to say: the supposed oppression of headscarf-wearing women has nowadays become the benchmark of the so-called “community of values” (Wertegemeinschaft) based on the repudiation of “Oriental mores” or – to put it differently – to construct a superior occidental identity (hereafter occidentality in the sense of occidental self-affirmation).

European Identity as “Occidentality”

A basic assumption for the following considerations is that “occidentality” has developed into a new “leading marker of difference” (Leitdifferenz) of European societies after the breakdown of the Eastern Bloc and especially after 9/11. The question “what is European Culture” – or more precisely “what is the historical, ideological, social, political, and institutional basis of European identity” – had forcefully entered the political agenda (cf. Kaina 2009). A wide array of statements and theory on European identity has been

published, such as Thomas Meyer (2004) in Germany, David Lovell (2003) and Brian Graham (1998) in the UK, Michèle Lamettais (1998) in France, Furio Cerrutti (Cerutti, 2001) in Italy and, last but not least, Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida on the occasion of the war in Iraq (Habermas/Derrida 2005). Only a few social scientists remain skeptical about promoting the concept. One of the few, Klaus Eder, warns: “people asking for the definition of a European culture in order to construct unity might find themselves in the position of the sorcerer’s apprentice who cannot get rid of the ghosts he has conjured up” (my transl., quoted in Viehoff/Segers 1990, p. 165, see also Eder 2001).

Looking at statements on European identity as “essentially contested concept” (Walter 2008: 37) reasoning runs along the lines of social geography, theories of modernity such as enlightenment, capitalism, democracy, individualism and rationalism. Political scientist Goeran Therborn sums up the heritage of European history as “far-reaching skepticism towards God, sciences and the nation, in a collective idea of a socially responsible state and family-based individualism.” (Therborn 1995: 353) William Outwaite highlights the early development of capitalism, industrialism, weak religious affiliation, constitutionalism, a tendency toward the welfare state and civil society (Outwaite 2008). Claus Leggewie identifies five areas of discursive inscriptions of European identity: 1) geographical space, 2) community of historic memory and destiny (Schicksalsgemeinschaft), 3) capitalist community of market(s), 4) hoard of democracy and human rights, and finally 5) heritage of the Christian occident (Leggewie 2004: 13).

Especially the more conservative strand of identity construction refers mainly to occidental Christianity as a distinctly European heritage. As far as Christianity is concerned, the question continues to be controversial as to whether it is possible to construct a special link between Christianity and democracy. The secular camp represented for instance by the German sociologist Meyer strictly denies such a Christian lineage of democracy and points to the history of spiritually legitimized absolutism and centuries of religious wars. He insists on the importance of the secularizing enlightenment as the proper foundation of European identity and democracy, understood formally as a procedural tool for political unity and decision-making. In Meyer’s view Christian social philosophy has no right to claim democracy as a Christian heritage (cf. Meyer 2004).

In contrast to Meyer, the German Christian Democratic Union Party (CDU), in a paper of immigration, speaks of Europe as a ‘community of values of the Christian occident’ – Wertegemeinschaft des christlichen Abendlandes –, founded on ‘Christianity, Judaism, classical philosophy, Humanism, Roman law and enlightenment.’ The absence of Ibero-Arabian cultural achievements, which equally took place on European soil, is telling. Enrique Dussel pointed out in “Europe, Modernity, and Eurocentrism” (2000) that this is a story written by the winners that has been rewritten several times, since beyond the Spanish Arabian civilization neither the ‘Greek’ tradition nor the tradition of the Eastern Orthodox Church saw itself as being occidental, and Aristotle served initially as a benchmark reference for



both the Hellenistic and Arab worlds. Taking this into account, the political discussions concerning Christianity are not so much motivated by religious concern, but by a distinction between true (Christian/Judaic) and false (Muslim) religious/cultural affiliation.

Building identities is a matter of differentiating one's own identity from someone else's. To put it in Foucault's terms as developed in the *Microphysics of Power*, the formation of new discourses – in our case European identity after the Bloc divide has evaporated – works by the foreclosure of newly conceptualized alterity (Foucault 1976). This means for the case at hand that constructing a sharp binary split between an imaginary orient – 'rogue states' at the outer borders and Muslim immigration at the inner borders – and an enlightened occident seems to fill an important strategic position in the reassessment of European identity formation. The construction of this distinct binary will be referred to as 'Occidentalism.' Critique of Occidentalism – meaning systematic attention to covert neo-racisms working through the rhetoric of 'emancipation' and enlightenment – will be the starting point of this investigation. In the following, I will first develop the ramifications of the notions occident/occidentality/Occidentalism and their intrinsic connection with colonialism and racism. The core of the article then deals with sexual politics, meaning the systematic Western entanglement of occidentality and gender constructions. Some thoughts regarding methodological questions concerning the status of a research perspective 'Critique of Occidentalism' will conclude the article.

## Occidentalism

The notion Occidentalism refers to the assumption of an occident, which is thought of standing in binary opposition to an assumed orient. The Oxford English Dictionary speaks of the 'occident' as "the countries, civilization, or culture of the West."<sup>[1]</sup> This definition makes the occident into a political term. The employment of the notion 'culture' (singular) alludes to an implicit feeling of (occidental) supremacy. Wendy Brown elaborates: " [...] 'we' have culture while culture has 'them,' or we have a culture while they are culture. Or we are a democracy, while they are a culture" (Brown 2006: 151; emphasis Brown). Interestingly enough most German dictionaries and encyclopedias do not list the word 'occident' up to the 1960s. Similar to other reigning principles such as maleness or heterosexuality, occidentality functions as a 'silent norm,'<sup>[2]</sup> which is not mentioned because it represents the presumed universal, unmarked category.

The usage of the neologism 'Occidentalism' is based on the term 'Orientalism,' coined by the founding father of colonial theory, Edward Said. Edward Said has analyzed the 'oriental other' as an invention and knowledge formation of the European colonial enterprise based on the "ontological and epistemological construction between the 'Orient' and the 'Occident'" (Said 1978, 1). The present-day reality of Orientalism differs distinctly from Said's description, which was in terms of sexual politics governed by images of feminized polygamous masters of the harem and submissive women. This analysis was adequate for the colonial period, but is no longer so for globalized societies with transnational Muslim diasporas. Ideas of the 'oriental' other has changed so much that Aziz Al-Azmeh coined as early as 1993 the term Neo-Orientalism (60). According to him contemporary occidentalist fantasy now unifies Islam into 'invariant essence' (62). My investigation, focusing on gender-relations and sexual politics, applies the term Neo-Orientalism more on images of autocratic 'oriental' patriarchs and sexually and mentally oppressed 'veiled' Muslim women, which have replaced the old orientalist fantasies of feminized pashas and eroticized harem playmates.

One can emphasize different aspects of orientalism: first the logic of Othering as Said did in concentrating on the imaginary orient of British and French colonial fantasy; second, one can stress the benefit gained by

the occidental hegemonic self through the procedures of orientalizing. In the last decennium, postcolonial theorists with Latin American background, such as the Venezuelan Fernando Coronil and the Argentine Walter Mignolo have criticized the concept of Orientalism as too limited, too territorial and too historically restricted (Coronil 1996; Mignolo 2000; Coronil 2002). They spoke instead of 'Occidentalism.' By introducing the term, they brought the critical force of orientalism up to date. By extending the notion and turning it around, they sharpened it, making clear that the subject of critical endeavor should not be the process of 'othering,' but rather the production of the occidental self. Fernando Coronil elaborates:

"Occidentalism, as I define it here, is not the reverse of Orientalism but the condition of its possibility [...] it is] an ensemble of representational practices which participates in the production of the construction of the world, which (1) separates the world's components into bounded units; (2) disaggregates their relational histories; (3) turn difference into hierarchy; (4) naturalize these representations, and thus (5) intervene, however unwittingly, in the reproduction of existing asymmetrical power relations." (Coronil 1996: 7f)

The intention of the critical move of Latin American postcolonial critics is to establish what Walter Mignolo calls "post-occidental reason" (Mignolo 2000), which also informs the title of Coronil's signature essay, "Beyond Occidentalism." Enrique Dussel stays in the same line of thinking with different vocabulary in "Beyond Eurocentrism" (Dussel 1998). In their view, the position of their thinking is not adequately described by notions of post-colonialism or post-orientalism (Lowe, 1991), since, according to Enrique Dussel, Eurocentrism is the only ethnocentrism that has succeeded in becoming universal through an "irrational praxis of violence" (Dussel 2000: 472). Authors like Mignolo are concerned to provide the critical endeavor with "subaltern knowledge" and "border-thinking" in "third epistemological space[s]" (cf. Mignolo 2000). This brand of postcolonial theory does not only stake a claim to a notion of reason beyond Occidentalism, but also rewrites the concept of modernity as 'multiple' (Eisenstadt 2002) or 'entangled' (Randeria 1999) modernities, hereby challenging European political theory, which regards modernity as occidental and unfulfilled (exemplified by Habermas' 'The Project of Modernity').<sup>[3]</sup>

## History of a Term

In 1995, the anthropologist James Carrier published an anthology called Occidentalism. Images of the West which approaches the topic from three vantage points: first, as a critical notion in the above developed sense in order to problematize presuppositions of Western anthropologists; second, as a description for the cultural mixture happening when elements of Western modernization are implemented in 'oriental' cultures. Third, the term Occidentalism could also be used for fantasies of the West in oriental (Arab, middle-eastern and far-eastern) imagination (cf. Carrier 1995). US-Americans Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit referred in 2004 to the third meaning with their pamphlet: *The West in the Eyes of its Enemies*, thereby analyzing a supposed anti-Western resentment of far-eastern (Chinese) and Arabic-Muslim societies. Such a reading of the ideological hostility of non-Western thinking toward was highly welcome in a post 9/11 occident.<sup>[4]</sup>

The following usage of the term Occidentalism does not endorse Buruma/Margalit's usage, but is attached to the postcolonial brand of Mignolo and Coronil. Critique of Occidentalism is related to epistemological enterprises of de-centering, such as Provincializing Europe (Chakrabarty 2000), Beyond Eurocentrism (Dussel 1998), Unthinking Eurocentrism (Shohat/Stam 1996). In contrast to Coronil and Mignolo, who deal with the substantial material after-effects of colonialism and the North/South axis, my claim to the notion of is motivated differently: on the one hand by the assumption of a new orient/occident binary in the wake

of Muslim immigration to post-war Europe along with the growth of the Muslim population, and on the other hand by the replacement of the East/West axis after the collapse of communism with an Orient/Occident axis in the wake of the 'Palestinian question,' the US and its allies' 'wars on terror and rogue states,' suicide-bombing, and the alleged hate preaching of Muslim clerics within Western societies.

## Migration, Xenophobia and Neo-Racism

European Occidentalism differs from one country to the next. A substantial contingent of immigrants to France, England, and the Netherlands is composed of former colonized peoples (from North Africa, Pakistan, Indonesia). They are subjected to varying regimes of migration: to secular laicism in France, separatist multiculturalism in the Netherlands (Michaelowski 2005), and diversity politics in England (Modood 2002). The respective peculiarities engendered different theorizations of late-modern racisms such as Étienne Balibar's 'neo-racism' (Balibar 1991) for France, Philomena Essed's *Everyday-Racism* (Essed 1995) in the Netherlands and Stuart Hall's 'cultural racism' for England (Hall 2000).

Former colonial powers define themselves often in patterns of paternalistic caretaking towards their former subjects. In contrast Austria – in denial of its Habsburg 'postcoloniality' – implements a strict migration regime depriving the children of immigrant of citizenship by the so-called blood-right (*ius sanguinis*). Following this pattern Germany declined any relation between national immigration politics and its colonial past<sup>[5]</sup> and executed the same restrictive citizenship-model as Austria until 2005, which left all immigrants (and their children and grandchildren) in the position of (legal) aliens or foreigners (*Ausländer*). As a consequence, in Germany racism against immigrants is called *Ausländerfeindlichkeit* (hostility towards foreigners).

There is ample research on the history of the political metaphor *Ausländerfeindlichkeit* and the migration regime supporting it (cf. Terkessides 2004; Bojadžijev 2007, Karakayali 2008). For a critical perspective on German Occidentalism it is interesting to look into the 'cultural work' that the notion of *Ausländerfeindlichkeit* is able to achieve. A foreigner is guessed as someone not born in the country, no matter, which passport she/he holds.<sup>[6]</sup> But having been born in the country implies likewise being German, which after the holocaust is a national affiliation seen with embarrassment. So discriminating against Non-Germans was one of the few means to reoccupy German-ness affectively.<sup>[7]</sup> Not only foreigners from far-away countries served as tools of national re-affirmation, but the 'other Germans' of the former GDR irritated as well because they perceived themselves as socialist and post-national and refused to take part in the paradigm of postfascist 'collective guilt' (*Kollektivschuld*). This is one of the reasons why the Cold War was so important for West-German identity formation. The idea of 'freedom and democracy' as the Federal Republic's own best property found its way into the repertoire of later anti-Muslim racism. It is fair to say that rights of personal freedom worked as the criterion for the appropriation of German-ness, which later brought Western 'emancipation/liberation' in position as countering the bondage of Muslim women.

But the question of religion was not always in the forefront. A German 'Culture of Domination' (*Dominanzkultur* cf. Rommelspacher 1995) classified the new arrivals at the beginning of immigration in the 1950s under labor contracts in the register of 'class' and facilitated the desire for occidental superiority with "ethnic coding of societal (sub) systems" (cf. Esser 2007: 313; q.v. *ethnische Unterschichtung* cf. Esser 2001). Early undercover investigative journalism into the situation of Turkish 'guestworkers'<sup>[8]</sup> in the steel industry (Wallraff 1985) emblemized the position in



which Germans wanted to see the migrants with the title *Ganz Unten* (engl. version "The Lowest of the Low" 2005).[9] Obvious racism assumed the shape of classism. Religious affiliation played only a marginal role in the conviction that Turkish people had to stay at the bottom of the workplace hierarchy. If the resentment was discussed in the register of race, people talked of 'prejudices.'

Meanwhile, other European countries indeed did identify the growing resentment against migrants as racism. In post-holocaust thinking conceptions of 'race' as a biological entity were neither feasible nor desirable. Étienne Balibar and others therefore spoke about 'racism without race' (cf. Balibar 1990: 28). Key features of the so-called cultural and/or differential neo-racism are supposedly unchangeable dissimilarities between occidental and 'other' people. Manuela Bojadžijev specifies: "Differentialism and culturalism denote two different things: While the latter indicates a discursive displacement from biologism, the former initiates a displacement from a racial hierarchy to societal segregation" (my transl. 2008: 23).

There was strong resistance in Germany to calling animosity and resentment towards immigrants 'racism.' The notion 'race' was to a large extent delegitimized after the holocaust. Furthermore, a special "postwar-taboo" (my transl. of *Nachkriegstabu*, Bielefeldt 1998: 12) prohibited recognizing any connection with racism, because the German liberal elite was convinced that they have learned their lesson in the process of 'coming to terms with the past' (*Vergangenheitsbewältigung*). As mentioned above, the notion of *Ausländerfeindlichkeit* re-organized the anti-immigrant neo-racism as an ethnicized understanding of citizenship (Kerner 2005: 232). With the displacement of *Ausländerfeindlichkeit* towards Turkish and Arabic 'guestworkers' from classist onto cultural racism, the common religion of the discriminated immigrant, the Muslim faith, suddenly moved into the center of concern. An 'Islamizing of migrants' (Schiffauer 2007: 117), as a shift from "ethnological to religious framing" of Turkish immigrants (Yildiz 2009: 466) unified considerable differences among different Muslim denominations (cf. Rumpf/Gerhard/Janssen: 2003) and reduced complex life-experiences into monolithic and enlightenment-averse religious devotion.[10]

Notions such as *Leitkultur* (leading culture),[11] 'community of values' (*Wertegemeinschaft*) and the return of long forgotten phrases such as the 'Christian occident' (*Christliches Abendland*) were brought into position against the supposed danger of losing one's cultural identity. As Levent Tezcan indicated: "[...] 'the debate over a German leading culture' is a reaction to the idea that multiculturalism has won. If this would be the case it brought up the question how power relations between 'cultures' will be sorted out in the future" (my transl. Tezcan 2008: 60). It is quite remarkable that – as a first in Germany – politicians now speak of the Jewish-Christian heritage. Chancellor Merkel has put the composite adjective prominently into an address to the 50th anniversary of the EU as then head of the council's board: "Europe is based upon common values and spiritual roots. The religious roots of our Jewish-Christian heritage are formative for our society" (my transl. Merkel 2003). For obvious reasons Germany has in the 20th century no tradition invoking Jewish heritage favorably. The reference to Jewish-Christian heritage tells us more about the exclusion of the third monotheism, the Islam, from the European 'community of values' – although Spanish Arabic philosophy, science, medicine and poetry is of course itself rooted in European soil – than about a new appreciation for and reevaluation of Jewish cultural achievements in Europe.[12] Together with Sigrid Nökel and Levant Tezcan, I would like to refer to the current fixation on a supposed 'oriental other' as 'Islamic complex' (*islamischer Komplex* cf. Nökel/Tezcan 2005: 10). The notion emphasizes the fact that neither a homogeneous Islam nor a monolithic Muslim civilization is presumed. The wording 'complex' moreover alludes to complexity and psychological inhibition.

## Occidentalism as Meta-Racism

Anti-Muslim racism as a variation of late-modern racisms developed with postcolonial migration out of the former colonies to England, France, Portugal, the Netherlands and, with a contract-labor force from Turkey, the Middle East and North Africa, in Germany. The phenomenon gained momentum as Muslim fundamentalism and terrorism became visible at home and abroad. By then, at the latest, the West became convinced along with Samuel Huntington that it was experiencing a 'clash with a civilization' which was not compatible with an occidental 'system of values.'

The trouble with cultural racisms is, that they are not easy to identify as racism, because they come along as apparently sound – and scientifically substantiated – judgments. The resentment towards 'foreigners' therefore often looks like a reasonable reaction to the presence of 'too many' foreigners, or, to put it differently, as an appropriate answer to the assumed dangerous resentments of native lowerclass citizens. Balibar terms this structure "Meta-Racism" (1990: 30). Social psychologist Mark Terkessides has documented this pattern of thinking with a poll by the EMNID Institute for Social Research. According to the study, one in three German citizens sympathized with "right-wing tendencies prompted by the problem of the foreigners" (my transl. Terkessidis 1991: 104). As stated by Terkessides, "enlightened holders of power positions" did not see themselves as racists but as neutral observers observing the effects 'too many foreigners' have on the lower class populace. This line of thinking is one of the main reasons why the fight against right-wing radicalism did not take the form of anti-racist education. Instead a more restrictive migration regime was installed to get rid of the 'causes' of *Ausländerfeindlichkeit*.

Such positions are assumed by writers of editorials, commissions of experts, law-makers, political consultants and think-tanks. Keeping this in mind, I would like to sharpen the notion of Occidentalism by calling it a 'meta-racism of elites.' It is characteristic for this kind of racism to deny its very existence. Educated elites see themselves as enlightened and in the German case as additionally purged through the mental processes of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*. The brand of Occidentalism developed here hides behind a 'competency to problematize'[13] or a 'knowledge system.' Occidental meta-racist self-perception denies that 'justifiable criticism' of Muslim fundamentalism could contain racist elements. Even though the UN and the 'European Monitoring Center of Racism and Xenophobia' (EUMC) qualified 'islamophobia' in 2002 as racism as "equally repellent and unwanted as antisemitism and other global discriminatory phenomena" (Allen 2004: 1), the German opinion-setting media reject its very existence. The conservative daily newspaper *Die Welt* declares: "what is this all about islamophobia? It is definitely not an anti-Muslim variation of antisemitism [...] it is] a stupid and empty category, invented to silence the discussion of the atrocities carried out in the name of Islam in recent years" (my transl.).[14]

Referring to this brand of argument, anthropologist Mattie Bunzl points to an interesting difference between contemporary islamophobia and the history of European anti-Semitism: "Islamophobes are not particularly worried, whether Muslims are good Germans, Danes, or Italians. Rather they question whether Muslims can be good Europeans. Islamophobia, in other words, functions less in the interest of national purification than as a means of fortifying Europe." (Bunzl 2005: 502)

## The Occidental Gender-Pact

Whenever the 'order of values' (*Werteordnung*) or the *Leitkultur* is discussed, the emancipation/liberation of Western women always takes center stage. In occidental discourse gender-relations especially the women's question – are not subsidiary contradictions, as Marxism used to see it, but its signature. One of

the more obvious reasons is that political discourse after the 'iconic-' or 'visual turn' works mainly via visual representations in the media. As a consequence, the veiled or (headscarf-) covered women becomes a main signifier of 'Otherness.' But it is only possible to scandalize covering/veiling when being uncovered functions as the cultural norm. Chafiq Chaglah und Farhad Khosrokhavar therefore identify 'open' occidental and 'covered' oriental gender-systems (as cited by Scott 2007: 154). Jennifer Fluri speaks of a "naked veil." [15] Therefore, revealing and concealing are seen as two different regimes of visibility. However, for the occidental gaze, only concealment is visible. The headscarf forms of veiling become the master metaphor for women's oppression. The freedom of occidental women to uncover now becomes staged before the backdrop of covered orientality.[16]

The freedom of women is an empty category if not filled with equality. This brings us to a central hinge of occidental discourse and its fixation on the headscarf: the women's question poses one of the greatest challenges to the promise of equality in the Western mindset because democracy, equal opportunity, and justice are seen as benchmarks for occidental superiority. Over 200 years after Cartesian feminism ('the mind has no sex'), over 160 years after the first women's rights movement (1848 Declaration of Sentiments in Seneca Falls, USA), and just under 100 years after winning suffrage, women earn less, are tied to childrearing and the care for the elderly by a gender-related division of labor, lose significant career opportunities by performing family duties and finally enjoy a shorter half-life than men because their exchange value depends more and more on sexual attractiveness and youth due to the growing importance of the visual.

This argument seems easy to counter because – if one excludes the short heyday of radical feminism in the 1970s and 1980s – there is no new wave of women's resistance and protest in sight. As a reason for this, a structure comes into play that I would like to call the 'occidental dividend.' In the phrasing of Robert Connell (1995), sexually, socially, or ethnically underprivileged men profit from 'patriarchal dividends,' because they feel entitled to wield power over women in general and 'their' women in particular, even if they are positioned deep down in the masculine hierarchy. White women can likewise benefit from an occidental dividend in contrast to neo-orientalized 'Others' (male or female).[17] Contrary to 'oriental' women, occidental women are able to imagine themselves as free – at least in the choice of male mates –, to feel themselves as sexual beings, and they are allowed to show off sexual assets. One side of enlightenment discourse is thereby represented, namely its demand for transparency and visibility. As an embodied deficit of women's emancipation, the figure of the 'headscarf-woman' is evocative of the incompleteness of occidental women's liberation. Social psychologist Birgit Rommelspacher argues that the larger the gulf between pretence and reality the bigger the desire to prove one's own progressiveness via a forced rhetoric of 'emancipation' and liberation (cf. Rommelspacher 2002).

The discourse of *Leitkultur* claims that women's emancipation has already been achieved. But in the tradition of the enlightenment, freedom of women is seen more as a property of the self, meaning the right to speak in public, the freedom of contract, and the right to divorce and access to abortion. Given that these rights are mostly granted, the male part of the contract considers himself as having granted all possible rights. Luckily, these rights do not compromise the conventional male entitlement to female surplus labour at home. Just the opposite: the ostentatious talk about the freedom of Western women makes male privilege vanish. This explains why very conservative politicians have lately become so enthusiastic about women's emancipation. Any allegation of sexism can be denied and transferred to the 'oriental patriarch.' Accordingly, Margret Jäger calls this neo-orientalist pattern 'ethnicizing of sexism' (cf. Jäger: 1996).



This matrix of male dominance, sexism and racialization produces something I want to call the 'occidental gender pact.' By stigmatizing 'oriental woman' as oppressed, suddenly women's liberation – in the new millennium mostly seen as a quite dated discourse – becomes sexy again and acknowledged as necessary. However, the second step is taken before the first, not on material grounds but only on male recognition that emancipation/liberation of (oriental) women is truly right and necessary. Thus, occidental women are staged performatively as already emancipated/liberated. This development not only makes Western sex-gender systems into a pivotal sign of enlightenment but into a benchmark of the occident itself. The 'Orient' hereby gains an epistemological status. Queer cultural theorist Sara Ahmed highlights the etymological connection of 'Orient' and 'Orientation.' Quoting the philosopher Edward Casey – writes: "To orient after all is to orientate to something other than that which does the orienting itself" (quoted in Ahmed 2006, 115) – Ahmed concludes "the occident coheres as that which we are organized around through the very direction of our gaze toward the Orient" (ibid. 116, emphasized by Ahmed).

The articulation of any remaining female discontent had been left to the aging representatives of second-wave feminism and their periodicals – in Germany EMMA. They took the chance to give their allegedly outdated rhetoric a modern face. This brings us, so to speak, to the superstructure of the occidental gender-pact (or compromise): German mainstream feminism, aka the influential figure of Alice Schwarzer, has become an opinion leader in criticizing so-called oriental patriarchy (cf. Marx: 2006) suppressing their women. Neo Orientalist Othering is here masked/disguised as solidarity with oppressed 'oriental' sisters.[18]

In doing so, alliances form between occidental emancipation/liberation discourses (of oriental women) and migration regimes of the state. Feminists in Germany even started an initiative to support the legal expulsion of 'oriental patriarchs' – who have forced their daughter against their will under the veil, in marriages, or injured them with disciplinary practices – by withdrawing permits of residency. Given these developments, it is absolutely misleading to bemoan with subdued voice the 'errors' of feminists, who – carried away by sisterly solidarity – have overlooked being instrumentalized by conservative governments. Just the opposite is true: the fact of having been asked for expertise in female oppression by 'the state' is understood as victory, as having finally achieved a central demand of the movement.

The occidental gender-pact however works as 'asymmetric compromise' (cf. Karakayalı 2008: 249). The flipside of the process outlined above is that organized mainstream feminism loses clout/ground towards the uncompleted emancipation at home. The cultural gain in hegemony does not cancel out occidental patriarchy. Feminist Occidentalism is only a good deal for occidental men, because it makes domestic women's questions vanish. Or, to put it differently: the occidental genderpact is a peace treaty between the protagonists of an unfinished revolution and the occidental sex-gender-system at the expense of Muslim women. Epitomized by the headscarf this generalized figure works as condensation in psychoanalytical sense or as a collective symbol (cf. Schiffer 2005: 25; cited from Braun/Mathes 2008: 365). One could say as well, that the headscarf-woman is an apotropaic sign of felt but not acknowledged Western deficits in women's emancipation/liberation.

## The Neo-Muslim Woman as a figure of Cultural Criticism

Asymmetric compromises do not add up smoothly. They get caught up in contradictions and wayward figurations. For instance, occidental men envy the imagined 'oriental patriarchs' their mostly unchallenged ruling power in the microsphere of their families. Oc-

cidental and oriental sex-gender-systems act quite differently in situations of family conflict. The 'oriental' patriarch does not shy away from arguing with honour and tradition when feeling forced to reinstall the proper order of gender in his family. The male beneficiary of the occidental sex-gender system, on the contrary, has forfeited the ideological framework in matters of authority. His inner feelings of entitlement are very often channelled into 'direct action'; looking at the brief notices in the crime-sections of newspapers, one finds quite often stories of Western husbands/boyfriends, who – threatened by unwanted separation, divorce or loss of fortune – snuff out the life of whole families together with kids, parents, and in-laws.[19] There exists no name/notion for this statistically quite frequent occidental crime. By way of contrast, allegedly typical oriental 'honour killings' are flooding the news and are used as "boundary drawing" devices between enlightened occidental women and oppressed oriental ones (cf. Kartweg/ Yurdacul 2008). We see here a clear example of the 'silent norm' discussed earlier: a hegemonic pattern cannot be named. But as an ethnically coded deviation a quite similar crime is nameable. A heterodox Austrian feminist recently coined the notion 'Amok-Väter' (fathers on a killing-spree) for this violent kind of self-affirmation by occidental patriarchs feeling disenfranchised (cf. Gregor 2005).

As argued above, however, the most provoking sign is the figure of the headscarf-wearing woman. Occidental perception is irritated because it is impossible to decide whether she is wearing it voluntarily or not. In order to reduce the irritating complexity, all Muslim women living in Germany and wearing headscarves are simply denied agency. A considerable amount of research argues against this generalization, research on teachers of the Muslim faith living in Germany (cf. Jonker 2003), on Turkish Sunni women from the second generation of immigrants (cf. Klinkhammer 2000), and on headscarf-wearing graduate students (cf. Karakaşoğlu 2003; Nökel 2002; Amir-Moazami 2005). They report unanimously on the voluntary covering of well educated young women who are negotiating the triangle of family, host-nation, and self-affirmation. The researchers talk about the headscarf as a 'protected model of self-realization' or as a sign-system for an unorganized "lower-class female emancipation movement" (Nökel 2005: 189). This denial of agency was becoming preposterous in the case of Fereshta Ludin. Although the Afghan schoolteacher has carried her fight for the right to wear a headscarf in class through five legal stages, the minister of culture in the state of Württemberg stated that her desire to cover was not only a religious symbol but political as well, being a sign for the oppression of women and for Islamist fundamentalism.

With Muslim women insisting on wearing the headscarf of their own free will, a completely new figuration enters the social stage, namely the Neo-Muslima (German term for self-conscious devout young Muslim women) as an agent of cultural criticism. Sigrid Nökel sums up the results of her qualitative research on neo-Muslim women in Germany:

"[new Muslim femininity] is directed against the concept of traditional femininity as well as against the definition of 'superior femininity,' which is how modern German women see themselves, supposedly connecting universalism with the promise of equality, but in fact demanding submission and disavowal of authenticity." (my transl. Nökel 1999: 189)

Such disconcerting insights are not only privileged knowledge in academia. Popular television also circulates this kind of message in intelligent sitcom formats. The successful post-identitarian series *Türkisch für Anfänger* (Turkish for Beginners) about a German-Turkish patchwork family features the voluntarily headscarved, thirteen-year-old, neo-Muslim woman Yağmur. She is pictured as an authority for family values. She debunks anti-authoritarian education as neglect, blames parents' resistance to setting rules as a cardinal sin against the development of a child's character, and damns leni-

ency concerning excesses such as teenage sexuality and drug-habits as behaviour that actively endangers the spiritual and physical health of minors. Yağmur tells her new German patchwork sister that her New Age mother can hardly love her if she is exposing her to that much endangerment. After a disastrous drinking spree with a terrible hangover, the sister then asks her Western mother for 'rules' to prove her love. (She got a list of rules. Her obedience did not last long, but she had learned her lesson.)

The Neo-Muslima is to a certain extent the personified critique of the growing sexualisation and objectivation of female bodies after the 'visual turn' in the internet and other visual media. Seen through this lens, devout Muslim women possess themselves and safeguard their bodies with acumen. Accordingly, Charles Hirschkind and Saba Mamood ask: "Can our bras, ties, pants, miniskirts, underwear and bathing suits all be so easily arrayed on one side or another of the divide between freedom and captivity?" (Hirschkind/Mamood 2002: 353). And Nivedita Menon comments on veiled experience: "I used to go to the beauty parlour regularly [...] but now I don't have to bother about my face. [...] It can be liberatory [...] you can go where ever you want to go" (Menon 2005: 209).

## Three Modes of 'Male Domination'[20]

The refusal of being looked at does not only provoke occidental femininity, which is defined more and more via the short-lived 'power of attractiveness' (see the German term *Attraktivitätsmacht*, Mühlen-Achs 1998: 272). The impossibility of touching Muslim women attired in decent clothing disturbs the cultural logic of sexual appropriation that men of 'superior' populations feel traditionally entitled to claim toward the women of 'inferior' populations. This common phenomenon might happen along various axes of difference. For a long time this male habit was a privilege of class and caste in the Western world: the seigneur exercising the 'right' of *ius primae noctis*, the master raping slave women, and the bourgeois pater familias coercing the maids sexually, thereby being sure that the misdemeanour is seen as a peccadillo.

Taking sexual possession of the Other's women is crucial for the subordination of ethnic minorities. This behaviour is a kind of language used to humiliate men of subordinated ethnic groups. One has only to bring to mind systematic rapes in wars or the way the Western media enthused about the 'unveiling' of Afghan women. Media-coverage very often depicted women shedding burqas in tandem with images of defeated Taliban men, showing that they have lost the property of their women.[21] If veiling of minority women stays uncontested, it counteracts the ethnic male domination achieved by taking the women of the subordinated (or defeated) ethnic group into possession.[22] This kind of male domination cannot be carried out with covered women because it would make the appropriation obvious as a violation. So the habit is transferred into domestic prostitution with 'other' women, mailorder brides from countries with more distinct gender-hierarchies, and most notably sex-tourism to Mexico, Thailand, West-Africa, the Caribbean and Bali. The double-standard in judging the supposedly typical sexual misconduct of the 'Islamic Complex' (forced marriages and honour killings) and overlooking the equally typical sexual misconduct of the West (patriarchal killing-sprees, mail-order brides, forced prostitution, and sex tourism) is one of the most significant currencies of Occidentalism.

A second mode of male domination I want to call panoptic male domination. This refers to Foucault's notion of 'panopticism' as a technique of control derived from the prison-guard's power in the inner watch-tower, the power of being able to see without being seen. On the side of the monitored inmates this kind of surveillance leads to self-control and subjectivation (cf. Foucault 1977: 251ff.) Feminist theory has made ample use of

the concept, especially in the critique of the female 'beauty mystique' as a form of subjectivation enforced by a panoptic male gaze (cf. Bartky 1991; Degele 2004). Sandra Bartky speaks of the male gazer as "panoptical male connoisseur" (Ibid.: 51). Panoptic male domination effect a visual regime or an imperative of visibility towards all women, as psychoanalytic film theory has widely demonstrated. Radical feminism of the 1970s ganged up on the male gaze and fended it off with desexualized clothing-styles such as bib overalls. The covered 'oriental' woman does not only work as a program warding off the male gaze, but she literally deflects the gaze, prompting the sender to realize the imposition of his visual appropriation. This applies as well for male immigrants, who profit, as mentioned above, by the patriarchal dividend. Gritt Klinkhammer quotes in an interview how the female student Hatiche experiences the reaction to her headscarf in a German university library:

"It is a form of liberation for me. I can breathe freely and will be treated differently. It is quite interesting, how Palestinians, Arabs and Turks behave towards a veiled woman. [...] The faithful behave the same with all women. But it is very interesting to see how the (laughing) half-faithful behave. Some devour other women with their gazes and when I am coming along they do not dare to cast their eyes on me." (my transl., quoted in Klinkhammer 2003: 263)

While the first two of the above-mentioned modes of male domination, the ethnic male domination and the panoptic male domination, are counteracted by veiling, a third discourse – in a way crossing/queering the two others – compensates for the loss: the discourse of occidental male domination. Interestingly enough, this brand of male domination does not construct itself by appropriation (ethnic domination) or by voyeurism (panoptic domination), but in the assertion that cultural superiority would consist in providing freedom for women. This special discourse of granting women's emancipation needs the 'oriental patriarch' in order to stage itself as enlightened.

The presence of mainstream feminism in cultural wars against the headscarf is very helpful for occidental male domination, because traditional feminists, as certified adversaries of male domination in general, bear testimony to the catharsis and redemption of occidental sex-gender systems. The embedding of Western emancipation/liberation-movements into the occidental project (cf. Hunt 2006) appeases furthermore the fundamental opposition to male domination and organizes complicity by the 'ethnicizing of sexism' previously mentioned. Christine Delphy writes with regard to the French veiling debates and similar strands of the ethnicizing of sexism: "Does our society not thereby prove that sexism is not tolerated? – If sexism is the 'difference' marking the 'other,' is then the absence of sexism in 'our' society the proof for the foreignness of the sexist?" (Delphy quoted by Scott 2007: 173).

## Occidentalism and 'Homonationalism'

Occidentalism does not only generate the fiction of liberated women and liberal men who provide freedom and rights, but also claims a special brand of enlightened relationship to homosexuality. In addition to women's liberation, the tolerance of homosexuality is assessed as an ultimate proof of European superiority. The corresponding German discourse still betrays the effort involved in making the claim, because homosexuality has been completely legal only in the last 15 years. 'Gay marriage' has only been in place since 2001 (after a bitter fight stopping just short of the Supreme Court). The newness of the anti-discrimination legislation concerning homosexuality did not preclude making the tolerance of homosexuality a major imperative for granting German citizenship. Standardized questionnaires (mandatory in the German state Württemberg) scan possible homophobias

of potential citizens in order to deprive Muslims of naturalization. One of the questions in the so-called 'Muslim-questionnaires' (Muslimfragebögen) says 'imagine that your adult son approaches you declaring that he is gay and planning to live together with a man. How would you react?' [23] Queer theorist Jasbir K. Puar calls this development of co-opting homosexuals and homosexuality in the service of national discourse 'Homonationalism.' In the US she sees a "dual movement in which certain homosexual U.S. constituencies have embraced U.S. national agendas and have also been embraced by national agendas" (2007, xxiv, my emphasis).

Homonationalism develops against the backdrop of neo-orientalism (in the old colonialist orientalist discourse, masculinity was seen as much more ambivalent, partly feminized and open for sexual ambiguity). The 'dual movement' Puar has identified for the US has afflicted parts of the gay and lesbian community in Germany as well. This becomes apparent in the figure of the 'homophobic (Muslim) migrant.' While discourses of naturalization pretend to protect the occidental consensus on tolerance, the case is different for the homosexual community. In their view the 'homophobic immigrant' is a figure prone to violence and ideologically/ religiously motivated gay-bashing.

Jin Haritaworn illustrates the power of the discursive figure with reactions to a gay-bashing incident against drag-kings at a queer festival in Berlin. Haritaworn identifies a moral panic, culminating in a 'Smash Homophobia' demonstration attended by over a thousand mostly white people:

"These representations are full of ambivalence not only regarding migration but also and especially sexual- and gender-nonconformity. The presence of 'homophobic migrants' helps maintaining Western exceptionalism. Their alleged 'hate' relativizes 'our' ambivalence concerning 'other' intimacies, whose vulnerability forces 'us' into action. The hyper-violence of 'immigrants' effects the imagination of a new public sphere, which 'protects' queer intimacies and bodies." (my transl. 60)

Similar to the previously analyzed occidentalizing of important parts of mainstream feminism, one can see that a neo-liberal re-evaluation of homosexual difference[24] moves the formerly marginalized position 'queer' along the axes of whiteness and occidentality. Sara Ahmed made an interesting argument which does apply to the construction of the figure of the 'homophobic migrant' by homonationalist gay activists. In *Cultural Politics of Emotion* she closely aligns love and fear and put both emotions in a paradoxical relationship: "[...] fear does not involve the defence of borders that already exist; rather than fear makes those borders, by establishing objects from which the subject, in fearing, can flee" (Ahmed 2004, 67).

Ahmed argues with Freud's Fort Da game, where the child symbolically tries to overcome the absence of the mother by throwing away and getting back objects. Here fear is displayed by the child to master the "impossibility of her love" (ibid.):

"[...] the turning away from the object of fear also involves the turning towards the object of love, who becomes a defence against the death that is apparently threatened by the object of fear [...] Rather than fear getting in the way of love, we can see that fear allow the subject to get closer to the loved object." (ibid. 68)

Homonationalism then can be seen as effort to conquer/win the 'love' of heteronormative mainstream society by presenting an object of fear in order to get protected.

Just as one can speak of an ethnicizing/(neo)-orientalizing of sexism, one can also speak under certain circumstances of an ethnicizing/(neo)-orientalizing of homophobia. This development makes fractions of white

women and parts of the gay/ lesbian community into vanguards of current cultural wars. The price for the inclusion is a kind of 'double addressing' (Engel 2009, 108). On the one hand the recently privileged embody society's gain in tolerance on the other hand they are expected to function as 'border police' by reporting, criticizing and emotionalizing sexist and homophobic incidents by non-occidental perpetrators. Lisa Duggan calls this development "Homonormativity" (Duggan 2002).

The last four sections – on the occidental gender-pact, the three modes of male domination, the figure of the Neo-Muslima and on homonationalism have demonstrated that a critique of Occidentalism is not only an additional 'axis of difference' beneficial for the analysis of gender-relations but a genuine part of hegemonic(self)-criticism (Dietze 2008b) and intersectional analysis. The critique of Occidentalism allows reading figures of 'progressive' occidental femininity, masculinity, and 'tolerated' sexual difference through the lens of orientalist Otherness. This kind of reading does not provide all-encompassing genealogies for current gender-issues, but it highlights the crucial function of gender-relations for the production of ethnic/white/Eurocentric hegemony.

## Critique of Occidentalism as 'corrective methodology'

Up to this point, I have resorted to various critical theories such as postcolonial-, critical migration-, critical whiteness-, and critical race theory, to political theory in the tradition of discourse analysis and/or neo-Marxism and above all to deconstructive feminism, gender studies and queer theory. In summing up the findings of this essay it seems appropriate to consider whether the perspective 'critique of Occidentalism' (or 'Critical Occidentalism') offers an additional dimension of insight not provided by other critical theories. Here I would like to refer to the notion of 'corrective methodology,' which I developed in another context together with Elahe Haschemi Yekani and Beatrice Michaelis (cf. Dietze/Haschemi/Michaelis 2008: 136ff., engl. version forthcoming with Haschemi/Michaelis/Dietze 2010). The notion answered the dilemma that theories of intersectionality very often do not reflect heteronormativity and sexuality, and that queer theory only very recently occupied itself with intersectionality in the research-fields Queer of Color, Queer of Diaspora and Queer of Class. In trying to make the paradigms of intersectionality and queer theory mutually productive, it turned out very quickly that the areas where useful statements could be made were scarce. Efforts to synthesize intersectional and queer thinking led to weak results with minor explanatory power. However critique from the one perspective pointing to the shortcomings of the respective paradigm did not only specify answers but led to new questions as well.[25] Thus, employing critical perspectives such as the critique of Occidentalism as corrective methodology means understanding categorical differences not as borders to be policed but as enriching differentiation.[26] In this sense the critique of Occidentalism is not a corrective method, because it is only a variation of deconstructive practices such as the de-centring of ethno- or phallogocentrism or heteronormativity. But the critique of Occidentalism is a corrective perspective drawing attention to the production of postcolonial and globalized hegemony. Or to put it differently, by freely making use of Spivak's 'strategic essentialism,' the critique of Occidentalism works as "strategic categorialism" (Dietze/Haschemi/Michaelis 2008: 138) which puts the category 'occident' in the centre in order to highlight historically new and specific patterns of discrimination.

Critique of Occidentalism shares with other critical moves against centrisms (such as andro-, ethno-, Euro-centrism) the fallacy of binarism, namely the tendency to unify and homogenize the Other by analyzing its constructedness. This danger is kept in check by theorists who argue from a perspective of 'multiplicity' (Hardt/Negri 2004). Manuela Bojadžijev asks in



the Die windige Internationale for a "relational theory of racism, which reads (economic) cycles of racisms together with the history of social struggle (ibid. 2007: 14).[27] Inderpal Grewal and Karen Caplan suggest splitting the notion of hegemony temporally and personally, and they speak of Scattered Hegemonies (cf. Grewal/Caplan 1997). Nivedita Menon advises Western Feminism of the fact that veiled women appreciate neither the stigmatizing of minority costumes nor the multicultural 'tolerance' for a supposedly immutable 'others.' Instead she pleads for a "greater fracturing of universalism" (Menon 2005: 255).

Critique of Occidentalism works as perspectivation, making visible the function of a neo-orientalised 'constitutive Other' for a re-arrangement of European identity as occidental. In this process Muslim immigrants become boundary-marking objects. The marking happens mostly via gender-relations, or to put it differently, via non-occidental sex-gender systems. They are contrasted with occidental success in the liberation of women and sexual minorities. A critical mass of white Feminists and queer activists – formerly feeling marginalized – happily exchange their discontent concerning the remaining sexism and heteronormativities for an 'occidental dividend.' However, if one turns the search lights onto this occidental gender-pact, one can detect one of the best kept secrets of the liberated occident: its likewise asymmetric sex-gender system.

By remaining fixated on the metaphor of the headscarf woman as a visible sign of a hierarchic sex-gender system, the asymmetric distribution of power in one's own sex-gender system stays invisible. The panoptic mode of male domination is hereby enforced. This matrix contains silent beauty for the white male heterosexual contracting party of the occidental gender-pact: the dispositive of revealment/develling facilitates a continuous objectification/reification of the female body. The female 'object of his desire' revels in her short-lived attractiveness misconceived as power. For feminists and – under different conditions – queer people, critique of Occidentalism is not only an ethical/moral imperative but also an analytic tool for the deconstruction of occidental and heteronormative sex-gender systems in general.

NOTE: This article is an abridged and revised translation of the essay "Okzidentalismuskritik. Grenze und Möglichkeiten einer Forschungsperspektivierung" in *Kritik des Okzidentalismus. Transdisziplinäre Beiträge zu (Neo)-Orientalismus und Geschlecht*, Gabriele Dietze, Claudia Brunner, Edith Wenzel, eds., transcript, Bielefeld, 2009. For productive challenge and criticism I have to thank Manuela Boatcă, Christina von Braun, Sabine Broeck, Claudia Brunner, Rey Chow, Sergio Costa, Fernando Coronil, Inderpal Grewal, Elahe Hachemi Yekani, Antje Hornscheidt, the research colloquium of ICI – in particular Christoph Holzhey, Luca di Blasi, Antke Engel, James Redfield und Kyung-Ho Cha – Nanna Heidenreich, Carsten Junker, Ina Kerner, Sara Lewis, Beatrice Michaelis, the students of the seminars "Kritischer Okzidentalismus" at Humboldt Universität 2005, Katharina Walgenbach and Edith Wenzel.

#### FOOTNOTES

[1] The complete quotation says: "The part of the world situated to the west of some recognized region; spec. the countries, civilization, or culture of the West. Originally with reference to Western Christendom or the Western Roman Empire, or to Europe as opposed to Asia and the Orient; now usually with reference to Europe and America as opposed to Asia and the Orient, or occas. to America or the Western hemisphere as opposed to the Old World." (Oxford English Dictionary, Draft Revision March 2009.).

[2] Compare the usage of 'silent norm' in *Critical Whiteness Theory* as employed by Marilyn Frye 1983.

[3] Crouze Venn used 2001 the notion 'Occidentalism' in order to criticize Western philosophy as Eurocentric.

[4] The Iranian Mohamed Tavokoli Targhi refers 2000 in *Refashioning Iran: Orientalism, Occidentalism and Historiography to Occidentalism*, in order to point to the suppression of Iranian contributions to the description of the orient in European historical science. The Chinese Xiaomei Chen

in contrast uses the notion Occidentalism to discuss positive influences of the West for the democracy in China in: *Occidentalism A Theory of Counter-Discourse in Post-Mao China*. Most recently the Swiss critic of globalization Jean Ziegler took up the notion occident in his 2008 book *La Haine de L'Occident* in order to point to the 'hate' of the Third World towards the speculation with commodity futures exchange on basic food supplies.

[5] Kien-Nghie Ha challenges this discourse in his article "Deutsche Integrationspolitik als koloniale Praxis" in (Dietze/Brunner/Wenzel 2009: 137-151).

[6] The withholding of 'emotional citizenship' (Dietze 2008a) applies as well to persons, who do not 'look' German, for instance AfroGermans, regardless of origin. Sara Ahmed has brilliantly described this reference to the epidermal schema of blackness as a racist conflation of 'like ness' with inheritance (Ahmed 2006, 123).

[7] Étienne Balibar indicates that no nation has a 'pure' ethnic base and instead "fictitious ethnicities" are invented (1990: 15). He identifies constructions of exaggerated nationhood as 'Franco-Frenchmen' or 'English Englishmen.' (cf. 76). Kanak Attak, the anti-neoliberalism intervention group, uses for a similar German phenomenon the notion 'biodeutsch' (bio-German) (vgl. Heidenreich 2006).

[8] Guest-worker (Gastarbeiter) is an early euphemism in the history of labor immigration, pretending these 'guests' will leave eventually.

[9] Cf. the chapter "Günter Wallraff, The Lowest of the Low" (Pilger 2005 :158-174.).

[10] Bielefeldt distinguishes two binaries constitutive for European constructions of 'Islam': secularity versus tradition and 'civilized' Christianity versus 'barbaric' Islam (cf. Bielefeldt 2005).

[11] This notion Leitkultur was coined by Bassam Tibi in 1998 in the book *Europa ohne Identität. Leitkultur und Wertebeleblichkeit*. The coinage was taken up by the CDU politician Friedrich Merz 2000 as "freiheitliche deutsche Leitkultur", arguing against multiculturalism and so called parallel-societies.

[12] In the US, speaking of 'Judeo-Christian heritage' is quite common and gained currency long before 9/11. In contrast to Germany this development does not so much echo an occidentalizing of Jewishness as a whitening and de-racialization juxtaposed to racialized understandings of Blackness (cf. Goldstein 2007).

[13] Philomena Essed 1991 points in *Understanding of Everyday Racisms* (1991) to the fact, that 'discourses of problematization' of elites about 'understandable difficulties' have a central function in late-modern racism (ibid.:10).

[14] <http://www.welt.de/weblogs/4881boess+in+bein/77412/was+ist+islamophobie,4.5.2009>.

[15] See the lecture at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 6.21.2006: "The Naked Veil and the Retro-Modern Other", unpublished manuscript, quoted in (Braun/Mathes 2007, 295).

[16] Excellent examples for the extensive literature on veiling see in Yegenoglu 1996, Braun/Mathes 2007, and most recently Heath 2008.

[17] As early as 1993 Helma Lutz has identified German occidentalist resentment towards Muslimimmigrant women as 'Orientalism.' A female dividend of male white/occidental hegemony applies to various contexts: see also women in Fascism (Christina Thürmer-Rohr 1988), wives of British settler colonialists in Africa (McClintock 1995), and white women in German colonies (Mamozai 1982; Walgenbach 2005; Dietrich 2007).

[18] Cf. for similar American moves see Robin Morgan's 'global sisterhood' discussed critically in Dietze 2006b and Hunt 2006.

[19] Under the title "Why do we keep calm when fathers murder" at the Berliner Morgenpost March 22nd, 2009, the editorial writer Leinemann puts together a "Daddy-killing-spreelist" for the year 2009 and counts 12 murdered wives, kids, family members of Amok Daddies: [http://www.morgenpost.de/kolumne/leinemann/article1059465/Warum\\_schweigen\\_wir\\_wenn\\_Vaeter\\_morden.html](http://www.morgenpost.de/kolumne/leinemann/article1059465/Warum_schweigen_wir_wenn_Vaeter_morden.html), 18.4.2009.

[20] The following refers to Pierre Bourdieu's 1998 *La Domination Masculine* (cf. engl. Transl Bourdieu 2001). Bourdieu sees masculine as well as feminine gender-positions as very stable and speaks therefore of habit(us) inscribed in the social body. Taking on the form of 'doxa' habit(us) can only be changed by a complete revolution of the belief system.

[21] See the interesting investigation on the visual politics of the Afghan veil prior to de-veiling after the post 9/11 occupation/liberation, demonstrating that the sign-system 'veil' is open to all kinds of politicization via the female body as a collective symbol. 1985 National Geographic had published a foto-image known as 'the Afghan girl' showing a young distraught refugee woman, displaced by the Russian occupation. The image was meant to criticize the Soviet rule. 2001 National Geographic conducted a search for 'the Afghan girl' and found her – now named as Sharbat Gula. Clad in a burqa she displayed the old picture next to her now veiled face.

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**Margarita Padilla** – IT inženjer i nekadašnja direktorka magazina Mundo Linux, Španija. Jedna je od malobrojnih žena koje mogu da stvore i održavaju sisteme. Naučila je GNU/Linux i društvenu i političku upotrebu novih tehnologija u skvotiranim društvenim centrima. Nešto što nije mogla da nauči na fakultetu. Zajedno sa drugim hakerima osnovala je Sindominio.net.

Margarita Padilla – IT engineer and former director of the magazine Mundo Linux, Spain. Padilla is one of that small minority of women who can create and maintain systems. She learnt GNU/Linux and social and political uses of new technology in squatted social centers. Something she wasn't taught at university. Together with other hackers she founded Sindominio.net.

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**de/re/konstrukcija:**

prostor/vreme/sećanje

**de/re/construction:**

space/time/memories







